

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_150030

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 295/D23 M.

Accession No. 6558

Author Dastur M. N.

Title Moral & ethical ——— zarathush

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

THE MORAL AND ETHICAL TEACHINGS
OF
ZARATHÛSHTRA

(THE BOMBAY UNIVERSITY SIR JAMSETJEE
JEJEEBHOY, THIRD BARONET,
PRIZE ESSAY)

BY
MANECKSHAW NAVROJI DASTUR, M.A.
1912.

BOMBAY:

PRINTED AT THE BRITISH INDIA PRESS, MAZGAON, AND PUBLISHED BY
MR. F. M. DASTUR, REGISTRAR, THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY.

1928.

FOREWORD.

It is with great pleasure that I write these few words to introduce this learned prize-essay to the reading public, because I had an humble hand in the preliminary arrangements for the use of the fund collected to commemorate the name of Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, Third Baronet, C.S.I., who died on 17th July 1898 at the age of 47. The University of Bombay has several memorial funds out of which competitive prize-essays are asked but the annual proceeds of all the funds are not sufficient to enable the University to ask for prize-essays on larger and broader subjects requiring deep study and research, and to publish them. So, the following thoughts occurred to me to strike a new line in the matter of this fund.

- (a) The interest of the fund may be allowed to accumulate for a number of years, so that, instead of having small essays every year or every two years, essays of deeper study and research may be asked every seven or ten years.
- (b) The competition for such essays of research on larger subjects may be open to all Universities—Universities of the East and Universities of the West—so that this broader field of competition may bring the University of Bombay and its studies into closer contact with the Universities and Scholars of the West. I am glad to see, from this point of view, that the Bombay University is now occasionally calling Professors from the West to deliver series of lectures before its students.
- (c) Such big prize-essays should pass through a closer scrutiny of the Examiners, and so, to secure good examiners, they must be pretty well paid.
- (d) Such successful prize-essays should be published.

With the consent of some leading members of the Memorial movement, I consulted on the subject the Hon. Mr. Justice Candy, the then Vice-Chancellor and he kindly agreed with me.

As this is the first Essay to be published from the Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy III Baronet Memorial Fund, I give below the letter, dated 15th February 1901, from the late Mr. Bomonji Dinshaw Petit, Chairman of the Sub-Committee appointed by

the subscribers of the Memorial Fund, and the resolution of the Senate, dated 25th January 1902 accepting the offer, and announcing Regulations for the Prize.

This essay was submitted for examination to Shams-ul-Ulma Dastur (now Dr.) Darabjee Peshotan Sanjana, B.A., and Dr. Maneckji Bomonji Davar, M.A., Ph.D. and they declared it worthy of the prize. The Essay was returned to the author to make some alterations and annotations as suggested by the Examiners. It seems that, owing to some other literary work in hand, the author could not attend to this matter. He then died, on 28th September 1920 and so the essay remained unpublished.

I had some correspondence with the University in this matter about three years ago. Then, attention being again drawn to the matter, I placed the matter before the Committee of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute and they kindly accepted my suggestion to publish it. On opening correspondence with the University, the Syndicate kindly resolved to publish the Essay as a University publication and I beg to thank the Syndicate for it.

As to the author, Mr. Maneckshaw Nowroji Dastur, in his sad death at a young age, the Parsee community has lost one who promised to be a brilliant scholar. He was born at Naosari on 7th April 1884 and studied there at the Sir Cawasjee Jehangir Madressa from which he passed his Matriculation in 1901. He took his B.A. degree in 1905 with Avesta Pahlavi as the Second Language. He took his M.A. degree in 1907. He studied Iranian languages at the Sir Jamseljee Jeejeebhoy Zarthoshti Madressa for six years from 1902 to 1907. He was a quite unostentatious scholar of an uncommonly retiring disposition. He had also won a prize of Rs. 500 for a Dissertation on Sir Oliver Lodge's "Substance of Faith."

I beg to thank Mr. Ardeshir Khurshedji Vcsavewala for kindly seeing the essay through the press.

PEET COTTAGE,
KHANDALLA,
4th June, 1928.

}

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI

*Letter from the late Mr. Bomanji Dinsha Petit,
Chairman of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Subscribers
of the Memorial Fund.*

Bombay, 15th February 1901.

To

THE REGISTRAR,

BOMBAY UNIVERSITY.

SIR,

A Public meeting of the friends and admirers of the late Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Third Baronet, C. S.I., was held at the Town Hall on 26th August 1898 under the presidency of His Excellency Lord Sandhurst when it was resolved to open a fund to commemorate the name of the deceased Baronet. Altogether Rs. 18,639 were subscribed. The subscribers at a meeting, held on 8th December 1900 at the Sir Jamsetjee Institution Building, resolved, that out of the sum collected, a sum of Rs. 6,000 be handed to the University of Bombay. In pursuance of that Resolution, on behalf of the Sub-Committee appointed at the above meeting of the subscribers, I beg to offer that sum in Government Promissory Notes to the University on the following conditions:—

That a separate account be opened in the books of the University in the name of the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Third Baronet Memorial Fund and that the proceeds of the interest of that amount after deducting the usual 5 per cent. administration expenses of the University be spent as follows:—

- (a) The interest to be allowed to accumulate for a period of 10 years.
- (b) At the end of each period the University shall offer a Prize for the sum accumulated or likely to be accumulated by that time and ask for a prize essay.
- (c) The subject shall be named at least about 18 months before the date of the production of the essay.

- (d) The subject of the essay shall be Iranian. It may be on all matters appertaining to Ancient Iran such as its History, Literature, Science, Art, Religion, etc. It may be the translation of an hitherto untranslated Avesta, Pahlavi, Cuneiform or Persian book or inscriptions, gems, jewels, etc., of general Iranian interest or the preparation of a collated edition of an unpublished manuscript.
- (e) One-fourth of the sum realised shall be reserved for printing the essay.
- (f) The competitors of the Prize Essay may be graduates or undergraduates or members of any University.
- (g) The Prize shall be advertised in India as well as in Europe and America in one or more literary journals.

On hearing from you that the University accepts the donation on the above terms, I shall send over Government Promissory Notes of the above amount duly endorsed to the names of the University authorities.

Yours faithfully,

(Sd.) BOMANJEE DINSHA PETIT,

Chairman of the Sub-Committee appointed by
the subscribers of the Sir Jamsetjee
Jeejeebhoy Third Baronet
Memorial Fund.

RESOLUTION PASSED AT A MEETING OF THE
SENATE HELD ON SATURDAY, THE
25th JANUARY 1902.

That the offer of Rs. 6,000 in 3½ per cent. Government paper from the Chairman of the Sub-Committee appointed by the subscribers of the Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, Third Baronet, Memorial Fund for the foundation of a Prize in the name of the late Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, Third Baronet, be accepted with the best thanks of the Senate and that the following regulations be adopted for awarding the Prize :—

A Prize to be called “The Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy (Third Baronet) Prize” of the value of Rs. 1,100, shall be awarded every tenth year to the best Essay by a University student in accordance with the subjoined conditions.

2. Competitors shall be graduates or undergraduates or members of any University.

3. The subject of the Essay shall be Iranian. It may be on all matters appertaining to ancient Iran, such as its history, literature, science, art, religion, etc. It may be the translation of an hitherto untranslated Avesta, Pahlavi, Cuneiform or Persian book or inscriptions, gems, jewels, etc., of general Iranian interest, or the preparation of an edition—collated or uncollated—of an unpublished manuscript.

4. The subject shall be selected and notified by the Syndicate not less than eighteen months before the day for sending in the Essay.

5. Each Essay shall be written in English and sent to the University Registrar on or before the last Monday in August. Each Essay shall be signed by the writer and shall be accompanied by a statement giving his University standing, if any, his Post Office address, and a declaration that the Essay sent in by him is *bona fide* his own composition.

6. The Judges shall be two in number and shall be nominated by the Syndicate. Their decision shall be announced as early as practicable. The honorarium for each Judge shall be Rs. 150.

7. The Prize shall not be awarded to an Essay which, in the opinion of the Judges, is not deserving of a reward.

8. The said Essay, translation or edition shall be printed and published by the University, provided always that all expenses of, or incidental to, the printing and publication of the work shall not exceed one forth of the total amount available after ten years.

9. The annual income of the Fund shall be subject to a deduction of 5 per cent. to be contributed to the General Fund of the University.

10. On the occasion when the Prize is not awarded, the money shall be applied by the syndicate in such manner as they shall think best fitted for furthering the object and purposes of the endowment.

11. The Senate shall have the power, whenever it may think fit, to modify or alter the terms upon which the Prize may be awarded, or otherwise to deal with the income of the Fund, provided the object for which the Prize has been founded is kept in view.

PREFACE.

In this work on "The Moral and Ethical Teachings of Zarathûshtra", I have dealt only with such of them as are expressed by some particular terms which have a broad moral signification and which are well known even to the lay public. There are, however many other noteworthy moral teachings of Zarathûshtra which we come across in our religious literature, and they are to be found not in certain words, but in sentences and paragraphs. These latter are not less important than the former, and should not be omitted in a comprehensive treatment of the subject of the moral teachings of Zarathûshtra. As however my attention was not drawn to the importance of many of these, when I wrote this book for the University, I have not incorporated all of them in this work, and have thought it proper to deal with them in another work of mine, a translation with a critical explanation of the Gathâs, which I intend to give to the public in the future. As will be seen from the reading of the contents of this work, the bulk of these has reference to the Gathâs, which even in their present fragmentary condition undoubtedly form the best portion of the existing remnants of the Avestan literature in the matter of the moral teachings of Zarathûshtra. During the course of this work some philological explanation has been rendered necessary in order to determine the meanings of certain words before starting on an exposition of the same with reference to the context. In cases, however, where such philological criticism is not quite indispensable, I have referred the reader to my future work on the Gathâs; and this is with a view to make the present work more interesting even to the lay public than would be the case by devoting too much space to philological criticism. Finally, I find it necessary to state that the complexity of the Gathâs is so great that even after a period of seven year's concentrated research work on that very small text, one cannot be entirely satisfied with the translation that he has established. Hence it is possible that there will be room for amending in my future work the translation of some of the passages quoted in this volume.

The first question that suggests itself to us when asked to deal with the teachings of the Iranian Prophet, Zarathûshtra, is as to what Avestan writings, as they are extant at present are to be ascribed to Zarathûshtra and what to some other sources. Indeed, there may be something like an unity observable throughout all these writings so far as the name of

Avestan writings. As regards the Gâthâs, undoubtedly, we should regard them as the description of the life-work of Zarathûshtra, as appears from the introductory sentence prefixed to the Gâthâs at a later period, which says:—"The immortal bounteous Gâthâs contain the blessed thought, the blessed word, the blessed speech of Holy Zarathûshtra." Indeed there are other prominent personages mentioned in the Gâthâs, and sometimes it also seems that it is not Zarathûshtra himself who is the proper speaker. However, the Inspirer of the whole movement described in the Gâthâs, and in which these personages took part, was Zarathûshtra alone. Again when we have said that the Gâthâs are, as it were, a biography of Zarathûshtra, this biography is not in the form of one in which a writer of a later period describes in his own words the life-work of the person for whom he writes. We are introduced to Zarathûshtra in the Gâthâs through Zarathûshtra's own thoughts, and words, and not through a second-hand representation of him, as we find him described in the non-Gathic Avesta; though the author of the same stanzas in the Gâthâs may be some other personage, and not necessarily Zarathûshtra himself. Hence while treating the subject of the Moral and Ethical teachings of Zarathûshtra in the following pages, I have attached far greater importance to the Gâthâs than to the non-Gathic Avestan writings. These latter, however, are not to be left out of consideration. Indeed, as we said before, it is difficult for us to speak about the teachings of Zarathûshtra with as much certainty from the authority of the non-Gathic Avesta as we can do from the authority of the Gâthâs (although there are such texts as those of Yasna, Chapters XII, XXXV-XLI, & LVIII which seem to be more closely related to the Gâthâs than the others). However, one thing should be borne in mind while we want to speak of Zarathûshtra's teachings. The majority of people assume that Zarathûshtra was the first author of the moral civilization of ancient Iranians, and hence when they speak of Zarathûshtra's teachings, they mean to imply all that was good and noble in that civilization. The assumption is wrong, since, as we said before, the moral civilization of at least certain parts of Iran in times prior to Zarathûshtra was wrought through the efforts of "the foremost teachers or law-givers" of these times. But Zarathûshtra had greatly strengthened the force of that civilization by his own noble efforts, which were regarded by the Iranians as surpassing all the efforts of the teachers or law-givers of past times. Thus the assumption is wrong. But the conclusion is right, namely, that Zarathûshtra's teachings are in harmony with the good and noble teachings that produced the moral civilization of the former Iranian society. This being so, we shall, in

dealing with the teachings of Zarathûshtra, also include therein doctrines which we find exclusively in the Non-Gathic Avesta, so far as they are in harmony with what we find from the Gathâs. In cases, however, when there is a difference between a doctrine as understood in the Gathâs and the same as understood in the Non-Gathic Avesta, we shall state wherein that difference lies, and it is, I think, not wrong in this case to ask the readers to attach more authority to the former than to the latter.

But when we have thought it proper to deal, in our Essay, with doctrines that cannot be proved to be Zarathûshtra's own, although not inconsistent with his own doctrines, one might ask why we should not, on the same principle, also dilate upon doctrines found in the Pahalvi writings. I say this with special reference to that great Pahalvi work, the Dinkârd. This book although not a consistent whole, although it has passed through a recasting and an enlargement at the hands of more than one composer, although it mentions events which happened so late as the downfall of the Sassanian Monarchy, and finally although it contains many legendary stories connected with the life of Zarathûshtra does nevertheless abound with chapters containing noble ideas which may very well have been the possession of ancient, probably even pre-Zarathushtrian Iranians. More than once we come across the Pahalvi forms of certain Avestan terms and phrases which have been entirely lost to us at present. Moreover, the ideas contained in many of these chapters are mentioned on the authority of what is called "the exposition of the good Religion" (Nakiz-i-Vehdin), which shows that those ideas, although expressed in the Pahalvi language, first formed part of the Avestan writings in which the literature of the ancient Iranians was written. In spite of this, however, we shall, in our Essay, leave out of consideration anything stated in this Pahalvi book, and this for the following reasons: (1) Many of the chapters of the kind alluded to above have not yet been properly understood and translated; (2) the possibility of some of the original terms and phrases having undergone a great modification in meaning by the lapse of time; (3) the desirability of not marring the unity of the exposition of the different subjects of

our Essay which can be done by sticking to the language of the Avesta in which Zarathûshtra's teachings were directly expressed. The last two remarks apply also in the case of other Pahalvi writings.

We shall divide the subject of our Essay under the following heads :—

- (1) On the conception of God.
- (2) On the spirit of good.
- (3) On the spirit of evil (with which is associated the question relating to the origin of evil).
- (4) On the self of man (which includes an explanation of the doctrine of Fravashîs).
- (5) On the duties of man.
- (6) On the aim of man (which includes an explanation of the doctrine of Frashokereti).
- (7) On the so-called Ameshâspentas (Archangels).
- (8) On the so-called Yazatas (Angels).


CONTENTS.

(SUBJECTS)	PAGE
PREFACE	vii
THE CONCEPTION OF GOD	1
THE SPIRIT OF GOOD	13
THE SPIRIT OF EVIL	17
THE SELF OF MAN :—	28
(1) FRAVASHI	28
(2) URVAN	40
(3) DAENA	41
(4) BAODHANGH AND AHŪ	52
APPENDIX ON MĀNTHRA SPENTA	52
THE DUTIES OF MAN :—	58
(1) YASNA	59
(2) STAOTA	66
(3) VAHMA	67
(4) OFFERINGS	68
(5) NEMANGH	72
(6) INVOCATION, &c.	73
(7) CONDUCT OF ONE INDIVIDUAL TOWARDS ANOTHER	77
THE AIM OF MAN :—	83
(1) VAHISHTA	83
(2) VAHISHTA ANGHŪ	86
(3) PARĀHŪM, MANAHIM AHŪM	87
(4) FRASHOKÉRÉTI	90
(5) APEMA URVAÉSA	101
(6) GARO DEMĀNA	104
(7) ACHISHTA ANGHŪ	106
(8) DRUJÔ DEMĀNA	107

(SUBJECTS)	PAGE
GENERAL REMARKS ON THE NEXT LIFE	110
THE NEXT LIFE OF THE NON-GATHIC AVESTA	111
CHINVAT PERETŪ	119
ON THE AMESHA SPENTAS :—	121
(1) THE GATHIC	121
(2) THE NON-GATHIC	129
GENERAL REMARKS.	
ON THE YAZATAS :—	132
(1) SRAOSHA	133
(2) MITHRA	137
(3) RASHNŪ AND ARSHTÂT	143

ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD.

An eminent philosopher has remarked that there can be no system of morality without the belief in a moral government of the universe, which presupposes the existence of a Being whom we can conceive either as the originator of the moral law, or as identified with that moral law, and who thus governs the whole universe. This Being is known by different names among different classes of humanity. As everybody knows, such a Being is, under the moral system of Zarathushtra, named *Mazdā Ahura*, or *Ahura Mazdā*, or *Mazdā*, or *Ahura*. We shall begin this subject by examining the signification of the very terms *Mazdā* and *Ahura*, which are used for this Supreme Being.

Mazdā literally signifies “ the Great Creator, or giver, or dispenser ” (from  = to create, give, or dispense), and not “ the Great knower ”: firstly because when the idea of knowing is referred to in the *Gāthās* in connection with God or in connection with man, we find the root *Vid*, “ to know ” used in far the greater majority of instances and not the root *Dā*¹ ; Secondly, because when any act of giving or creating or dispensing on the part of God is referred to, it is invariably expressed by the verb *Dā*.

The term “ *Ahura* ” derived from *hū* = to be strong or powerful, or to govern² expresses the idea of a governing lord, not only

¹ For *Vidhvāṅh* and *Vaedishta* as applied to *Mazda Ahura*, Y. 29, 6 ; 32, 7 ; 45, 3 ; 46, 19 ; 48, 2. For *Vidhvāṅh* as applied to a man Y. 30 1 ; 31, 12, 17 ; 34, 9. For other different forms of the root *Vid* 28, 5. 10, 43, 10 ; 45, 4 ; 46, 2. 10 ; 48, 9 ; 51, 22. In the text I have spoken of “ the majority of instances ” only, because we of course find the words “ *hūd-ānū* ” and “ *huzentū* ”, the former occurring only four times, the latter only twice in the *Gāthās*.

² For proof see my *Gāthās*.

in the Gathâs but in the whole of the Avestan literature, and it is used not only for God but also for man. A strong testimony to this is to be found from the fact that in Y. 31, 8, Mazda is called "The Ahura, or governor of the human world in the matter of activities" (Angheush Ahurem Shyaôthnaeshû) and again in Y. 46, 9. he is called "the beloved, bountiful, and righteous (or awful) Governor over the activity" (of man) (Zevishtim Shyaothnoi Spentem Ahurem Ashavanem). It is impossible to translate these phrases if we are to accept the word "Ahura" as expressing simply the idea of "Being" (from Ah = to be) as showing the real existence of God. We shall not hesitate to say that the author of the Gathâs and the people of the times did never entertain any doubt with regard to the real existence of the Supreme God. Hence there is no special term in the Avesta which emphasises the real existence of God. This existence is taken for granted. And whatever designation is applied to God, it is only for expressing some other quality, or condition, or function, pertaining to Him. Thus the meaning contained in the compound term "Mazda Ahura" is that of the Great-Creator-Governor. The whole universe is governed by God, hence He is called Ahura : and whatever happens therein, is created, or given, or dispensed by God, hence He is called Mazda. Of these two names applied to God, Mazda seems to be the primary one, as we see in Y. 31, 8 :—

سج. تکیس. هککس. وکککککک. هکککککک. هکککککک.
 وکککککک. هکککککک.

وکککککک. وکککککک. هکککککک. هکککککک. هکککککک.
 هکککککک. هکککککک. هکککککک.

[illegible]

“When I grasped Thee, O Mazda! in the (mental) eye, I sincerely thought Thee as the first actor in the universe, as the Father of Reason, as the true Originator (or Creator) of the Right Law, as the Governor over the actions of humanity.” Here the speaker directs his address solely to Mazda, and describes Him in His different capacities, of which one is that of being an Ahura. This denotes that to God’s position as a Governor is attached an importance somewhat subordinate to His position as a Creator. It should not, however, be understood, that when reference is made to Mazda or Ahura, the two different functions meant by these two terms are kept in view by the author of the Gathâs : that is, if mention is made of Mazda alone without Ahura, or of Ahura without Mazda, in a Gathic stanza or line, we should not think that that stanza or line does necessarily contain an idea which has reference only to God’s position as a Mazda exclusive of His position as an Ahura, and vice versa.

Mazda and Ahura, however, are not the only names denoting the idea of the Supreme Deity. There is a third name to be found in Asha. This important term is the Gathic equivalent of what is right, straight, or true, and signifies the Law of Truth or justice, or Truth or justice itself, sometimes also conduct based upon the Law of Truth, that is righteousness. This Law is something that is necessarily required to be associated with a Creator-Governor, if his Creation (or Dispensation) and Government are to proceed on a regular line of order, and if that Creator (or Dispenser) Governor is not to act by an unlawful arbitrary will. Hence we find Mazda Ahura described as Asha-hazaosha, that is of one will with the Law of Truth, as also Ashanghâchim accompanied with the Law of Truth ¹ and Ashât apanotemem, "one who most attains to things through the Law or The Greatest Worker of the Law of Truth." ²

¹ Y. 41. 3.

2 Y. 1. 1.

In these two instances, we cannot take Ashâ to be in the instrumental sense. Both the rhythm and the context of these passages require it to be put in the vocative together with Mazdâ Ahura. Sometimes we have Asha, when used in this sense, mentioned not with both Mazdâ and Ahura, but with Mazdâ alone ; that is, the idea of the Godhead is in these instances expressed by Mazdâ-Asha as in other instances it is expressed by Mazdâ-Ahura. We find this in Y. 33 8. 14 ; Y. 34, 7. 12 ; Y. 46, 18 ; Y. 50, 9. In the first of these passages we read of the Yasna and Staota of Mazdâ-Asha. In the second Zarathûshtra dedicates all the good things and conditions pertaining to him to Mazda-Asha. In the third, Mazdâ-Asha is besought to afford protection to the addressers. In the fourth, Mazdâ-Asha is entreated to show the paths of Reason. In the fifth, the speaker declares his adoption of a particular attitude towards the good and the evil men in order to please the will of Mazdâ-Asha. In the last stanza, the speaker wants to approach Mazdâ-Asha, with the Yasnas performed by him.

There are many other instances where we find that Asha is put in the same position as Mazda-Ahura, though these cannot be said to be affording as clear an evidence as the above quoted instances, the reason being that in these we find the particle Cha (=and) coming with Asha, when it is preceded by Mazda, or Ahura, or Mazda Ahura, which may seem to show that Asha in these instances is referred to as being apart from Mazda Ahura. On this, however, we shall speak later on.

The above quoted passages show that Asha, the Law of Truth or the moral Law, is itself used as one of the names of the Supreme Godhead, the other two being Mazda and Ahura. It should also be noted that even in the non-Gathic Avesta Asha Vahishta is mentioned as one of the twenty names of Mazda Ahura himself.¹

In Mazda is implied the idea of creating : this creation comprehends both the world of matter and the world of spirit. Hence we can call Mazda the Lord-Creative, Ahura, as the Governor or Lord Executive, and Asha, as the Lord Judicial. Thus Mazda-Ahura-Asha can be described as the one Supreme Being who combines in himself all these three functions together, that is, who creates or gives or dispenses everything, and judges everything, in the whole universe. Mazda, Ahura, and Asha,

¹ Hormuzd Yasht 7-9. "tûirya Asha Vahishta"—Fourthly, I am Asha Vahishta (by name).

The object of the foregoing statement is to show the essential position of the Supreme Being mentioned in the Gathâs. This Being is described as the Great-Creator (or Dispenser), and Governor of the universe, whose two essential features are the Moral Law and the Best Reason (which is an equivalent of the Summum Bonum).

One other essential quality of Mazda Ahura is what is called Ârmaiti, which signifies highmindedness or magnanimity (thwoi as Ârmaitish : Spentân Ârmaitim Varemairi, hâ ne anghat) (y. 32, 2). The omniscience of Mazda is emphasized at many places as when it is said that He as the calculator or knower of all things, knows everything by His Best Reason, and sees all things by his powerful shining eyes¹ that He is fully acquainted with the damnation pertaining to men of vicious character (erekhtem Vaidishto)² He knoweth best the rewards arising in the later or superior life to men of good character.³ He is most mindful (mairishto) of the activity of the vicious people and discerneth from before what will be done by them in future.⁴ He is the calculator of all things (Hâtâ Marânê) that happen on earth.⁵ He is friendly or one worthy of being loved (Zévishtya), not one to be looked upon, or approached with fear.⁶ He teaches (sish) and reveals (fradakhsh) all good things including the Good words or doctrines; and this through His own mouth (thwâ êêâonghâ) or through the tongue of His mouth (hizvâ thwahyâ âonghâ) as it were.⁷

He is the first and foremost realiser (paoûrvim Vaedem) of any good condition that may befall man.⁸ He looks, with His powerful shining eyes, as it were, all that happens on earth.⁹ Under His care and protection lies the preservation of the virtuous and heavenly life and other good and happy conditions prevailing among mankind on earth.¹⁰ He lends help (Avangh) and infuses cheerfulness and joyful fervour (rafedhra) in the heart of him who acts according to His Law¹¹ He is not only bounteous (spenta) but also strong (takhma), Āthra or the spirit

¹ Y. 32, 6 ; 31, 13 ; 45, 4.

² Y. 32, 7.

³ Y. 46, 19.

⁴ Y. 29, 4.

⁵ Y. 32, 6.

⁶ Y. 28, 9 ; 46, 9 ; 50, 7.

⁷ Y. 31, 17 ; 28, 11 ; 51, 3.

⁸ Y. 29, 10.

⁹ Y. 31, 13.

¹⁰ Y. 49, 10.

¹¹ Y. 50, 5 ; 46, 12 ; 28, 1 ; 51, 20.

of physical force, or the force of nature, being associated with Him¹ (tôi Ātarêm ; thwâ Āthra) and hence the issue of a physical fight is decided by Him in favour of the virtuous party.² He by His skilfulness of a Creator or creating power (thwâ hûnarâ dâmôish) has created (or established) the principle of good to the good and evil to the evil (akêm akâi vangûhim ashîm vanghavê).³ He adheres to, and never departs from his contract of doing good to the good and evil to the evil (avâish ūrvâtâish yâ tû Mazdâ didereghzhô).⁴ He has His own doctrine (thwahyâ senghahyâ), His own Laws (Mazdâodâtâ), His own active or creating intellect (thwâ khratû (s) châ), His own Wisdom (khsh-mâkâm hûchistim).⁵ He is one who is permanently of the same nature and position susceptible to no change (nûremchit hâmô).⁶ He is the maker of the Earth or Living-World (geûsh tashâ).⁷ It is He who as the Good Artificer or Worker (hvâpâô) is the cause of all the physical phenomena.⁸ He has destined the benefits of His Kingdom for all who lead a life of Reason and Truth.⁹

It is He who has produced in man the loving desire for the procreation of offsprings.¹⁰ He should be appreciated and loved by means of humble reverential praises offered to Him on account of His goodness and beneficence.¹¹ He is to be pleased and satisfied by a virtuous heavenly life of Reason led on earth by man.¹² He should be pleased (or extolled) (mîmaghzhê) by means of the devotional sacrificial-services (yasna).¹³ His homage (Vahma) should be advanced further and further on earth by our realising all the grand benefits associated with the progress of a virtuous life upto the point when Garo-Demâna is attained to.¹⁴ His most potent body (or, incarnation) on earth (toi Vâzîstô Astish) is a ruler who helps or strengthens Truth or Justice by his actions and words.¹⁵ His true "devotees" (Aredra) are those who, in spite of grievous and distressing

¹ Y 43, 4.

² Y 47, 6 ; 51, 9.

³ Y 43, 5.

⁴ Y 44, 15.

⁵ Y 44, 14 ; 51, 19 ; 31, 11 ; 34, 14.

⁶ 31, 7.

⁷ Y 51, 7 ; 47, 3 ; 31, 9.

⁸ Y 44, 5.

⁹ Y 43, 6.

¹⁰ Y 44, 7.

¹¹ Y 45, 8.

¹² 45, 9.

¹³ Y 45, 10.

¹⁴ Y 45, 8.

¹⁵ Y 31, 22.

circumstances, endeavour hard to spread the teaching of the good doctrines of life.¹ The above is a brief summary of the nature and attributes of Mazda as described in the Gathâs. In short, He is the source of all good things and conditions relating to the material, mental, and moral life of man. He is as it were a goal that can and should be striven after and realised. Hence we find the idea of "approaching" Mazda Ahura.² There is no insuperable gulf between a human being and the Great Godhead, the difference being only a difference of degree, not of kind; and this can be done through the influence of the moral Law (Asha) and Reason (Vohu Manangh) which are intrinsically associated with both God and man.

Coming now to the Non-Gathic Avestan writings, we don't find much in it that differs from what we have said above with reference to the Gathâs. In the Yasna Haptanghaiti we find Ahura Mazda described as "the adherent of and the revealer of the words (or religious statements)"³ just as He was described in the Gathâs as "the first and foremost revealer of the words."

We find also reference made here to His "good artifices or works" (hvapanghâishchâ) just as he is called "a good artificer or worker" (hvâpâô) in the Gathâs. In the seventh chapter of Yasna Haptanghaiti, Ahura Mazda is called "a yajata accompanied with Asha, possessing good worthy things, and causing prosperity" (Hûmâim izhêm yazatêm Ashanghâchim). Here we find the word "yajata" applied to Ahura Mazda, which is an epithet meaning "one worthy of being served with sacrifice." Again, the epithet Ashanghâchim reminds us of the fact alluded to before that Asha is the Law inseparably associated with Mazda Ahura, and that therefore Asha is used as another name of Mazda Ahura. In the following sentence, again, we find the addressers beseeching Ahura Mazda to "become life and limbs unto them."

سزاسد. مژم. افر. جن ددند دسرسد. ددند دسرسد. ددند دسرسد. ددند دسرسد.

which shows recognition of the very close relationship between God and human beings in their affairs of life, and this is strictly in harmony with the Gathic ideas. Some designations of Ahura

¹ Y 34, 7.

² Vâo paiti-ayeni-Y 50, 9. Sometimes this idea of approaching is also expressed by pairi-jas, for which see Y 28, 2 and Y 50, 8.

³ thwâm at aeshâm pâityâstâremchâ fradakshtâremchâ dademaide-Y. 35, 9.

Law in them. This may possibly also explain the description of a Godly ruler as the "most potent body of God" in 31, 22. Sixthly, He is "active (or creating) intelligence" (khratûsh) itself, while his seventh name is "One possessing active (or creative) intelligence" (khratûmão). In this case, then, Mazda Ahura is described as a being possessing a particular quality but also as that quality itself, which is only a way of emphasizing the maximum perfection of that quality or power as residing in the Deity or of regarding the Deity as the very incarnation of that good power or quality. Similarly, He is both Wisdom (Chisti) and wisdom-possessing (Chistivão), both intelligence (spânangh) and intelligence possessing (spananghvão). He is also called the most beneficent (sevîstō), not liable to harm (Vidvaêshtvō), not liable to being overpowered (avanêmna), the calculator of all things (Hāta-marênish), the all seeing (vispa-hishas), the cure-giving (baêshazyō), the Lawful (Dâtō.)¹ This list of names is followed by another one, wherein besides a repetition of some of the names already mentioned before, Mazda Ahura is also called the protector (pāta), the creator (dāta), the nourisher (thrāta), the most-possessed of energy (āthravatemala), which refers to the physical force of nature, as distinguished from his moral force², the most righteous (Ashavastema) the most Glorious (Kharenangûhastema), the most wide-seeing (poûrû-darshtema), the most far-seeing (duraêdarshstema), the most recognising (Zhnô-ishta), the prosperity-causing (fshûmão), the most absolute-willed ruler (isê-khshathryōtema), the most famous ruler (nâmo-khshathryōtema) the undeceiving (Adhavîsh), the undeceivable (vidhavish), the all over-coming (Vispavana), the all-fashioning (vispa-tash), the all-blissful (vispa-khâthra), of efficacious grace (Verêzi-saoka), of efficacious benefit (verezi-sevâo) the strong (sûra), the exalted one (bêrêza). Such are the designations of the Deity to be found in Hormuzd Yt. There does not seem to be any difference between those designations and those that we find in the Gathâs for the Supreme Being. There is one point, however, which requires to be noted here. The Gathâs do not seem to contain anything either corroborating or contradicting the idea approaching pantheism that is expressed in the sentence in Hormuzd Yt., that Mazda Ahura is "all the good things created by Mazda, and possessing the essence (or origin) of Asha". Man at least has the essence of Spenta (or Vohu) Mainyu within him, which is also the essence of Mazda Ahura ; this we find from the Gathâs. There is, however,

¹ Hormuzd Yasht 7-9.

² For Âthra as meaning also physical energy or force and also as martial spirit. See my contribution to the Hosang Memorial Volume.

no mention in the Gathâs of Spenta Mainyu in relation to the non-human part of the world, possibly because Spenta or Vohu Mainyu in the Gathâs is emphasized as the bounteous spirit that produces good thoughts, words and actions, without directly indicating whether there is a physical aspect of it also. We say there is no direct indication of this, because one can infer its physical aspect indirectly from the fact that it is regarded as the instrument of all material benefits too that are enjoyed by mankind. There must be a connecting link between the exertion of its moral force and the production of these material benefits for human life at least. Once this physical aspect of Spenta Mainyu is admitted, there is no reason why this Mainyu should not be regarded as associated with the non-human existences of the world too ; since, although the moral Law is not inherent in these non-human existences because the practice of the moral Law is based upon free-will which is not a condition of non-human earthly existences—still, because they are governed by the physical law, it is only the physical aspect of Spenta Mainyu that may be said to have been emphasized. Moreover, it should be remembered that in the above quoted sentence of Hormuzd Yt., containing the word “Asha Chithra”, Asha does not necessarily imply the idea of the moral Law, but only bears here its most comprehensive meaning, the True Law. Hence when these things are said to be “of the essence (or origin) of the Law, we are to understand only the immutable physical law of nature to be implied here. The Law of God operates not only in the affairs of human beings but in the whole physical universe too. And this Law is, as we showed before, one of the three aspects of the Godhead. Hence the operation of the Law in the non-human parts also of the universe is identical with the operation of Mazda Ahura or of Spenta Mainyu in the same. We make this statement to show that the Gathâs do not afford any evidence contradicting the pantheistic idea implied in the above quoted sentence from Hormuzd Yt. On the contrary, they and especially the last stanza of the 31st chapter seem indirectly to go to corroborate it.

ON THE SPIRIT OF GOOD.

As every Avesta student knows, the idea of the good spirit is expressed in the Avesta by the terms Spenta (or Spanyolh or Spenishta) Mainyu, and Vohu (or Vahishta) Mainyu. The word “Spenta” is derived from the root Span, which implies the idea of prospering or causing to prosper or advance, or of exercising a beneficent influence. Spenta Mainyu is the spirit that exercises a beneficent influence for causing advancement in all

sorts of goodness and happiness. This Spenta Mainyu is the opposite of Aka Mainyu, or Angra Mainyu, that spirit that causes harm and decadence and destruction of all things that advance goodness and happiness. There is no difference in idea between the terms Spenta Mainyu and Vohu Mainyu or between Spenishta Mainyu and Vahishta Mainyu—the word Vohu or Vahishta too being derived from “Vangh,” “to do good, or benefit” which is in no way different from the idea expressed by the root “span”. The word “Mainyu” itself meaning “spirit” when applied to God or man signifies the spirit that lies internally within one’s own person as distinguished from the words or actions that are to be regarded as the external manifestations of that spirit. Hence in some exceptional instances, “Mainyu” just like “Manangh” can also express the idea of the motive or will that prompts one to say or do anything. We find Spenta or Spenishta Mainyu often mentioned as intrinsically pertaining to, or associated with, Mazda Ahura. This being so, one should not lay much stress on the comparative and superlative forms “Spanyangh,” and thus say that these two epithets should be assigned to beings higher than those to whom the positive form “Spenta” is applied. I allude to this point for this reason that some may be led to the notion that it is only “Spenishta Mainyu” that should be applied to the Bounteous spirit of Mazda Ahura and not “Spenta Mainyu”, thus reserving this latter one for a position inferior in rank to Mazda Ahura, and thus putting it and not Spenishta Mainyu in direct contrast to Aka or Angra Mainyu, thereby avoiding the possibility of encroaching upon the supreme position of Mazda Ahura which would be the case if he is put in direct contrast to Aka or Angra Mainyu. (See 47, 1; 44, 7; 45, 6; etc., etc.) This however, does not imply that the Gathâs mention, or even indirectly imply, any idea like that of Mazda Ahura Himself being the author of Aka or Angra Mainyu. Though Spanyolgh Mainyu is undoubtedly contrasted with Angra Mainyu in 45, 2, and even Spenishta Mainyu with Angra Mainyu in 30, 5, the fact is noteworthy, that the name Mazda Ahura is studiously avoided by the composer of the Gathâs when reference is made to the two warring spirits in the Universe. (See also 30, 3. 4.)

As we said before Spenta Mainyu is the source of all good Aka or Angra Mainyu the source of all evil. The fact that these two spirits are not outside the person of a human being is shown from the following stanzas:—“These two original (or fundamental) spirits, that are famed as mysterious twins (or, that are known, by (their) mysterious conjunction) in thought, word, and action are something very beneficial and something harmful

(respectively)" (Y. 30, 3.) "The evil ones are destroyed of (or emptied) from, (*i.e.*, destitute of) this bounteous spirit; not so the righteous ones" (47, 4.). The good thoughts, words, and deeds of a person are the outcome of the good spirit existing in his own person. The evil people, on the contrary, are utterly shorn of, or devoid of, this good spirit; hence the evil spirit that is triumphant in them, instigates them to bad thoughts, words, and deeds. Such instances as these show that these two spirits are to be understood with reference to a man's moral position consisting in his thoughts, words, and deeds and therefore not to be represented as spirits external to human beings whose influence is connected only with the world of material phenomena. The same idea lies in Y. 45, 2, where the speaker says "I declare unto you (about) the two original (or fundamental) spirits of human life (or human world), of whom the very bounteous one spoke thus to the harmful (or destructive) one, "neither our thoughts, nor doctrines, nor practical talents, neither our beliefs, nor words, nor actions, neither our ethical laws nor our willing selves keep company (with each other.)" Here we see that all the things mentioned as points of contrast between the two spirits are relating to the moral position of human beings. There is no mention in this stanza of any material condition or phenomena wherein these spirits are opposed to each other. There is one more passage in the Gathâs which is an important one as bearing on this point and has been misunderstood by some scholars. It stands thus:—"Verily when these two spirits first came together to make life and death - in which way indeed it will be upto the end - the worst life is of (*i.e.*, belongs to) the vicious ones, and the Best Intelligence (or Best Reason) is to (*i.e.*, belongs to) the virtuous ones." (30, 4.). Here we read of the simultaneous advent of the two spirits at the very beginning of the living world "to make life and death" respectively. Life and death express no other ideas but those of activity and absence of activity respectively. Those are in the wrong who understand this sentence as containing the idea of the creations created by the two spirits, which we meet with in the Non-Gathic Avesta in the sentence "Mainyû dâman daidhitem." The life of a man consists in his activity on this earth; in other words, the activity of a human being is possible only when he is living; the discontinuance of life is the discontinuance of activity; death is only a synonym for the discontinuance of activity. Now this life of a human being consists in thinking, speaking, and acting. Hence, the idea underlying the statement that the one spirit made life and the other death, is that life-activity in the broadest sense of the word shows the activity of the bounteous spirit and it is by activity that a human being is to strive for reaching the goal of

his existence ; on the contrary, where there is the condition of death, that is, where there is no life-activity, the goal of human life is impossible to be reached, since it is for action and action alone, in the broadest sense of the word, that the living world is created. Where you see life, that is, activity, it is the proof of the working of the bounteous spirit. The reason why death or the absence of life-activity is attributed to the evil spirit is that this absence of activity puts a check upon the further and further advancement of a human being towards his goal. All that checks this advancement is represented as due to the evil spirit, while all that furthers it, is undoubtedly the result of the good spirit. Thus we see that in this passage, too, there is no reference to any material creation or phenomenon being created by the two spirits but only some abstract condition of things that is associated with the operation of the two spirits. The idea contained in this passage, as a whole, is that ever since the beginning of the life or activity of the human world, it is the righteous people leading their life according to the right Law of Mazda that are leading the truly best condition of life, while the worst kind of life is that which is led by those who break the Law of Mazda and lead unjust or false way of life. (This stanza is one of those in the Gathâs that admit of more than one translation. As this, however, does not affect the point discussed above, I shall deal with it elsewhere.)

There are many other passages in the Gathâs where Spenta Mainyu is found occurring. As these, however, do not contain anything noteworthy as far as this term is concerned, I omit any reference to them here.

In the non-Gathic Avesta, especially the Yasht portion, it seems certain that Spenta Mainyu is represented solely as the minister of Mazda Ahura, appointed to govern the physical universe as in Yt. 13, 28, 29, where Spenta Mainyu is said to be supporting the sky, the earth, the waters etc., and in Yt. 19, 46, where he struggles with Angra Mainyu for the possession of "Kavaêm Kharênô". In the same way, the creations of nature too are divided as partly belonging to Spenta Mainyu and partly to Angra Mainyu (Vend, 5 ; Vend, 12). This idea has been carried still further in Yt. 19, 44, where Spenta Mainyu is said to be residing in the topmost Heaven while Angra Mainyu in the lowest Hell. In short, wherever reference is made to Spenta (or Spenishta) Mainyu in the Vendidad and the Yashts, it is not as the spirit of goodness common to both God and man which produces good material consequences, as is the case in the Gathâs, but as the Minister of God sometimes occupying the same

position as God Himself, who is not associated with man but who is in charge of the physical universe including mankind. This idea of Spenta Mainyu being the governor of the physical universe has been touched upon by us already before, and will be dealt with again in our treatment of the subject of Fravashis.

ON THE SPIRIT OF EVIL.

To Spenta Mainyu, the Good Bounteous Spirit, is opposed Aka or Angra Mainyu, the Evil Spirit that causes suffering and destruction. We shall explain the importance of this term by dealing with the question of the origin of evil and other points relating thereto. In doing this we shall start from the Gathâs, as we have done in the foregoing exposition.

The terms that bear in them the expression of the idea of evil in the Gathâs are Drûj (with its diadetic Dregvant) and Aka or Angra (with its forms Ashyangah and Achishta). Before coming to the main point regarding the origin of evil, we should try to settle the meaning of these terms. The word Drûj, as every student knows, occurs as a direct antonym of Asha.¹ Asha is Truth or Justice or just Law established by Mazda Ahura and intimately associated with Mazda Ahura, by which He, Mazda Ahura, governs the universe. It also secondarily signifies true or just conduct.

The literal signification of Drûj is that of "lie or deceit" or by way of personification, "a liar or deceiver," and thus expresses also the ideas of wrong, impropriety, injustice, unjust conduct, and injury.

The word "Dregvant" is upto now supposed to be derived from the root Drû, "to run." The idea of running can never lead us to the idea of bad conduct, explain it in whatever way you like. The "Drûj" of "Dregvant" is exactly the same as the "Drû" of the non-Gathic word "Drvant", the former being only an extended form of the latter; and both "Drû" and "Drûj" express the idea of telling a lie and not that of running away from something. Dregvant is the exact antonym of the term Ashavan, which is the adjectival form of Asha, exactly as Drûj is the antonym of Asha.² Still further confirmation is afforded by the fact that the nominative form of the non-Gathic

¹ See Y. 30, 8; 32, 12; 44, 13; 48, 1; 49, 3; 51, 3; 53, 6; versus 44, 17.

² See Y. 44, 12; 31, 17; 48, 2; 45, 7; 46, 6; 47, 4.

question that arises here is why are these two fundamental spirits, good and evil, denoted respectively by the words Spenta and Angra and not by some words derived from Asha and Drûj, when we know that Asha denotes true conduct and Drûj false or improper conduct. An answer to this question would help us a great deal in knowing what was the idea prevalent amongst the ancient Iranians, at best in the mind of the author of the Gathâs as regards what is generally styled "evil." By the occurrence of these two pairs of words—(1) Spenta and Angra (or Aka) and (2) Asha and Drûj—we are led easily to conclude that our Scriptures distinguish between two kinds of evils, *viz.*, the moral evil and the physical evil. By the moral evil I mean the intrinsic evil position of a man's will, which expresses itself in the form of evil thoughts, words and deeds. By the physical evil I mean those cross circumstances of a man's life which are experienced by him with a feeling of pain and which that man would regard as something bad for him. It is this idea of physical evil that is implied in the word Aka, or Angra, and that idea of moral evil that is expressed by the word Drûj. Which then of these two kinds of evil should we mean, when we want to deal with the question of the origin of evil? Remembering the fact—and this is an important Zarathûstrian doctrine—that a man being endowed with free-will brings physical evil on himself by his own moral evil, the question of the origin of evil should be reduced to a question of the origin of moral evil. We repeat, then, that when we are talking of the principle of evil and its origin, we should go to the word Drûj rather than to Angra (or Aka). Let us here pause for a moment to prove this.

We have the terms Angra Mainyu and Aka Mainyu each occurring once in the Gathâs. Both Aka and Angra are derived from the same root, "Anj" or "Ang" to straiten, to torment,"¹ Aka being as an adjective, and Angra as an agentive noun.² Both thus mean a spirit that brings a person in narrow circumstances, or causes sufferings unto him.³ The primary idea, therefore, that is implied in the words Aka and Angra, is

¹ See Ervad Kanga's Dictionary.

² As instances of agentive nouns (or the same as used are adjectives) formed by the addition of the suffix "ا" to the root, دندول, دندول etc.

³ For instances where "Aka" is used as a noun, meaning "suffering or punishment" or "one who causeth suffering or punishment", see Y. 33, 2; 43, 5; 47, 4, etc.

"Of these two spirits, he, that is vicious, liked the working of worst things (or actions); (while) the most Bounteous Spirit chose Truth (or justice). In this passage we find Spenishta Mainyu placed in antithesis to Dregvâo. Although the word Mainyu does not actually occur with Dregvâo, yet it is quite evident from the context that Dregvâo is here applied to the spirit who is antagonistic to the most Bounteous Spirit. So we have found a phrase like "Dregvâo Mainyush", "the lying or unjust spirit", whom (and not Aka or Angra Mainyu) we can regard rather as the fundamental spirit of evil identical with Druj. Hence the moral evil expressed by the term is the same as the moral evil originating from the Mainyu mentioned in this stanza, especially because the "Mainyu" of something forms the essence of that thing. Whence, however, this Mainyu came, is not replied to in the Gathâs. In Y. 30, 3 we read of the two original spirits who are known by their mysterious combination in thoughts, words, and actions. These two spirits show themselves in all the three spheres of thinking, speaking and acting. Thoughts, words, and actions are sometimes good, sometimes bad. But whence those fundamental spirits arise which are at the bottom of these, is a mystery. Hence their combined existence in these is called "mysterious or latent," i.e., not visible or apparent. These two spirits are here described as a very good thing and a bad thing respectively. By understanding then the third, fourth and fifth stanzas of the thirtieth chapter with the second stanza of the forty-fifth chapter, we are led to conclude, first, that there is a Mainyu whose intrinsic essence is that of Drûj, and this Mainyu is fundamental, behind which, there is nothing of its own kind, since otherwise it cannot be called "Paûrûya" (Y. 30, 3); secondly, that sometimes this Mainyu is known as Aka, or Angra, Mainyu, only in respect of its results—that is, this Mainyu, which is identical with Druj, is absolutely in itself the Dregvâo Mainyu, but when understood in connection with the harmful results arising from it, it is Aka or Angra Mainyu. A remarkable instance bearing on this point is met with in Y. 51, 10, which runs thus:—

سپنیشتا مینو دگر دگر است. دگر دگر دگر دگر است.

سپنیشتا مینو دگر دگر است.

سپنیشتا مینو دگر دگر است. دگر دگر دگر دگر است.

(Y. 51, 10.) سپنیشتا مینو دگر دگر است.

“ Ahura Mazda, the Best one, declared the “ Ahuna-Vairya ”. He, the Best and unchanging one, put into effect. Forthwith did the evil-harmful-one arise ; and He (Ahura Mazda) denounced the Liar (or unjust) with this interdict, saying, “ neither our thoughts, nor our doctrines, etc., etc.” This passage, although not to be regarded as contemporaneous with the text of the Gathâs, is nevertheless not to be regarded as inferior in importance to the Gathâs : this on account of the fact that it gives us information regarding something that happened prior to the mutual repudiation of the two spirits in the Gathic Y. 45, 2, which stanza seems to be commencing a little too abruptly, just like Y. 30, 3. Now, in this passage (Y. 19, 15) as will be seen from the translation, it is stated that this mutual repudiation of the two spirits took place at the very moment when the vicious spirit, who is also the author of suffering, came into existence, and this spirit is said to have come into existence at the very moment when the Will of God was put into effect, that is, when God by His Will brought about the existence of the entire universe together with the laws governing it. According to this passage, it is possible to understand that evil arose, not by itself, but as a consequence of the manifestation, or expression, of the Will of God, not sometime after that, but immediately at the moment when that expression took place. The bare statement here is—“ God put His Will into effect and forthwith did the Evil-One arise—evil-harmful-one arise ”—which implies that what is called evil is a necessary concomitant of the operation of the Will of God, although the difference between the two may be of an unimaginable extent. In this passage, again, we should note the occurrence of the two different words *Ako* and *Drvantem*. Why was it ever necessary to repress the idea of evil by these two different terms ? Can we say that the author of this passage understood the difference between *Aka* and *Dregvant* in the same way as we have explained it in the foregoing exposition ? If so, why does he say “ the evil-harmful arose ” and not “ the Liar or (Unjust) arose ? ” These questions are unanswerable. It may not be wrong, however, to say that this is one of those passages in the Avesta, where *Aka* and *Dregvant* seemed to be used indiscriminately. One other thing that is to be noted in this passage is that it is not the *Spanyao Mainyu* and the *Angra Mainyu* that are made to stand against and repudiate each other, as is the case in Y. 45, 2, but it is Ahura Mazda Himself who is here made to pronounce the repudiating assertion (*antarê-ukhti*) against the vicious author of suffering. This, too, then, is a point, in which the author of this passage seems to differ from the Gathâs. This passage is also the only one in the whole of the extant Avestan

evil not so much in its moral aspect as in its physical or material aspect. As in our former exposition we have explained the word Drûj and together with it the term Dregvâo Mainyu as expressing the idea of moral evil, we shall now ask what signification does Drûj bear in the Vendidad either by itself or in its relation to Angra Mainyu. From an examination of its contents we find that even the word Drûj has lost there its moral import and is made to stand as a personification of some material evil or other. Who does not know the well-known Druj-i-Nashûsh, and Nashûsh certainly is physical impurity. In such instances, then, we cannot harmonise the Drûj of the Vendidad with the Drûj of the Gathâs. It seems, however, that although Drûj is often referred to in the Vendidad as being apart from Angra Mainyu (as when Angra Mainyu commands Drûj to attack and kill Zarathûshtra-Pargard XIX), there is at least one passage to show that Drûj and Angra Mainyu are sometimes identified with one another :

[illegible]

“How shall I make (all) these free from this Drûj, from the evil-doing Angra Mainyu?” Here the difference between these two is only that Drûj is understood as a female and Angra Mainyu as a male. This is confirmed by Vend. 18, where we read of the pregnancy of Drûj brought about by four different kinds of evil people. Here, then, we gain something by finding the close connection of ideas between the terms Drûj and Angra Mainyu, since although the author of this passage may have meant both in a material sense it goes to corroborate further our interpretation of these two with reference to the Gathâs, when we said that Drûj or Dregvâo Mainyu implies moral evil which is the only real evil that can be perpetrated by man and Angra Mainyu as implying only the bad physical consequences thereof, and that herein lies the close connection of Drûj and Angra Mainyu. Another similarity between the Gathâs and the Vendidad lies in the application of the epithet Dûzhdâo, evil-doer (or creator or giver) to the author of evil: the only difference being that in the Gathâs although the phrase Dûzhdâo yoi henti

•ဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ

•နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ

This must show that the Fravashis existed before, or at least simultaneously with, the creation of creatures. The only idea in harmony with reason that can be said to be implied here is that of the grand destinies whose function was pre-ordained in the Universe that was to be created, and according to whose influence the world goes on in its course. This is supported by the fact that the Fravashis are said to belong also to such inanimate objects as the waters, the earth, and the vegetation.

•ဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ

•နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ နေဗုဒ္ဓံ

—“ We adore the Fravashis... that which is of the water, that which is of the earth, that which is of the vegetation ”. Hence the Fravashis can be classed into those of personal beings and those of inanimate nature. It is the Fravashis, or, the grand spiritual destinies that first set the whole inanimate nature into activity as when it is said that the waters which hitherto lay still in one and the same place for a long time were set in motion and made to flow “ towards the destined goal ” or according to their prescribed function (Yt. 13, 53, 54), that the different kinds of vegetation which hitherto lay without any growth were made to grow (55, 56), and that the sun, moon, and stars, which hitherto stood motionless, were set in motion, all tending to the final moment of the final renovation (57, 58). This spiritual force behind the natural phenomena did not, however, manifest its activity only at the time when the whole universe began its course. Its activity is continual and still maintains the different things of nature, as when it is said that it is through the splendour and glory of the Fravashis or destinies underlying at the bottom that Ahura Mazda maintains the sky and the earth, it is through their splendour and glory that such phenomena as the birth-giving of females, the flowing of waters, the growing of vegetation, take place (Yt. 13, 1-15). It is this very idea that is expressed in another passage wherein Mazda is represented as calling the Fravashis for the assistance of the sky, the earth, the waters, and the vegetation, and Spenta Mainyu as maintaining those creations.

But the most efficacious of all the Fravashis are the Fravashis of the renovation-producing benefactors that are to arise in the future, and of the foremost¹ law-givers of all times. There are the benefactors who have produced an advanced renovated humanity in past times also (*Zâtânâm Frasho-charethrâm saoshiyantâm*, Yt. 19, 22). Their high destiny manifested in their very beneficent activity in their own times has paved the way for the present condition of mankind. But the present condition is again to be improved upon and carried to a still higher and higher condition by men who are to arise in the future and who will become the "lode-stars" of humanity. These future Saoshiyants (benefactors) then have Fravashis of theirs which, together with those of the foremost teachers or law-givers of all times, are the strongest or the most powerful of all. In other words, their destiny will be most potent and will shed the lustre of its good fortune of its actions on the position of mankind, thereby contributing to their advancement in a measure which is the greatest possible for their respective times.

¹ The word *Paoirya Tkaesha* is never used as a compound in the Avesta, with the exception of one instance. This is proved by the fact that the suffix denoting gender and number which is added to *Tkaesha* is also added to *Paoirya* which shows that *Paoirya* is an adjective standing by itself and as an epithet of "*Tkaesha*" and not as a part of the compound *Paoirya Tkaesha*". And since by *Paoirya Tkaesha* are certainly meant persons and not things, the word *Tkacsha* meaning teaching, or law, is in this phrase, used for teachers or law-givers. Similarly we find *Urvâkhsa*, the brother of *Kersaspa* described as a *Tkaesha* (i.e., a teacher or law-giver) and "*dâtô-razô* (regulator of the law). The word *Paoirya* in the phrase *Paoirya Tkaesha* means foremost or first. But that it here means foremost in ranks and not first in time is shown clearly by the fact that in Y. 13, 150, we read not only of the *Paoirya Tkaeshas* who have been before but also those who are living at present. Thus *Paoirya Tkaesha* is a designation of all the foremost or highest moral teachers or law-givers. This is further proved by the fact that in the passage under question (Yt. 13, 17) the Fravashis of the *Paoirya Tkaeshas* are placed on an equal footing of the highest degree with the Fravashis of the future renovation-producing Saoshiyans, which is impossible to understand if we are to understand by *Paoirya Tkaesha* all classes of Mazdayasnian people who lived before *Zarathûshtra*; moreover all these classes of people are denoted in this passage by the word "dead" (*iristanam*) which includes peoples of all times, while the *Paoirya Tkaeshas*, i.e., the highest teachers or law-givers of all times, are specially distinguished from other people. We also find *Zarathûshtra* himself described in Yt. 13, 92, as the highest teacher or law-giver of the countries (i.e., of course all Iranian territories) (*paoiryo tkaeshô dakhyûnâm*), or where the context of the words "of the countries or territories" makes it quite clear that *Paoirya Tkaesha* means the highest law-giver, just as the same *Zarathûshtra* is in the very next passage called "*Paoiryo Athrava*, *Paoiryô Rathaeshtâo*, *Paoiryo Vâstro-fshûyâs*", where *Paoirya* means first not in point of time but in point of rank. In Yt. 13, 148, again, we find *Zarathûshtra* described not simply as a "*paoirya tkaesha*" but as a "*paoirya Ahuirya tkaesha*," that is, as the highest royal (or, aristocratic) law-giver, or teacher.

The second thing that we find in Farvardin Yasht is the adoration or worship of the Fravashis. This implies the idea of the veneration of the destinies of great good men by means of their noble virtuous actions associated with their destiny have done great benefit to the people of their times, the influence of which continues to exist even in later times. This idea is confirmed by the fact that simultaneously with the mention of the adoration or worship of the Fravashis of different men, we find a brief mention made also of some particular noble actions done by some of them. It is in these actions that the force of their high destiny lies. The adoration of Zarathûshtra's Fravashi, for instance, is followed by a statement in which he is described as having overturned the authority of the Daevas, and preached the law of virtuousness to the people, and by whose efforts peace and prosperity were established in the whole country, and so on (Yt. 13, 88-95). Again, Kavi Vishtasp's Fravashi is adored because of the fact that he has championed the teaching of Zarathûshtra, and secured success for it by his power and influence. (99, 100) A man named Vohunémangh, again, was noted for finding remedies against "bad sleep, bad dreams, etc." (104). The adoration of his Fravashi, then, consists in praising his high destiny which produced a beneficent effect upon the people of his and succeeding times, by relieving them of certain sufferings. Similarly, Thraetaona's Fravashi is adored on account of his finding remedies for various diseases (131). Yima Vivanghana, too, was noted for having fought, and having enabled the people to fight against, misery, drought, and mortality (130). Such an action was prescribed by the latent spiritual destined force in him. This action of his, advanced the position and prosperity of the people: hence the adoration of his Fravashi. We find a very large number of names of other persons whose Fravashis have been adored in whose case, however, there is no mention made at all of any of their noble actions. They were undoubtedly all virtuous people, through whose actions the country benefited, but those actions being not of such a distinguished kind as those of Yima, Zarathûshtra, Vistaspa, etc., are not specified. Our object here is only to show the true signification of the term Fravashi when mentioned together with the actions of individuals. It is that high destiny subsisting in man, which, manifesting itself in the performance of good actions, influences for good the position of all human beings not only in his own but also in the succeeding generations. The adoration of the Fravashi of a good individual, however, does not take place simply by a verbal expression to that effect. It must be based upon a knowledge of his merits, and the sincerity of this adoration can be proved by one's exhibiting a virtuous conduct in his own sphere

of life, whatever this may be, in order to contribute to the general advancement of mankind in harmony with the Fravashis of others that he adores. There is another passage in Yt. 13, 41, from which we gather some idea as to the nature of the adoration of Fravashis. It runs thus :—

وسدق ايد. سدسدد. وادس. سد ايد. سد. سدس.
 سد. سدسدد سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سد. سد.
 سدسدد. سد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد.
 سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد.
 سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد.
 (Y. 13, 41.) سدسدد. سدسدد. سدسدد.

“ They (the Fravashis) are givers of good glory unto him who adores them just as that man, Zarathûshtra, the Ratu of the corporeal world, and the head of the two-legged (*i.e.*, human) species, adored them while undertaking whatever feats and threatened by whatever distressful-difficulties.” Why is there a reference made here to the great feats undertaken by Zarathûshtra and to the great difficulties and distressful circumstances that terrified him, side by side with the mention of his worship of the Fravashis? The reply that seems most reasonable is that it is the high progress-producing forces of destiny that a man is said to be adoring when he does not allow himself to be cowed by the great difficulties and misfortunes lying in his way in the act of fulfilling that destiny and thus secures “ the good glory ” associated with the performance of noble actions and thereby benefits himself and the people. The words “ he who adores them just as Zarathûshtra adored ” imply that there are different ways of adoring the Fravashis, and the best of these is here said to be the above-mentioned one practised by Zarathûshtra. There are other ways too, of adoring the Fravashis, referred to in Yt. 13, 24, 50, and elsewhere, but as these seem to refer to physical ceremony and have no connection with the moral position of man, we shall pass them over.

Another circumstance spoken of in connection with Fravashis is the assistance given by them to mankind. By this assistance

shown by the root-meaning of the term *Urvan* "that which wills, or chooses", hence, "the willing self" from *Vērē*, "to choose."¹ *Urvan* is that part of a man's self which consists in his wishes. These wishes may be either good or bad according to the goodness or badness of the objects wished for. Hence the *Urvan* of a person can be evil as well as good. Herein lies the difference between *Urvan* and *Fravashi*, because, as we showed before, an evil *Fravashi* is an absurd expression. Again as we are told at more than one place in the Avestan writings including the *Gathās*, the good or bad reward of a man's actions is experienced through that man's *Urvan*, in other words, a man is rewarded with good or bad things according to his good or bad wishes or inclinations (Y. 49, 11; Y. 51, 13; Vend. 13, 8; Vend. 19, 29; *Hādokht Nusk*, Fragments II, 2 and III, 20). Sometimes we find *Daena*² also mentioned with *Urvan* when reference is made to the reward given to a man for his actions. This is because *Daena*, that is character consisting in activity and speech, is itself something that is the consequence of or rather the necessary accompaniment of *Urvan* if a man's will is inclined to evil actions, his speech and activity which stamp his character will also be bad; if it is inclined to good actions, the character too will be good. Hence when *Urvan* and *Daena* are mentioned together as a good or bad reward the idea is that of the good or bad consequences befalling a person according to his inner desires and outwardly-expressed speech and activity.

DAENA.

The term *Daena* figures prominently also in the *Gathās*. We shall therefore first show what signification it bears in these writings. It occurs in the *Gathās* at about twenty-five places. In two of these, as we said just above, *Daena* comes in conjunction with *Urvan*, which shows the close connection between these two. These two are as follows:—

"I shall speak unto you (about) the two original spirits of human life, of whom the very bounteous one said to him who is

¹ The infinitive or dative form *𐬨𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌*, "to choose, to believe" or, "for choosing, for believing". (Y. 31, 2.)

² *Daena*, which is derived from "di" to see, in the sense of seeing with one's mind, that is, "known" literally means that which is known, or knowledge, or object of knowledge. It has come to mean "religion, or the word of religion", hence it is the true knowledge imparted by a sage to his people that forms the contents of his religion or teaching. Hence "*Daena*" can also mean the ethical teaching or the ethical law which a man follows in his life. Again as it is the ethical law, or religion, followed by a man that shapes his character, *Daena* sometimes also signifies character.

be translated by "the ethical law, or religion"; while in those cases where we find the plural form, we should translate it by "ethical laws." We shall quote here a few select sentences of both kinds:—

وښتس. ځڼډ. سسځس. سسځس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
(Y. 44, 9.)

"How shall I support this my ethical law (or religion).....

وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
وښتس. ځڼډ. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
(Y. 44, 10.)

"that ethical law (or religion) which is the best of all those existing things, which, as going hand in hand with virtuousness, could further-the-prosperity of my territories".....

وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
(Y. 44, 11.)

"How, O Mazda ? shall Noble Disposition be realised by (lit. come unto) those unto whom thy ethical law (or religion) is preached ?"

وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
(Y. 49, 4.)

"those men devote themselves to (or, support) the Daevas through what is their vicious ethical law (or, religion) lit. the ethical law pertaining to the vicious."

وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس. وښتس.
(Y. 31, 11.)

evil people who were the opponents of Zarathūshtra, in the words "Dregvato Daenā" (Y. 49, 4; Y. 51, 13.) As, therefore, a man's character varies with his ethical law, Daenā, the term Daenā is itself used to denote the character, or the active self of a person.

Passing now to the non-Gathic Avesta, we find that this idea of Daena, viz., character, is practically illustrated in what are known as the Hādokht Nusk fragments. It is the Daena of a person that is said to meet that person after his death in the form of a beautiful female who leads that person to heaven, if his mode of life was good, and in that of an ugly female who leads him to hell according to his bad mode of life. That this Daena in the form of a female is not external or foreign to him but something made up of his own actions, is clearly shown by the following passage :—

سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد.
 داور. داور. داور. داور. داور. داور. داور. داور. داور. داور.
 سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد.
 سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد.
 سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد.
 سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد. سپهبد.
 (Yt. 22, 10, 11.)

"Then the Willing-Self of the virtuous person asked (lit. said questioning unto) her, "What virgin art thou, whom I have ever seen as best of all the virgins in bodily appearance?" Then, she that was his own Daena, replied unto him, "O thou youth of good thought, of good word, of good deed, of good character! I am indeed thine. I am thy own Daena, of thy own person." The idea that lies at the basis of this representation is that of the good or bad character of a person bringing forth good or bad consequences after death. We should note in this passage that it is to the Urvan, the willing-self of the person that Daena addresses herself. This clearly shows that as we said before, the Urvan, the willing-self, bears the responsibility of good or bad actions while Daena, the character, is only a means

by which the consequences befall the Urvan, the willing-self of that person, since Daena itself is a production of Urvan.

In a large number of instances, however, in the non-Gathic Avesta, the word Daena is used in the sense of religion or the ethical law. This law is designated as "good, doing (or, inculcating) the sacrificial-service of Mazda, abolishing conflicts, causing the fighting-weapon to be laid down, and creating kinship or brotherhood (Vanguhîm Mâzdayasnîm Fraspâyaoikhê-dhrâm, Nidhâsnaithishêm, Khaetvadathâm). These are the main characteristics of the ethical law of Zarathûshtra. This law prompts man to adore and serve Mazda Ahura by doing self-sacrificing altruistic virtuous actions. It is a law which establishes the brotherhood of all those who are its adherents. It establishes peace amongst them by getting rid of all the causes that tend to produce feuds and strifes, hence it is called Fraspâyaoikhêdra and Nidhâ-snaithish." Hence also it is the ruler who wants peace in his country, prays for it to Daena's inseparable companion, Chishti (wisdom or knowledge).¹ This law of Zarathûshtra is also called "royal, or aristocratic," which seems to be the true meaning of its epithet "Ahurish." It is so called either for the sake of denoting its position as superior to that of all other ethical laws or religions, or possibly because Zarathûshtra, its founder, is called "highest aristocratic or royal teacher, or law-giver" (paoirîm âhûirîm tkaeshêm, Yt. 13, 148) or perhaps because it was the state religion protected by the King. It is also described as "the most true-created of all the good things, of all the things having the essence (of, origin) of the moral law."

و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا
و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا

The moral bearing of Zarathûshtra Mazdayasnian religion and its influence on the character of the individual who follows it, are clearly set forth even in the Vendidad in the following passage :—

¹ Yt. 16, 19 :

و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا
و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا و ستر دانا

"whom (i.e., Chishti) the absolute willed (lit. commanding) lord of the country adored, desiring peace for his country and courage (or strength) for himself (or, for his body)."

at the beginning of every sub-division of the Yasht. This association of Chisti with Daena is also to be found in the Gathas ; and the reason for this association lies in the almost identical meaning of the words, Chisti and Daena. While Daena means what is seen by our mind, that is, knowledge (di=to see) Chishti too, which comes from Chit, "to know, or learn" means "knowledge or wisdom." There are two Gathic passages wherein we find Daena and Chisti mentioned together, these are as follows :—

۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 (Y. 44, 10.) ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞

"That religion, O Mazda! which (religion) is the best of all those existing things which as going hand in hand with virtue could further the prosperity of my farm-districts, and which (religion) by means of the right activity of noble disposition resulting through its words bestows the wealths pertaining to my Practical-Wisdom according to (or by) Thy Will."

۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞ ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞
 (Y. 51, 21.) ۞۞۞۞۞۞۞

ON YASNA.

Yasna being derived from “yaz” meaning, “to love, esteem, or adore¹” expresses the idea of loving-service, or fraternal love; while Staota carries with it the idea of praise, being derived from “Stû,” “to praise.” What kind of loving-service, however, and what kind of praise are meant by these terms will be made clear from the following statements:

In Y. 33, 8, we read as follows:—

۱۰۱. ۱۰۲. ۱۰۳. ۱۰۴. ۱۰۵. ۱۰۶. ۱۰۷. ۱۰۸. ۱۰۹. ۱۱۰.
 ۱۱۱. ۱۱۲. ۱۱۳. ۱۱۴. ۱۱۵. ۱۱۶. ۱۱۷. ۱۱۸. ۱۱۹. ۱۲۰.
 ۱۲۱. ۱۲۲. ۱۲۳. ۱۲۴. ۱۲۵. ۱۲۶. ۱۲۷. ۱۲۸. ۱۲۹. ۱۳۰.
 ۱۳۱. ۱۳۲. ۱۳۳. ۱۳۴. ۱۳۵. ۱۳۶. ۱۳۷. ۱۳۸. ۱۳۹. ۱۴۰.

“Do you, O Mazda-Asha! announce unto me the right law so that, I may promote with Reason the loving service and the oral praise (lit. the words belonging to praise) of One-of-Your-position.

Here we have “Yasna” and “Staomya Vachangh” (which is similar to Staota) mentioned together. The latter means “word of praise,” which shows that Staota is here at least meant to be a speech, an oral statement in which we ascribe praise unto God. It is only an appreciatory statement without being at the same time necessarily accompanied with any activity or service for the sake of God. This activity on behalf of God, or the service of God whereby alone love of God is regarded as sincere is meant by the other word, Yasna. It is called Yasna, that is love, or practical love, or love-service, since a true service of Mazda is always associated with a hearty devotion to Mazda on the part of the man who performs it. The chief reason why Yasna here cannot be taken to mean anything else than this, is that the speaker expresses his desire to further, or advance, the Yasna, (together with Staota) which means that he will further it not only in his own case, but among the people of the country too, by preaching unto them as to how the Yasna and Staota of Mazda are to be performed. And this preaching he cannot do

¹ This will be explained in my work on the Gathâs.

love services of Reason of good-eminence on behalf of Ahura, etc., etc." Again we read in Y. 34, 6 :

ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ

“ If, therefore, you, O Mazda Asha ! are verily associated with reason, then do you grant unto me instruction about the whole mode-of-life pertaining to this existence, so that I may approach you as a praiser and also as a heartily devoted loving-servant.” Here, too, as in 33, 8, we find the speaker wanting first to be enlightened with some laws or rules of life, through the knowledge of which he will be in a position to know very well for himself, and also to teach others as to how the love-service of Mazda is to be performed.

The words “ heartily devoted loving servant ” of this stanza remind us of “ the humble servants ” of Mazda mentioned in Y. 51, 20, where we read as follows :—

ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ
 ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ ۛۛۛۛۛۛۛ

“ O ye all unanimous humble loving-servants of Mazda, humbly seeking the fervid-joy of Mazda ! this is the boon of ours to be given unto you, viz., the Right Law pertaining to the Words of Reason, of which is also High-Thought.”

The speaker here addresses men of his party who are "of one will," that is, who are engaged in the performance of the same good task, and who therefore are described as the loving-servants of Mazda, craving for the joyful fervour of Mazda exhibited in the performance of noble actions. Yasnas are again mentioned in Y. 45, 10, where the speaker exhorts the people thus :—

۴۴۰. ۴۴۱. ۴۴۲. ۴۴۳. ۴۴۴. ۴۴۵. ۴۴۶. ۴۴۷. ۴۴۸. ۴۴۹. ۴۵۰.
 ۴۵۱. ۴۵۲. ۴۵۳. ۴۵۴. ۴۵۵. ۴۵۶. ۴۵۷. ۴۵۸. ۴۵۹. ۴۶۰.
 ۴۶۱. ۴۶۲. ۴۶۳. ۴۶۴. ۴۶۵. ۴۶۶. ۴۶۷. ۴۶۸. ۴۶۹. ۴۷۰.
 ۴۷۱. ۴۷۲. ۴۷۳. ۴۷۴. ۴۷۵. ۴۷۶. ۴۷۷. ۴۷۸. ۴۷۹. ۴۸۰.
 ۴۸۱. ۴۸۲. ۴۸۳. ۴۸۴. ۴۸۵. ۴۸۶. ۴۸۷. ۴۸۸. ۴۸۹. ۴۹۰.

"We should please (or, extol) Him by the love-services of High-Thought of Him, who in His invulnerability is known as the Great-Creator-Governor as He has shown (or taught or promised), and will give, unto this existence of ours two abiding powers *viz.*, Health and Immortality in his kingdom through the Right-Law and Reason." The chief importance here lies in the first line, and especially in the words, "the Yasnas of Armaiti." One of the most important teachings in the Gathâs is that of Armaiti, *i.e.*, High-Thought. The speaker in this stanza preaches to the people that they ought to please (or, extol) Mazda by all the grand noble actions that have their source in a regulated, noble-minded disposition, since these are all virtuous actions, and by means of these it is that a man builds up the kingdom of Mazda within himself so as to establish his soul in a healthy and immortal condition of virtuousness. Hence the Yasna of Armaiti are not different from the Yasna of Vohu Managh. Another important passage confirming the meaning we have assigned to Yasna is Y. 53, 2, which says :—

۵۳۱. ۵۳۲. ۵۳۳. ۵۳۴. ۵۳۵. ۵۳۶. ۵۳۷. ۵۳۸. ۵۳۹. ۵۴۰.
 ۵۴۱. ۵۴۲. ۵۴۳. ۵۴۴. ۵۴۵. ۵۴۶. ۵۴۷. ۵۴۸. ۵۴۹. ۵۵۰.
 ۵۵۱. ۵۵۲. ۵۵۳. ۵۵۴. ۵۵۵. ۵۵۶. ۵۵۷. ۵۵۸. ۵۵۹. ۵۶۰.

important idea that the Yazishn-service is to be done not only for Mazda-Ahura but also for those great and good personages who worked heart and soul for the noble cause of the advancement of society towards an ideal condition of existence. To serve these men, whether dead or living, is to serve the cause represented by them. The Yasna of a great man who is dead, consists in taking up whole heartedly and continuing with sincere attachment to him the noble task performed by that man during his lifetime : while the Yasna of a great man who is living amongst us at present is to imitate his living example, and thus to infuse oneself with the strength of character necessary for assisting him in and advancing the cause which he has at heart. Hence the Yasna of Mazda and the Yasna of those men who worked for Mazda are one and the same.

Besides the above explained Gathic passages there are others in which we find not the noun Yasna but the verbal forms of "Yas" occurring. In Y. 32, 3, we read as follows :—

"But you all Daevas are, and he who greatly lovingly serves you is, a manifestation of Evil-mind, Vice, and arrogance, by (or, in) the promotion of these deceitful doctrine by which you are famed in the seven-fold area of the land." Here we read of the Yazishn of the Daevas who were the most redoubtable enemies of Zarathûshtra and his followers and who are here described as an incarnation of bad qualities on account of their worst mode of life. The Yasna of such people is quite the opposite of the Yasna, mentioned before, of those men who strive to bring about a heavenly condition of life amongst the people, and therefore also quite the opposite of the Yasna of Mazda. And it is distinctly stated in this stanza that the Yasna of the Daevas is connected with the promotion of doctrines which go to establish a vicious and perverse-minded course of life. Another instance on the same meaning of "Yaz," is to be found in Y. 50, 4, which runs as follows :—

"I, as the praiser, would lovingly serve you, O Mazda-Ahura, together with Asha (virtue), and Vahishta Manangh (the Best mind), and Khshathra (the kingdom) so that, &c., &c." Here, once more, we find the Yasna of Vahishta Manangh, but this is accompanied with the service also of Mazda Ahura, Asha, and Khshathra. As we have pointed out before, Mazda Ahura, Asha, and Vahishta Manangh form, as it were, the Trinity of the Gathic Godhead. This is the reason why we have asserted before that the loving-service of Vohu Manangh and Asha is exactly what is meant by the loving-service of Mazda Ahura.

God, which consists in the extollation of His position as the Best and Highest of all beings.”¹

ON OFFERINGS etc.

Besides Yasna, Staota, and Vahma which define the duty of man towards Mazda, there is a fourth name under which this duty is inculcated, viz., what is called the making of offerings unto Mazda. This act of offering is sometimes denoted by the verb “Râd,” “to offer,” sometimes simply by “dâ,” “to give.” These offerings, however, as far as the Gathas are concerned, refer only to the virtuous activity of man on earth, thus being in harmony with the significations of Yasna and Vahma. In Y. 33, 2, a man is said to be devoted to or making offerings unto the Will of Mazda Ahura, who tries his best to check the vicious activity of an irreconcilable vicious man by punishing him, and thereafter to instruct him in good things.

¹ In connection with Vahma, let us say a few words here on the word

𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 (Y. 28, 3). It is generally supposed to be derived from Vap to “weave”, and thus as containing the idea of the weaving of songs, though it requires a long step to pass from the idea of weaving to that of weaving songs. In connection with this verb, one fact requires to be noted. We do not find any verbal forms from the root from which the noun Vahma is derived, just as we have the forms Yazâi, Staomi, etc., etc., derived from the roots from which Yasna and Staota are respectively derived. And Yasna, Staota, and Vahma are the three terms which very often occur jointly when the relationship of man with God is referred to. Hence if besides Yaz and Stu we find a third term (Ufya) in which the third attitude of men towards God is implied, it is not wrong to say that the root “Vap” of (Ufya) expresses an idea similar to “Vangh” of “Vahma” (For such modified forms of roots bearing the same meaning see my Gathas.) On these grounds, then, we can assign to the root “Vap” the meaning of “to glorify or adore,” although this “Vap” can also mean “to love” as “Vangh” also means “to love.” The following are the two Gathic passages wherein this verb occurs:—

“Do you come to my invocations for pleasure—I, who am in the highest degree adoring (or loving) you, O Right Law! and Reason, and Mazda Ahura, whose undecayable authority does High-thought further.”

(Y. 43, 8.) 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬎

“so long as I praise thee and adore (or glorify or love) Thee O Mazda!” The adoration or love of Mazda Asura, Vohû Manangh and Asha that we find in the first passage reminds us of the love service of Mazda Ahura, Asha, and Vahishta Manangh by a praise alluded to in Y. 50, 4. Similarly the joint occurrence of “Staomi” and “Ufya” in the second passage can be accounted for in the same way as the joint mention of Staota and Vahma in Y. 34, 2, and Y. 45, 8.

by that being. For instance, when Zarathûshtra calls Sraosha for help in order to realise the Kingdom of Reason, we are to understand that the existence of divine knowledge in a man is the chief requisite for the establishment of a kingdom or an authority of Reason within him ; hence the important good influence that will be produced by the realisation of divine knowledge on a man's condition, is spoken of as the help given by Sraosha. So also when Asha is invoked " to come with the good Ashi " (51, 10) it is the condition of virtuousness bringing a number of material blessings or good fortune with it, that is meant. The difficulty, however, arises when invocation is made to Mazda Ahura, because, although Mazda Ahura too has a literal signification, viz. that of " the Great-Creator-Governor," there is nothing in this meaning which may help us to explain the help given by Mazda Ahura in return for invocation, in just the same way as we have explained the help of Sraosha and of Asha ; that is, we can't imagine in the literal meaning of Mazda Ahura any idea of something or condition that can be realised by man at present, just as, for instance, virtuousness and the divine knowledge are realised by a man. It seems at first sight, therefore, that the invocation of Mazda Ahura has something mystic about it which is not capable of being explained even by making allowance for the personified form of representation which we find many times in the Gathâs. The difficulty here, however, is to a great extent relieved when we remember that Spénishta Mainyû, or Spénta Mainyû or Vahishta Mainyû, or Vohu Mainyû, as these two terms occur in the Gathâs, are names of the divine spirit inherent in every human being, and that each of these four names, especially Spénishta Mainyû and Vahishta Mainyû, can be applied also to the Supreme Godhead. This we have already shown at length before. Hence a man's invocation of Mazda Ahura is only his invocation of the indwelling Divine Spirit of his own self : and this invocation of one's own divine spirit is an expression of one's whole-hearted wish that this Spirit which is the source of everything good may inspire him with the knowledge and enthusiasm necessary for acquiring the boons associated with that spirit. The author originally wrote ' on this point we find an important passage in the Gathâs which we have already explained before.' It runs thus :—" I who am an upright *invoker* associated with virtuousness require (to know) from the Best Spirit what actions he willed (or wills) to be done with resolution (or sincerity). (Therefore) do I desire, (O) Ahura Mazda ! for a vision of Thee and a conference with Thee." This context makes it clear that the invoker invokes Vahishta Mainyû or Ahura Mazda. Now Vahishta Mainyû being the divine spirit in man that is identical with Mazda

which he simply expresses his wish for a good object without feeling what he himself is required to do in that respect ; the second attitude that should follow the first is that of invocation by which that man, not resting contented with merely wishing for something sincerely wants help or encouragement to gain that object. The ideas implied in Yâs and Zû (or Zbâ) are, thus, those of wishing to gain and being encouraged in gaining. A man who wants to gain a good object cannot gain it without encouraging himself to put forth efforts in that direction. But this self-encouragement cannot be had by him as long as his will is not sincerely attached to that object.

ON THE CONDUCT OF ONE INDIVIDUAL TOWARDS
ANOTHER.

The sharp distinction drawn in the Avesta between the good and the evil principle, and therefore between the good and the evil people should naturally lead us to expect to find in it some rules that should guide the conduct of a man towards the good and the evil people respectively. In the course of the description of the great religio-socio-political conflict that we find centred round the personality of Zarathûshtra in the Gathâs, wherein the parties of Asha and Drûj, or of Ashavan and Drêgvant, are ranged against one another, we find certain rules laid down by Zarathushtra, without which that conflict could not have been a real conflict at all. The Gathâs do not admit of a compromise between Asha, Virtue, and Druj, Vice, or between Ashavan, the virtuous, and Drêgvant, the vicious one, for the sake even of material requirements. This uncompromising attitude towards the evil people taken up by Zarathûshtra and his followers is one of the outstanding features of the Gathâs, and shows the great courage that he exhibited in his unflinching opposition to the evil people, however powerful these latter may be, and in his whole-hearted support of virtuous people in spite of their materially weak position. This is clearly witnessed from the following pronouncements that are made in the Gathâs :—

[illegible][illegible]

“ Let no high person please (or, satisfy) the vicious people, for thus they have been regarding all virtuous people as harmful-ones. In these lines Zarathûshtra enjoins upon every good man not to satisfy the vicious people in any respect because these vicious people, although they themselves are the true authors of suffering and destruction in the country, have been regarding their opponents, the virtuous people, as so many agents of suffering and destruction.¹ Hence if any sympathy is shown towards, or any support given unto, such vicious people, they will be strengthened more and more in their hostile attitude towards the virtuous. Thus an uncompromising attitude was necessary in the case of such people. This is the reason why a man who is a supporter of the vicious is himself called vicious, while on the contrary, that man is regarded as being himself virtuous who shows his love towards a virtuous man.

سزاسر. زب. وایزاسر. سزاسر. وایزاسر. سزاسر. وایزاسر. سزاسر.
 سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر. سزاسر.

(Y. 46, 6.)

“ Because he himself is vicious who is best for (i.e., the greatest supporter of) the vicious one. He himself is virtuous to whom the virtuous one is dear.” It is, however, not simply passive resistance that is preached against the vicious people. We are told in Y. 33, 2, “ He who doeth harm (lit. physical evil) to the vicious either by word (of mouth), or by thought (of curse), or by both the hands (i.e., by some action), and who giveth instruction to him in anything that is good, such persons are devoted to, or make offerings unto, the Will of Ahura Mazda, in, or according to, the pleasure of Ahura Mazda.” This passage inculcates opposition to, and punishment of, the vicious not simply by thought, or by verbal utterances but also by action done “ with both hands.” Punishments, however, should not be the end and aim of our attitude against the vicious ; but, as is said in this very passage, instruction in good things should be imparted unto him after he is punished. Such an attitude, at once strict and benevolent, entitles a man to be regarded as having made offerings unto Mazda and having thus pleased Him, as the last line of the stanza shows. Just as active resistance is enjoined against the vicious people, active assistance,

¹ A full explanation of this Gathic line will be given in my work on the Gathās.

and not simply benevolent neutrality is inculcated towards the virtuous, as we see in Y. 33, 3, which says :—

سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى.
 ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس.

سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى.
 ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس.

سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى.
 ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس.

“ That man who is best (*i.e.*, the greatest helper) for the virtuous, whether that man be a kinsman, or a servant, or a friend, and is one who perseveringly cares for the land, that man is (or, will be said to be) in the industrial-service of Asha (virtue) and Vohu Manangh (Reason).” A man who assists the virtuous, advances the cause of virtuousness (Asha) and Reason. Hence such a man is spoken of as being in the service of Asha and Vohû Manangh. It is not, however, a man of powerful means alone that can inflict punishment on the vicious and thus assist the vicious ; even a man of scanty resources, if he is really loving the virtuous, should find himself capable of inflicting punishment or harm on the vicious. This idea is found in Y. 47, 4, where it is said

سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى. سزى.
 ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس. ولس.

“ A person of scanty resources (or, of inferior position) as well as a powerful person of abundant resources shall, in his love for the virtuous, be a punishment (or harm) inflictor unto the vicious,” Zarathûshtra himself was a redoubtable enemy of the

vicious and a strong champion of the virtuous, as he himself defines his position :—

من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.
من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.

(Y. 43, 8.)

“ I am a real powerful pain-inflicting-foe for the vicious, but a (source of) mighty joy for the virtuous.” Zarathûshtra knows no compromise between the virtuous and the vicious. This firm attitude of Zarathûshtra is again expressed in Y. 46, 18, which runs thus :—

من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.
من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.

من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.
من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.
من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.
من شد دلداده. و درین بر من می رسد. دلداده. و این بر من رسد.

“ He who shall be unto my followers a supporter (or, strengthener by charity)—unto him, indeed, shall I teach (or show) the best things pertaining to my wealth of Reason but I shall show (or promise) sufferings unto him who will deliver us over to suffering. This, O Mazda-Asha ! is the judgment (or decision) of my practical-intelligence and of my thought (or will), as one who wishes to satisfy your Will (or, in order to satisfy your Will).” Zarathûshtra would not allow himself to be a passive sufferer at the hands of his enemies. He will send sufferings back on the heads of those who will cause sufferings unto him. Moreover, that this attitude of his was not begotten of a passionate animosity is proved from the last two lines of this passage where he speaks of his adoption of such an attitude as a decision arrived at by his thought and practical intelligence. He had thought over the

matter in his mind and he came to the conclusion that a compromise between his virtuous party and the vicious party was impossible for the sake of that good cause which he had at heart. Again, it is, as "a satisfier of the will of God" that he has come to this conclusion. The spread of virtue which Mazda expects from man cannot be achieved except by overpowering those who obstruct its realisation. The satisfaction of the Will of God by a person inflicting punishment on, and instructing, the vicious, is referred to in Y. 33. 2.

The spirit of the Gathas as regards the attitude to be adopted towards a good and an evil man, is preserved in the non-Gathic Avestan writings. In Y. 11, 15, a supplicant "prays for the comfort and bliss of (or, for) all the virtuous people, and for the distress and misery of (or, for) all the vicious people,"—

اندرين مهرمن. ميسر (ميسر) مهرمن. سدا (سدا) مهرمن. واپ مهرمن داسد.
 ميسر مهرمن. واپ مهرمن داسد. واپ مهرمن داسد. سدا (سدا) مهرمن.
 واپ مهرمن داسد. واپ مهرمن داسد. واپ مهرمن داسد.

Such statements, however should not be understood as implying a malicious will simply to do harm to the vicious. No : distress and misery are prayed for against a vicious person in order only that they may act as a check on the continuance of his vicious activity. It is the moral effect of physical sufferings experienced by a bad man that is the chief object of such imprecations. As long as a vicious person lives in "comfort and bliss," the viciousness of his character is not brought home to his mind. It is only when he begins to reap the bad consequences of his bad conduct that he can be expected to become conscious of that bad conduct and thus give a chance of future improvement. This fact has already been noticed by us in the Gathas, from Y. 33, 2, where all the physical evil that is preached against the vicious people has as its object, their education and consequently the improvement of their character. And this is further corroborated by Y. 44, 14, which says that the vice of the vicious people is to be annihilated by "the precepts of God's doctrine" after they are brought under the control of the virtuous people by means of physical force. On the other hand, "comfort and bliss," realised by virtuous people, are a great help to them in the continuance of their virtuous activity and thus in advancing the moral and material progress of mankind. The value of helping, and giving

ON THE AIM OF MAN.

The idea of the best condition of existence, or of what is generally called heaven, is expressed in our literature by the terms Vahishta (Best, or Behésht), Vahishta Anghū (Best Life), Vahishta Manangh (Best Reason, or Best Intelligence) and Garo Demâna (the abode of Glory). As the opposite of these we have Achishta Anghū (the worst life), Achishta Manangh (worst mind) and Drûjo Demâna (the abode of Lie, or of Vice) all of which signify a hell or a hellish condition of life. I shall first explain the signification of each of these terms as they occur in the Gathas.

ON VAHISHTA.

The term Vahishta, although an adjective meaning "Best" is very often used as a noun, thereby corresponding with the Behésht of Modern Persian. In Y. 31, 6, we read thus :—

"Unto Him-who, as the knowing one, declared the True Precept of Truth pertaining to Health and Immortality-belong (lit. is) the Behésht *viz.* that authority (or kingdom) of Mazda pertaining to Health and Immortality, which He increases through His Reason." Here we find Vahishta identified with "the Kingdom of Mazda, pertaining to Health and Immortality and connected with Truth."¹ The idea expressed here is that of the authority of the moral Law associated with Mazda (and also with any righteous person) by the true Mânthra which secures health and immortality of the soul. Such an authority of the moral Law in a person is called the Kingdom of God, and this kingdom is here called the Behésht or the best condition of existence that can befall a person. The same meaning of "Vahishta" is found in Y. 47, 2, which runs thus :—

"He, the Great Giver, the Father of Truth, does through that wisdom of His service the Best (king, *i.e.*, authority) pertaining to his Bounteous Spirit by the utterance of the Words of Reason Through the mouth of Reason and by the Zealous activity of High-Noble-Disposition."

Although the word "Khshathra" does not here occur with "Vahishta" as occurs in the stanza quoted before, yet the whole form of the sentence together with a similar context occurring

¹ This stanza can be construed in another way too, without affecting the meaning of Vahishta, for which see my Gathas.

at other places points to the idea that the Béhést mentioned here is nothing but the best authority. The stanza means to say that the Best authority of Mazda is manifested in this utterance of words and practice of actions, of a good order. He commandeth man, by His Words, things that are true and worthy of being done, and Himself achieves the grandest and noblest actions in the universe,—both of which show the good character of His authority. The identification of this Béhést with “the Good Kingdom” is clearly shown from Y. 51, 1 :—“The good kingdom, the most sustainable lot, lives (lit. walks) amongst the generous ones (or, purifying ones) by means of the actions associated with righteousness and prosperity. That Béhésht for us, let me, O Mazda ! exercise (or, practise) for ever (or, continually)¹.” Here, of course, the authority alluded to can also mean the authority exercised by a good ruler over his people. On this double signification of “khshathra”, however, I shall speak elsewhere. Anyhow we find the “Béhést” here applied to good authority, that is the authority of Mazda. Another passage containing the term “Vahishta” is Y. 51, 22 which runs thus :—“Any person-of those who have been before and are now living in whose love-service Mazda has announced unto me the Béhésht of Righteousness,—those persons would I lovingly-serve in (or, with) their own qualification-titles and approach with love” Here the Béhésht is described as consisting in the love-service of righteous men. The phrase “love-service of such men” can be explained in both the ways : first in the sense of the love-service shown by these men themselves towards Mazda ; secondly, the love-service rendered towards these good men by other people. In whatever way we may take it, the “Béhésht” here has reference to righteous activity, which activity remains righteous as well when it is spoken of as performed for Mazda as when spoken of as performed for the good cause of Mazda championed by some great noble righteous man. Another passage where “Vahishta” occurs in Y. 45, 4, where it is said :—

“I speak unto you (about) the Béhésht of Righteousness, pertaining to this life. Mazda has announced (or, known) him who possesses (or establishes) this Béhésht as the father of the efficiently active Reason, and a daughter to him is also the good-working noble-disposition. The all seeing Ahura is not to be deceived (or, does not tell an untruth). This stanza does not show distinctly in what does this Béhésht lie. But the fact that this Béhést is said to be “of righteousness” and also that the

¹ This stanza admits of more than one translation, for which see my *Gathas*.

man who possesses, or establishes, that Béhést is described as the father of Reason and High-Thought, does at least show that Béhésht to be connected with these good things ; and as we find " Kingdom " very closely associated with, Reason, and Noble-Disposition and Righteousness, the " Behesht " alluded to here can be nothing else but the kingdom reigning in a man who has realised these three good things, or that activity or love-service of Mazda associated with these three things which we found in Y. 51, 22 " Vahishta " occurs again in Y. 28, 8 which stands thus :—" O Thou Best One ! I beg of Thee, the Lord unanimous with the Best Truth,—I, the lover (of the same) beg of Thee the " Béhésht " for Frashaoshtra, for myself, and for those unto whom Thou dost present Reason (lit. that thing of Reason) for the whole period of life. In this passage, Vahishta occurs thrice, of which one is applied to Mazda, one to Asha and the third is used for Béhésht. The speaker here prays that he, together with Frashaoshtra and all other good followers of his, may succeed in realising the Béhést. Here, again, we are not told in what things does the Béhésht consist. But the fact that it is " the authority of the Moral Law " is shown by Y. 49, 8, where the speaker begs for " Ashahyâ Sarêm " (authority of moral Law or righteousness or virtuous leadership) " for Frashaoshtra and for myself." This is of course one of those passages where the authority of righteousness or moral law can be construed in both the ways, viz., by regarding it as the authority of that law existing in a man's own person, or as the righteous authority exercised by a good ruler over his subjects.

Here I end my examination of " Vahishta " as it occurs in the Gathas. The ideas we came across during that examination can be summarised as follows :—

The Béhésht is the best condition of life that can befall a man. It consists in possessing in one's own person the authority or kingdom of Mazda which is the same as the authority of Reason and Moral Law. If a man causes his life's actions to be dictated by authority of Reason and Moral Law, that is the best condition of life that can befall him. Sometimes, however, this kingdom of Mazda can also be understood as referring not only to individual persons, but also to the whole society, that is a sort of Divine republic is formed among the virtuous people, no other authority being recognised than that of Reason and the True Law of Mazda with Mazda Ahura at their head. Similarly, the same expression is sometimes used for the Benevolent-minded

and just authority of a righteous sovereign over his people who thereby furthers the cause of righteousness among those people under his rule. There is nothing in the above-quoted passages which should make us understand this Béhésht as having no reference to the present earthly life of human beings.

ON VAHISHTA ANGHŪ.

The second term that requires to be examined in connection with the subject of Heaven, is "Vahishta Anghū" "the Best Life (human)." This term, occurs only once in the Gathas, as also its antonym Achishta Anghū (the Worst Life).

This is in Y. 44, 2 which runs as follows :—

وَسَلَتَسَ . سَوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .
 وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .
 وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .
 وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .

"How, O Mazda! is that man, the beneficent one, associated with righteousness, a protector from all things pertaining to damnation, a friend of people through his spirit, how is he—who wishes it—to be benefitted in his desire of the foremost thing (or, the highest object of desire) pertaining to the Best Life?" What is called here "the first and foremost thing" pertaining "to the Best Life" is repeated in Y. 45, 3, in the words "The first-and-foremost thing

of this (or, that) Life" . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .

What then, is this foremost thing which is required for realising "the best life?" The answer to this question is supplied not so much from the passage we have just quoted as from Y. 45, 3 which is as follows :—

وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .
 وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ . وَاوَسَنَ .

which is the highest object associated with desire, of the doers-of-right-actions, from the offering-associated with Reason-of the doers-of-right-actions." Here we find that the speaker asks Mazda to bring about the most advanced condition of life; and this condition is here said to be belonging to, and aspired after by men who are doing those true actions which will lead to that true goal. In this passage we have not the word "Haithim" occurring with Frashotémém (as it does in 46, 19), but "Haithya" occurring as a part of the compound "haithya&Varshatâm."

We shall now pass on to the term "Manahîm Ahûm" as it occurs in the Gathas. The word "Manahîm", coming from "Manangh" "mind", signifies something which is only conceived in the mind but which is not an actually experienced fact. Hence "Manahîm Ahûm" means a condition of life which exists in the realm of thought, and which is not actually realised but is conceived as going to arise in future. Thus it means "a cogitable, or conceivable life." This cogitable life, when understood by itself, does not indicate whether this life denotes an earthly or a spiritual condition of existence, the mind being capable of conceiving both. Let us see, however, if something definite can be arrived at by examining Y. 53, 6 which is the only Gathic passage where we find this term used. The speaker, while addressing words of admonition to the marrying couples and probably also the audience assembled, says:—

وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج.
وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج.
وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج. وایو داندج.

"For (or, through) the vicious ones, bearing (or, supporting) the lustful-feeling (or, the dead or damned condition) of bad-enjoyment, and devoid of the right-law (or, destroyers of the right-law) the bliss is totally destroyed. By means of (or, amongst) such persons, O ye men and women! ye are ruining (or, will ruin) the ideal (or, cogitable) life."

This ruin, or destruction of the life of the good people at the hands of the evil people seems to have a very strong resemblance with what is called in Y. 51, 13 "the crushing of the veracious highest condition by the religion, or ethical law, or character,

of the vicious party." We should also note in this connection the ruin of the life of people alluded to in "ahûm mêtânshyât" (Y. 45, 11) and in "ahûm mêtêngêidyâi" (46, 11) and anghêush marêkhtâro ahyâ (Y. 32, 13).

As regards the signification of "manahîm" we should not fail to notice that the idea of spirit, or something spiritual in all the Avestan writings including the Gathas, is not expressed by the word "manangh" from which "manahîm" comes, but by the word "mainyû." The former, "manangh", relates to the sphere of thought which is not the sphere of the spirit. Hence "manahîm ahûm" cannot mean spiritual life except only by putting that construction on the term "cogitable life", which phrase can by itself be understood in an earthly as well as in a spiritual sense. This is one of the instances where we see the author of the Gathas not giving any definite indication as to whether what we call the next life is an earthly or a non-earthly condition.

ON FRASHŌKĒRĒTI.

We now pass on to another phrase which is connected with the idea of a future high life. It is the phrase "Frashêm ahûm." It signifies "an advanced humanity, or condition of human life, though not so advanced as that which was called "Frashotê-mêm" which is the superlative form of "Frashêm." With this phrase is associated the doctrine of what is called "Frashokêrêti." We shall therefore examine this doctrine here fully before dealing with other Gathic terms connected with the ideas of Heaven and Hell.

Frashokêrêti is derived from "Frasha", meaning "fresh" or "new" and "kêrê", "to do or make." Thus literally, it expresses the idea of the making something new and strong by destroying its old weak condition. The two parts of this compound word are found used separately at some places as in the words "Frashêm kérénaun" (Y. 30, 9). This fact should help us in determining the real original signification of the word "Frashōkêrêti". But here again as in so many other points,

"Amesha Spentas", thirdly (23 and 24) with reference to the spiritual and earthly "Yazatas" and the born and unborn Renovator-Saoshyants, and lastly (89, 90) with reference to "the Victorious Saoshyant." The text of 11 and 12 is as follows ¹ :—

۱۱. ۱۲. ۱۳. ۱۴. ۱۵. ۱۶. ۱۷. ۱۸. ۱۹. ۲۰. ۲۱. ۲۲. ۲۳. ۲۴. ۲۵. ۲۶. ۲۷. ۲۸. ۲۹. ۳۰. ۳۱. ۳۲. ۳۳. ۳۴. ۳۵. ۳۶. ۳۷. ۳۸. ۳۹. ۴۰. ۴۱. ۴۲. ۴۳. ۴۴. ۴۵. ۴۶. ۴۷. ۴۸. ۴۹. ۵۰. ۵۱. ۵۲. ۵۳. ۵۴. ۵۵. ۵۶. ۵۷. ۵۸. ۵۹. ۶۰. ۶۱. ۶۲. ۶۳. ۶۴. ۶۵. ۶۶. ۶۷. ۶۸. ۶۹. ۷۰. ۷۱. ۷۲. ۷۳. ۷۴. ۷۵. ۷۶. ۷۷. ۷۸. ۷۹. ۸۰. ۸۱. ۸۲. ۸۳. ۸۴. ۸۵. ۸۶. ۸۷. ۸۸. ۸۹. ۹۰. ۹۱. ۹۲. ۹۳. ۹۴. ۹۵. ۹۶. ۹۷. ۹۸. ۹۹. ۱۰۰.

"Which (Glory) will make the world fresh, undecaying, undying, not corruptible, not putrifying always living, always benefitting, governing at will, The dead will rise again. Life and immortality will come. The world will become fresh according to its will."

The crux of this passage lies in determining whether the verbs are used in the sense of the future or of the present, or as the past tense, since this will make us know whether the author of this writing had in view some renovated condition of things already brought about in the past time, or something going on at the present time, or that commonly-understood resurrection going to take place at a particular point of time in the remote future. Now no one can deny that all the verbs in the above passage with the exception of "dathaite" (which is in the present tense) are in the imperfect tense. At the same time it should be remembered that this imperfect often implies in it a sense of the future, or of the past tense, at least in the Gathas. The difficulty, then, seems to be great of determining whether these passages of the Zamyâd Yasht refer to a past, or a present, or a future event. A great deal of this difficulty,

The text of 19-20 and 23-24 is the same except that we have the words "Frashêm ahûm dâthêm" instead of "Frashêm ahûm kérénaon." So also in 89-90 where instead of "Kerenavân" in the plural, we have "Kerenavât" in the singular.

words "Sûra" and "Vanghûi" which are the epithets of Frashô-kérêti in these passages. Is the "Sûra Vanghûi" (heroic and good) "Frashôkêrêti" different from the ordinary Frashôkêrêtis? Can we understand it to be the consummation of all ordinary Frashokêrêtis? since we are bound in any way to fall upon the idea of an ultimate goal which we aim at while carrying our advancement to a higher and higher stage.

Besides Frashokêrêti, we have also the word "Frashocharêthra," meaning one who makes renovation, so I have already pointed out before, such persons are stated in our writings as not only going to arise in future times, but as having also existed in the past times (Zâtanâm azâtanêm Freshô-charêthrâm Saoshyantâm). Now the fact that draws our attention is, that the chapter (3rd) of Zamyâd Yt. in which mention is made of these Frashocharethras is immediately followed by chapters in which mention is made of the names of some most prominent Iranian personages of past times, and a short summary of their achievements. These are Haoshyangha, Yima, Thraetaona, Kêrésêspa, Kavi Kavâta, Kavi Haosravangh, Zarathûshtra, and Vishtâspa. Apart from what tradition says regarding these personages, we have the testimony of the Avesta to the fact that all these personages did by their actions in life produce mighty good changes in the condition of things existing in their respective times which changes led the people of the time to a higher level of morality and happiness.¹ It being so, these personages were distinguished as "Frashocharêthra Saoshyants", i.e., benefactors who caused renovation. Saoshyants, or benefactors there may be many. But the "Frashocharêthra Saoshyants" who in Farvardin Yasht, are placed on a level with "Paoirya Tkaeshas", that is, with the foremost law-givers, or teachers, are like these latter personages, "the lodestars of humanity," those round whom the affairs of the whole country turn. The advancement that is effected by them is not of that imperceptible kind which it is in the power of any ordinary virtuous person to effect. Such men's actions are epoch-making actions, and influence the life of the whole country. The "Frashocharêthra Saoshyants" are not only already born (Zâta) but also to be born (azâta). Moreover, the very mention of unborn "Frashocharêthra Saoshyants" in the plural number is sufficient to refute the idea that there is only one such Saoshyant going to arise in future. Many such Saoshyants have already been in the past, as those whose names are given above, and many will arise in future. There are, however, some passages in the extant Avesta

¹ See Yt. 19, 26, 28, 29, 31-33, 36, 37, 40-44, 71-72, 74-77, 79-81 and 84

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
 (Yt. 13, 130.) ··նոյաւեօյնս

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
 (Ys. 13, 131.)

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
 (Yt. 13, 136.)

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս
 (Yt. 13, 137.)·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
 (Yt. 13, 138.) ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս

In just the same way, in the case of Astvat-Ērēta we should have the passage stand thus :—

·նոյաւեօյնս ··բըստնաւ ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս ··նիւնս
·նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս ··նոյաւեօյնս
 ··նոյաւեօյնս

Thus, Astvat-Ērēta of this passage should be regarded as a man of the past times just like the men named in the above five passages.

clause into consideration refer to a personage connected with the future times,—chiefly because after the mention of the already born Frashocheréthra Saoshyants from Haoshyangha down to Zarathûshtra and Vishtaspa, we should expect some mention of the unborn Frashocharéthra Saoshyants, as both these are referred to together in Yt. 19, 23. Hence it is not wrong to say that the “Saoshyant” and the “Astvat-Êrêta” of Yt. 19, 89, 96 are to be placed in the latter category, that is, as men of future times.

Is all this, then, inconsistent with what we have said before regarding Frashokérêti? At first sight it seems so. But at the same time we have no authority to say that the authors of the above-quoted passages denied the act of Frashokérêti having been performed also in past times. One can speak of, and give special prominence to, the last “Frashocharéthra Saoshyant” of all, without thereby denying the existence of other Frashocharéthra Saoshyants born or unborn. Taking into consideration the idea formerly alluded to that the ordinary Frashokérêtis tend to the ultimate goal of the “Sûrâ Vangûhî Frashokérêti, we can in a similar manner say that although there have been many Frashocharéthra Saoshyants in the past and there will be many in future, yet the ultimate condition of things for humanity is associated with a particular Frashocharéthra Saoshyant who is the last of all.

ON APÊMA URVAESA.

At this stage of our treatment of the subject of “The aim of man” we should draw attention to a phrase occurring in the Gathas, whose signification is connected with the doctrine of Frashokérêti. This phrase is “apêma urvaesa”. Urvaesa, from “Urvis” (an extended form of Var) to turn, literally signifies turning, and thus, when used with reference to time and not to space, denotes a point of time entered into by means of a turn, that is, a moment. Different moments of time are so many different turnings of time which make the one continuous string of time. Hence “apêma urvaesa” means “the final moment.”¹

¹ This is shown also from Y. 71, 21, where Zarathûshtra is ordered to declare a particular doctrine upto the “ustema urvaesa of his life” (ustêmê urvaesê gayêhê) which can only mean “the last moment” of his life. “Urvis” sometimes also expresses the idea of turning with reference to space and not to time as the turning of a wheel or of a chariot (Yt. 13, 89) the turning or the revolution of the sun, moon and stars, (Yt. 13, 58), and so on.

—and not anything stated in the Gathas—that can be said to be definitely denoting a particular point of time in the remote future connected with the happening of some particular event.

ON GARÔ DEMÂNA OR HEAVEN.

We shall now revert to the subject of Heaven. We have explained the true signification of Vahishta-Anghû, and Frasho-témém, as denoting a most advanced state of human existence. There is yet one more important term remaining which as containing the same idea requires to be explained. It is Garô Demâna. "Demâna" means "home, abode," hence also a condition in which life is led. In this sense we have found it used in the phrases "Vanghéush manangho demâna," "Drûjô Demâna" and "achishtahyâ mananghō demâna." The word "Garô" (gen. sing) derived from "gar" to shine, means "splendour, or glory." Hence Garô Demâna expresses the idea of "the Home of Glory (or, Glorious Abode)." It denotes the idea of the most glorious or splendid, and therefore the happiest condition of existence to which man can aspire. From this its literal meaning one cannot draw any definite conclusion whether this highest happiest condition is to be reached on earth, or whether it is used for a spiritual condition of existence divorced of all earthly life. Let us here read the Gathic passages on this point. "We should love (or, like) Him (lit. love should be rendered unto him) by our humble praises,—now that I, having known that Great-Creator-Governor associated with the Law as belonging to (lit. of) the action and the word of the Good Spirit, have now perceived Him. Let us, then, establish this glorifications or adorations in the Home-of-Glory." It should be remembered that this is one of those three important Gathic passages (Y. 45, 8, 9, 10) which describe in the form of a kernel as it were the duties owed by man to Mazda Ahura. One of these is described in this passage as that of appreciating the intrinsic goodness of Mazda Ahura, and of following up this theoretical appreciation of Him by striving to "establish His glorifications or adorations more and more upto the point when the condition of Garô Demâna is reached. This latter idea becomes clear when we remember the bearing of the term Vahma on Garô Demâna. We have shown before that Vahma signifies the glorification, or adoration, of Mazda Ahura, witnessed in the realisation by man of all the benefits associated with a virtuous heavenly life. Hence, when the speaker here tells his audience to "establish the glorifications (of Mazda) in the Garô Demâna," his meaning is that they should persevere in the act of glorifying Mazda Ahura on earth by leading a higher and still higher condition of life and consequently by realising the

good boons thereof, upto the maximum point when that glorification of Mazda will be manifested in the most perfect form, in the case of an individual and this perfect form of Mazda's glorification can take place only in that highest condition of a man's life wherein he has attained to the highest degree of virtuousness. This morally highest and happiest condition it is, which is known here by the name Garô Demâna, or the Home of Glorious splendour. It is to be noted that this passage occurs in a chapter in which we see mention made also of the Behest (Vahishta) and "that life" (ahyâ aňgheush) (Y. 45, 3, 4). Another Gathic passage where we find Garô Demâna occurring in Y. 50, 4, which runs thus :—" I, the praiser, would lovingly serve you, O Mazda Ahura, together with Asha (Law or Virtue) and Vahishta Manangh (the Best Intelligence) and khshathra (kingdom) in the path of which the strong-willed desirer (of the same) stands firm. Let me listen to the famous gifts in the Home of Splendour." Here the signification of the word " gifts " should be properly understood. Leaving a detailed explanation of this word " aredra " for some other work, suffice it to note here that in this stanza it is used for the gifts given by Mazda to man in the form of the good doctrines of life. These good doctrines of life that are announced by Mazda can be heard by a man in Garô Demâna, that is, when he has brought himself in that " abode " or condition of mental existence which is called the abode of Glory. It is in this condition that a man has the great truths of Mazda revealed unto him by Mazda. And it is this which is meant by the prophets having a vision of, and a conference with, the Great-Creator-Lord. This condition is called the condition of glory or splendour, since it is the best condition that a man can bring himself in. We asked before whether it should be understood as an earthly or non-earthly condition. The condition of Garô Demâna is certainly a mental spiritual condition, but this condition can be experienced by a man without his being deprived of his bodily frame. It is a condition in which our body certainly has no function, but our mind or soul can raise itself to it by its moral force. This is in accord with the meaning of Béhest or the kingdom of God as we explained it before. This kingdom can exist in our person, nay it is our duty to make it exist in our person while leading the earthly life. The Béhest, or the kingdom of Mazda, or Garô Demâna are certainly no enjoyments of body, that is, no physical experiences nor conditions restricted by the condition of space, but are moral or mental or spiritual conditions which we can bring ourselves in, provided there is in us that moral or spiritual force which is necessary to bring it about. The third place where the Garô Demâna occurs in the Gathas is Y. 51, 15, which runs thus :—" The reward in the House of Glory which

Zarathûshtra showed (or taught or promised) unto the pure ones, and Mazda Ahura realised (lit. reached, or attained to) first (or, in the highest measure) such rewards as that will be promised (or, I shall promise) unto you with benefits through Reason and Righteousness." Here we read of Mazda Ahura Himself being the first or the highest being in possession of that sweet-blessedness which exists in the best glorious condition of existence. The third line shows that any man can attain to it through Reason and the Right-Law. There is nothing here that can make us regard Garô Demâna as a condition that can only be non-earthly and not possible to be realised by a man in his earthly life. At least it is not inconsistent with the explanation we gave above with reference to Y. 50, 4. It should also be noted that this passage (51, 15) which makes mention of Garô Demâna is immediately preceded by one which contains the terms "Drujô Demâna," meaning the Home of Druj, which expresses the idea of a very bad condition of life, which, too, as I shall show below, can very reasonably and easily be understood as pertaining to the life of individuals on earth.

At this stage our examination of Heaven or of a high life as found in the Gathas ends; and I have tried to show how the ideas of Vahishta, Vahishta Anghû, Frashotêmêm, and Garô Demâna, are closely similar to each other, and how all of them denote the very high condition of life for a man, and how the context of each and every passage where they occur can have reference to the earthly existence of a person. Some of these terms, viz., Vahishta Anghû, Garô Demâna, and Manahim Ahûm, are also to be found in the non-Gathic texts of the Avesta. Before examining these, however, we shall continue our treatment of the Gathic Heaven and Hell by an exposition of the doctrine of Hell in the Gathas.

ON ACHISHTA ANGHÛ.

There are two Gathic terms containing the idea of what is generally called Hell, viz., Achishta Anghû, and Drûjo Demâna, Achishta Anghû (Worst Life) is the exact antonym of Vahishta Anghû (Best Life); while Drûjo Demâna (the Abode of Lie, or of vice) has not an exact antonym like "Ashahyâ Demâna (since Asha is the antonym of Drûj) as we may expect to find, but we have "Ashâ hadêmoi" (the dwelling, or seat associated with the Right-Law, or righteousness (44, 9) though "Vanghêush Mananghō Demânâ" or "Garô Demâna" can also be understood as contrasted with "Drûjo Demâna".

Achishta Anghû occurs only once in the Gathas (as is also the case with Vahishta Anghû) and this in that important passage,

Y. 30, 2, which we quoted before while dealing with the subject of the two spirits. In view of its importance, let us quote it here again, "Verily when those two spirits first came together to make life and death—in which way indeed will it be upto the end—the Worst life is of the vicious ones, and the virtuous ones belongs the Best Reason." Here "the worst life" is contrasted not with "the best life", but with "the best Reason", since as we have pointed out on the subject of Vahishta Managh, it is in the best Reason that the Best Life lies. There is nothing in this stanza which should make us say that the reference here is to the condition of life befalling a man after his death. The bare statement is that ever since the beginning of the human world, the principle that is prevalent is that the best life consisting in the best Reason is enjoyed by the virtuous ones, while the worst life is led by those who are the enemies of the Right-Law. It is quite in accordance with reason to say that these lives are the lives we lead here on earth at present. This fact also should be noted that the words "in which way will be upto the end" apply to the making of life and death at the hands of the two spirits; that is, life and death were not only the conditions that befell the first human being, but they are conditions that also befall all other human beings that have followed and that will follow him. I attach special importance to this point since it is the word "apémem" that has led some to the opinion that "the end" referred to here is to be understood in connection with the third line of this stanza, in which it will denote the idea of the life of an individual after death.

(While writing these lines for printing, I have seen that there is another way too in which this stanza can be translated, according to the characteristic of the Gathas: this, however, will be dealt with in my work on the Gathas.)

ON DRÛJO DEMÂNA.

The hell meant by "Drûjo Demâna" "the abode of lie, or of vice" is that condition of existence which is associated with bad character and career based upon opposition to the Right-Law, and which has not the least amount of that blessed heavenliness which is associated with a virtuous condition of life based upon a knowledge of the Right-Law. This meaning—and this is the only one correct meaning—has nothing in it which can make us regard it as a condition of suffering befalling a man after his death as a result of bad conduct shown in the present earthly life. It denotes not the physical suffering, but the moral degradation of an individual. Hence if we put the English equivalent "hell"

for "Drûjo Demâna" we should understand this hell to be consisting in the morally bad position or the vicious character which attaches to an individual during his present earthly life, associated with an unjust oppression of the good people. Let us see the context of the three Gathic passages where this term occurs. In Y. 46, 11, it is said—"The Karapans and Kavis whom their own willing-self and their own character harden (or, afflict) when they come there where the Bridge of Longing is, combined their powers to ruin the life of the people by their bad actions. Their persons (or, existences, or bodies) are for ever in the Home of Vice."

This passage has a double importance, since we find in it "Chinvato Peretû" mentioned together with "Drûjo Demâna." This circumstance would seem at first sight to confirm the traditional view of Hell and the Bridge and to leave no room for explaining either of these ideas as having reference to the earthly life of man. However, it is not so. As we shall show later on, Chinvat Peretû is the bridge or path of longing which is longed for by every good individual on earth, that path or bridge leading to the best and happiest condition of life. The meaning of the whole passage is that the Kavis and the Karapans are men of such inner sentiments and bad character, that whenever they come to see the good path of life which alone produces bliss, their hearts harden themselves and consequently would have nothing to do with that righteous path: this being their position, they will continue to lead a bad life, a life in the "home of vice," it being not possible for them on account of their hardened hearts to abandon their bad conduct. Emphasis will be laid on the words "Yavoi Vispâi" by the holders of the traditional view of Drûjo Demâna and Chinvato Peretû. These words meaning "for the whole period of time" or "for ever" denote the idea of permanence. What, then, as some will ask, is meant by saying that those vicious persons will have their existence in "Drûjo Demâna" for the whole period of time, or for ever? How then can the idea of permanence be associated with the comparatively small number of years associated with the earthly life of every individual? Apart from the question whether it is only individuals or a whole race that is referred to here, we think too much stress should not be laid on the words "for the whole period of time," or "for ever" since we can very reasonably argue that this permanent existence in Drûjo Demâna is based upon the condition that those vicious people are not at all expected to adopt a good way of life on account of their hardened viciousness. Hence when it is said that the existence of the Karapans and Kavis will be in Drûjo Demâna for ever, it is because there is no

chance of their improvement. And thus “yavoi Vispâi” here denotes the idea of permanence as far as the earthly life led at present by the Kavis and Karapans is concerned.

We find Drûjo Demâna occurring again in the following passage :—“Inimical to the laws pertaining to the noble work for the living world are the Karapans, the destroyers of her perfect prosperity, by their actions and doctrines. That which is their doctrine keeps (or, will keep, or place) them in the Home of Vice upto the end.” The Karapans are here called the enemies of the good laws and therefore of the people of lawful conduct and the greatest opponents of all the virtuous actions which will advance the prosperity of the world. Hence it is said that the doctrine of life which impels them to do such things is such that they would never get free from the bondage of Vice as long as they hold to their bad doctrine : “upto the end” of their life, that is, “for ever” as long as their present life is concerned, will they remain in Drûjo Demâna. The word “apémén” occurring in this stanza just like the “yavoi vispâi” of 46, 11, should not be understood here ¹ as denoting the end of life so as to put the construction on this stanza that the punishment here spoken of is an after-death punishment of the traditional Hell. Here it simply signifies a period continuing upto the end of their life. Here is not the least reference to the fate befalling every individual after his death. This we find elsewhere. This passage, as we have already said before, is followed by another containing the term Garo Demâna, which denotes a state of life quite the opposite of Drûjo Demâna. The third Gathic passage wherein Drûjo Demâna is mentioned is Y. 49, 11, which runs as follows :—

۱-۲-۳-۴-۵-۶-۷-۸-۹-۱۰-۱۱-۱۲-۱۳-۱۴-۱۵-۱۶-۱۷-۱۸-۱۹-۲۰-۲۱-۲۲-۲۳-۲۴-۲۵-۲۶-۲۷-۲۸-۲۹-۳۰-۳۱-۳۲-۳۳-۳۴-۳۵-۳۶-۳۷-۳۸-۳۹-۴۰-۴۱-۴۲-۴۳-۴۴-۴۵-۴۶-۴۷-۴۸-۴۹-۵۰-۵۱-۵۲-۵۳-۵۴-۵۵-۵۶-۵۷-۵۸-۵۹-۶۰-۶۱-۶۲-۶۳-۶۴-۶۵-۶۶-۶۷-۶۸-۶۹-۷۰-۷۱-۷۲-۷۳-۷۴-۷۵-۷۶-۷۷-۷۸-۷۹-۸۰-۸۱-۸۲-۸۳-۸۴-۸۵-۸۶-۸۷-۸۸-۸۹-۹۰-۹۱-۹۲-۹۳-۹۴-۹۵-۹۶-۹۷-۹۸-۹۹-۱۰۰-۱۰۱-۱۰۲-۱۰۳-۱۰۴-۱۰۵-۱۰۶-۱۰۷-۱۰۸-۱۰۹-۱۱۰-۱۱۱-۱۱۲-۱۱۳-۱۱۴-۱۱۵-۱۱۶-۱۱۷-۱۱۸-۱۱۹-۱۲۰-۱۲۱-۱۲۲-۱۲۳-۱۲۴-۱۲۵-۱۲۶-۱۲۷-۱۲۸-۱۲۹-۱۳۰-۱۳۱-۱۳۲-۱۳۳-۱۳۴-۱۳۵-۱۳۶-۱۳۷-۱۳۸-۱۳۹-۱۴۰-۱۴۱-۱۴۲-۱۴۳-۱۴۴-۱۴۵-۱۴۶-۱۴۷-۱۴۸-۱۴۹-۱۵۰-۱۵۱-۱۵۲-۱۵۳-۱۵۴-۱۵۵-۱۵۶-۱۵۷-۱۵۸-۱۵۹-۱۶۰-۱۶۱-۱۶۲-۱۶۳-۱۶۴-۱۶۵-۱۶۶-۱۶۷-۱۶۸-۱۶۹-۱۷۰-۱۷۱-۱۷۲-۱۷۳-۱۷۴-۱۷۵-۱۷۶-۱۷۷-۱۷۸-۱۷۹-۱۸۰-۱۸۱-۱۸۲-۱۸۳-۱۸۴-۱۸۵-۱۸۶-۱۸۷-۱۸۸-۱۸۹-۱۹۰-۱۹۱-۱۹۲-۱۹۳-۱۹۴-۱۹۵-۱۹۶-۱۹۷-۱۹۸-۱۹۹-۲۰۰-۲۰۱-۲۰۲-۲۰۳-۲۰۴-۲۰۵-۲۰۶-۲۰۷-۲۰۸-۲۰۹-۲۱۰-۲۱۱-۲۱۲-۲۱۳-۲۱۴-۲۱۵-۲۱۶-۲۱۷-۲۱۸-۲۱۹-۲۲۰-۲۲۱-۲۲۲-۲۲۳-۲۲۴-۲۲۵-۲۲۶-۲۲۷-۲۲۸-۲۲۹-۲۳۰-۲۳۱-۲۳۲-۲۳۳-۲۳۴-۲۳۵-۲۳۶-۲۳۷-۲۳۸-۲۳۹-۲۴۰-۲۴۱-۲۴۲-۲۴۳-۲۴۴-۲۴۵-۲۴۶-۲۴۷-۲۴۸-۲۴۹-۲۵۰-۲۵۱-۲۵۲-۲۵۳-۲۵۴-۲۵۵-۲۵۶-۲۵۷-۲۵۸-۲۵۹-۲۶۰-۲۶۱-۲۶۲-۲۶۳-۲۶۴-۲۶۵-۲۶۶-۲۶۷-۲۶۸-۲۶۹-۲۷۰-۲۷۱-۲۷۲-۲۷۳-۲۷۴-۲۷۵-۲۷۶-۲۷۷-۲۷۸-۲۷۹-۲۸۰-۲۸۱-۲۸۲-۲۸۳-۲۸۴-۲۸۵-۲۸۶-۲۸۷-۲۸۸-۲۸۹-۲۹۰-۲۹۱-۲۹۲-۲۹۳-۲۹۴-۲۹۵-۲۹۶-۲۹۷-۲۹۸-۲۹۹-۳۰۰-۳۰۱-۳۰۲-۳۰۳-۳۰۴-۳۰۵-۳۰۶-۳۰۷-۳۰۸-۳۰۹-۳۱۰-۳۱۱-۳۱۲-۳۱۳-۳۱۴-۳۱۵-۳۱۶-۳۱۷-۳۱۸-۳۱۹-۳۲۰-۳۲۱-۳۲۲-۳۲۳-۳۲۴-۳۲۵-۳۲۶-۳۲۷-۳۲۸-۳۲۹-۳۳۰-۳۳۱-۳۳۲-۳۳۳-۳۳۴-۳۳۵-۳۳۶-۳۳۷-۳۳۸-۳۳۹-۳۴۰-۳۴۱-۳۴۲-۳۴۳-۳۴۴-۳۴۵-۳۴۶-۳۴۷-۳۴۸-۳۴۹-۳۵۰-۳۵۱-۳۵۲-۳۵۳-۳۵۴-۳۵۵-۳۵۶-۳۵۷-۳۵۸-۳۵۹-۳۶۰-۳۶۱-۳۶۲-۳۶۳-۳۶۴-۳۶۵-۳۶۶-۳۶۷-۳۶۸-۳۶۹-۳۷۰-۳۷۱-۳۷۲-۳۷۳-۳۷۴-۳۷۵-۳۷۶-۳۷۷-۳۷۸-۳۷۹-۳۸۰-۳۸۱-۳۸۲-۳۸۳-۳۸۴-۳۸۵-۳۸۶-۳۸۷-۳۸۸-۳۸۹-۳۹۰-۳۹۱-۳۹۲-۳۹۳-۳۹۴-۳۹۵-۳۹۶-۳۹۷-۳۹۸-۳۹۹-۴۰۰-۴۰۱-۴۰۲-۴۰۳-۴۰۴-۴۰۵-۴۰۶-۴۰۷-۴۰۸-۴۰۹-۴۱۰-۴۱۱-۴۱۲-۴۱۳-۴۱۴-۴۱۵-۴۱۶-۴۱۷-۴۱۸-۴۱۹-۴۲۰-۴۲۱-۴۲۲-۴۲۳-۴۲۴-۴۲۵-۴۲۶-۴۲۷-۴۲۸-۴۲۹-۴۳۰-۴۳۱-۴۳۲-۴۳۳-۴۳۴-۴۳۵-۴۳۶-۴۳۷-۴۳۸-۴۳۹-۴۴۰-۴۴۱-۴۴۲-۴۴۳-۴۴۴-۴۴۵-۴۴۶-۴۴۷-۴۴۸-۴۴۹-۴۵۰-۴۵۱-۴۵۲-۴۵۳-۴۵۴-۴۵۵-۴۵۶-۴۵۷-۴۵۸-۴۵۹-۴۶۰-۴۶۱-۴۶۲-۴۶۳-۴۶۴-۴۶۵-۴۶۶-۴۶۷-۴۶۸-۴۶۹-۴۷۰-۴۷۱-۴۷۲-۴۷۳-۴۷۴-۴۷۵-۴۷۶-۴۷۷-۴۷۸-۴۷۹-۴۸۰-۴۸۱-۴۸۲-۴۸۳-۴۸۴-۴۸۵-۴۸۶-۴۸۷-۴۸۸-۴۸۹-۴۹۰-۴۹۱-۴۹۲-۴۹۳-۴۹۴-۴۹۵-۴۹۶-۴۹۷-۴۹۸-۴۹۹-۵۰۰-۵۰۱-۵۰۲-۵۰۳-۵۰۴-۵۰۵-۵۰۶-۵۰۷-۵۰۸-۵۰۹-۵۱۰-۵۱۱-۵۱۲-۵۱۳-۵۱۴-۵۱۵-۵۱۶-۵۱۷-۵۱۸-۵۱۹-۵۲۰-۵۲۱-۵۲۲-۵۲۳-۵۲۴-۵۲۵-۵۲۶-۵۲۷-۵۲۸-۵۲۹-۵۳۰-۵۳۱-۵۳۲-۵۳۳-۵۳۴-۵۳۵-۵۳۶-۵۳۷-۵۳۸-۵۳۹-۵۴۰-۵۴۱-۵۴۲-۵۴۳-۵۴۴-۵۴۵-۵۴۶-۵۴۷-۵۴۸-۵۴۹-۵۵۰-۵۵۱-۵۵۲-۵۵۳-۵۵۴-۵۵۵-۵۵۶-۵۵۷-۵۵۸-۵۵۹-۵۶۰-۵۶۱-۵۶۲-۵۶۳-۵۶۴-۵۶۵-۵۶۶-۵۶۷-۵۶۸-۵۶۹-۵۷۰-۵۷۱-۵۷۲-۵۷۳-۵۷۴-۵۷۵-۵۷۶-۵۷۷-۵۷۸-۵۷۹-۵۸۰-۵۸۱-۵۸۲-۵۸۳-۵۸۴-۵۸۵-۵۸۶-۵۸۷-۵۸۸-۵۸۹-۵۹۰-۵۹۱-۵۹۲-۵۹۳-۵۹۴-۵۹۵-۵۹۶-۵۹۷-۵۹۸-۵۹۹-۶۰۰-۶۰۱-۶۰۲-۶۰۳-۶۰۴-۶۰۵-۶۰۶-۶۰۷-۶۰۸-۶۰۹-۶۱۰-۶۱۱-۶۱۲-۶۱۳-۶۱۴-۶۱۵-۶۱۶-۶۱۷-۶۱۸-۶۱۹-۶۲۰-۶۲۱-۶۲۲-۶۲۳-۶۲۴-۶۲۵-۶۲۶-۶۲۷-۶۲۸-۶۲۹-۶۳۰-۶۳۱-۶۳۲-۶۳۳-۶۳۴-۶۳۵-۶۳۶-۶۳۷-۶۳۸-۶۳۹-۶۴۰-۶۴۱-۶۴۲-۶۴۳-۶۴۴-۶۴۵-۶۴۶-۶۴۷-۶۴۸-۶۴۹-۶۵۰-۶۵۱-۶۵۲-۶۵۳-۶۵۴-۶۵۵-۶۵۶-۶۵۷-۶۵۸-۶۵۹-۶۶۰-۶۶۱-۶۶۲-۶۶۳-۶۶۴-۶۶۵-۶۶۶-۶۶۷-۶۶۸-۶۶۹-۶۷۰-۶۷۱-۶۷۲-۶۷۳-۶۷۴-۶۷۵-۶۷۶-۶۷۷-۶۷۸-۶۷۹-۶۸۰-۶۸۱-۶۸۲-۶۸۳-۶۸۴-۶۸۵-۶۸۶-۶۸۷-۶۸۸-۶۸۹-۶۹۰-۶۹۱-۶۹۲-۶۹۳-۶۹۴-۶۹۵-۶۹۶-۶۹۷-۶۹۸-۶۹۹-۷۰۰-۷۰۱-۷۰۲-۷۰۳-۷۰۴-۷۰۵-۷۰۶-۷۰۷-۷۰۸-۷۰۹-۷۱۰-۷۱۱-۷۱۲-۷۱۳-۷۱۴-۷۱۵-۷۱۶-۷۱۷-۷۱۸-۷۱۹-۷۲۰-۷۲۱-۷۲۲-۷۲۳-۷۲۴-۷۲۵-۷۲۶-۷۲۷-۷۲۸-۷۲۹-۷۳۰-۷۳۱-۷۳۲-۷۳۳-۷۳۴-۷۳۵-۷۳۶-۷۳۷-۷۳۸-۷۳۹-۷۴۰-۷۴۱-۷۴۲-۷۴۳-۷۴۴-۷۴۵-۷۴۶-۷۴۷-۷۴۸-۷۴۹-۷۵۰-۷۵۱-۷۵۲-۷۵۳-۷۵۴-۷۵۵-۷۵۶-۷۵۷-۷۵۸-۷۵۹-۷۶۰-۷۶۱-۷۶۲-۷۶۳-۷۶۴-۷۶۵-۷۶۶-۷۶۷-۷۶۸-۷۶۹-۷۷۰-۷۷۱-۷۷۲-۷۷۳-۷۷۴-۷۷۵-۷۷۶-۷۷۷-۷۷۸-۷۷۹-۷۸۰-۷۸۱-۷۸۲-۷۸۳-۷۸۴-۷۸۵-۷۸۶-۷۸۷-۷۸۸-۷۸۹-۷۹۰-۷۹۱-۷۹۲-۷۹۳-۷۹۴-۷۹۵-۷۹۶-۷۹۷-۷۹۸-۷۹۹-۸۰۰-۸۰۱-۸۰۲-۸۰۳-۸۰۴-۸۰۵-۸۰۶-۸۰۷-۸۰۸-۸۰۹-۸۱۰-۸۱۱-۸۱۲-۸۱۳-۸۱۴-۸۱۵-۸۱۶-۸۱۷-۸۱۸-۸۱۹-۸۲۰-۸۲۱-۸۲۲-۸۲۳-۸۲۴-۸۲۵-۸۲۶-۸۲۷-۸۲۸-۸۲۹-۸۳۰-۸۳۱-۸۳۲-۸۳۳-۸۳۴-۸۳۵-۸۳۶-۸۳۷-۸۳۸-۸۳۹-۸۴۰-۸۴۱-۸۴۲-۸۴۳-۸۴۴-۸۴۵-۸۴۶-۸۴۷-۸۴۸-۸۴۹-۸۵۰-۸۵۱-۸۵۲-۸۵۳-۸۵۴-۸۵۵-۸۵۶-۸۵۷-۸۵۸-۸۵۹-۸۶۰-۸۶۱-۸۶۲-۸۶۳-۸۶۴-۸۶۵-۸۶۶-۸۶۷-۸۶۸-۸۶۹-۸۷۰-۸۷۱-۸۷۲-۸۷۳-۸۷۴-۸۷۵-۸۷۶-۸۷۷-۸۷۸-۸۷۹-۸۸۰-۸۸۱-۸۸۲-۸۸۳-۸۸۴-۸۸۵-۸۸۶-۸۸۷-۸۸۸-۸۸۹-۸۹۰-۸۹۱-۸۹۲-۸۹۳-۸۹۴-۸۹۵-۸۹۶-۸۹۷-۸۹۸-۸۹۹-۹۰۰-۹۰۱-۹۰۲-۹۰۳-۹۰۴-۹۰۵-۹۰۶-۹۰۷-۹۰۸-۹۰۹-۹۱۰-۹۱۱-۹۱۲-۹۱۳-۹۱۴-۹۱۵-۹۱۶-۹۱۷-۹۱۸-۹۱۹-۹۲۰-۹۲۱-۹۲۲-۹۲۳-۹۲۴-۹۲۵-۹۲۶-۹۲۷-۹۲۸-۹۲۹-۹۳۰-۹۳۱-۹۳۲-۹۳۳-۹۳۴-۹۳۵-۹۳۶-۹۳۷-۹۳۸-۹۳۹-۹۴۰-۹۴۱-۹۴۲-۹۴۳-۹۴۴-۹۴۵-۹۴۶-۹۴۷-۹۴۸-۹۴۹-۹۵۰-۹۵۱-۹۵۲-۹۵۳-۹۵۴-۹۵۵-۹۵۶-۹۵۷-۹۵۸-۹۵۹-۹۶۰-۹۶۱-۹۶۲-۹۶۳-۹۶۴-۹۶۵-۹۶۶-۹۶۷-۹۶۸-۹۶۹-۹۷۰-۹۷۱-۹۷۲-۹۷۳-۹۷۴-۹۷۵-۹۷۶-۹۷۷-۹۷۸-۹۷۹-۹۸۰-۹۸۱-۹۸۲-۹۸۳-۹۸۴-۹۸۵-۹۸۶-۹۸۷-۹۸۸-۹۸۹-۹۹۰-۹۹۱-۹۹۲-۹۹۳-۹۹۴-۹۹۵-۹۹۶-۹۹۷-۹۹۸-۹۹۹-۱۰۰۰-۱۰۰۱-۱۰۰۲-۱۰۰۳-۱۰۰۴-۱۰۰۵-۱۰۰۶-۱۰۰۷-۱۰۰۸-۱۰۰۹-۱۰۱۰-۱۰۱۱-۱۰۱۲-۱۰۱۳-۱۰۱۴-۱۰۱۵-۱۰۱۶-۱۰۱۷-۱۰۱۸-۱۰۱۹-۱۰۲۰-۱۰۲۱-۱۰۲۲-۱۰۲۳-۱۰۲۴-۱۰۲۵-۱۰۲۶-۱۰۲۷-۱۰۲۸-۱۰۲۹-۱۰۳۰-۱۰۳۱-۱۰۳۲-۱۰۳۳-۱۰۳۴-۱۰۳۵-۱۰۳۶-۱۰۳۷-۱۰۳۸-۱۰۳۹-۱۰۴۰-۱۰۴۱-۱۰۴۲-۱۰۴۳-۱۰۴۴-۱۰۴۵-۱۰۴۶-۱۰۴۷-۱۰۴۸-۱۰۴۹-۱۰۵۰-۱۰۵۱-۱۰۵۲-۱۰۵۳-۱۰۵۴-۱۰۵۵-۱۰۵۶-۱۰۵۷-۱۰۵۸-۱۰۵۹-۱۰۶۰-۱۰۶۱-۱۰۶۲-۱۰۶۳-۱۰۶۴-۱۰۶۵-۱۰۶۶-۱۰۶۷-۱۰۶۸-۱۰۶۹-۱۰۷۰-۱۰۷۱-۱۰۷۲-۱۰۷۳-۱۰۷۴-۱۰۷۵-۱۰۷۶-۱۰۷۷-۱۰۷۸-۱۰۷۹-۱۰۸۰-۱۰۸۱-۱۰۸۲-۱۰۸۳-۱۰۸۴-۱۰۸۵-۱۰۸۶-۱۰۸۷-۱۰۸۸-۱۰۸۹-۱۰۹۰-۱۰۹۱-۱۰۹۲-۱۰۹۳-۱۰۹۴-۱۰۹۵-۱۰۹۶-۱۰۹۷-۱۰۹۸-۱۰۹۹-۱۱۰۰-۱۱۰۱-۱۱۰۲-۱۱۰۳-۱۱۰۴-۱۱۰۵-۱۱۰۶-۱۱۰۷-۱۱۰۸-۱۱۰۹-۱۱۱۰-۱۱۱۱-۱۱۱۲-۱۱۱۳-۱۱۱۴-۱۱۱۵-۱۱۱۶-۱۱۱۷-۱۱۱۸-۱۱۱۹-۱۱۲۰-۱۱۲۱-۱۱۲۲-۱۱۲۳-۱۱۲۴-۱۱۲۵-۱۱۲۶-۱۱۲۷-۱۱۲۸-۱۱۲۹-۱۱۳۰-۱۱۳۱-۱۱۳۲-۱۱۳۳-۱۱۳۴-۱۱۳۵-۱۱۳۶-۱۱۳۷-۱۱۳۸-۱۱۳۹-۱۱۴۰-۱۱۴۱-۱۱۴۲-۱۱۴۳-۱۱۴۴-۱۱۴۵-۱۱۴۶-۱۱۴۷-۱۱۴۸-۱۱۴۹-۱۱۵۰-۱۱۵۱-۱۱۵۲-۱۱۵۳-۱۱۵۴-۱۱۵۵-۱۱۵۶-۱۱۵۷-۱۱۵۸-۱۱۵۹-۱۱۶۰-۱۱۶۱-۱۱۶۲-۱۱۶۳-۱۱۶۴-۱۱۶۵-۱۱۶۶-۱۱۶۷-۱۱۶۸-۱۱۶۹-۱۱۷۰-۱۱۷۱-۱۱۷۲-۱۱۷۳-۱۱۷۴-۱۱۷۵-۱۱۷۶-۱۱۷۷-۱۱۷۸-۱۱۷۹-۱۱۸۰-۱۱۸۱-۱۱۸۲-۱۱۸۳-۱۱۸۴-۱۱۸۵-۱۱۸۶-۱۱۸۷-۱۱۸۸-۱۱۸۹-۱۱۹۰-۱۱۹۱-۱۱۹۲-۱۱۹۳-۱۱۹۴-۱۱۹۵-۱۱۹۶-۱۱۹۷-۱۱۹۸-۱۱۹۹-۱۲۰۰-۱۲۰۱-۱۲۰۲-۱۲۰۳-۱۲۰۴-۱۲۰۵-۱۲۰۶-۱۲۰۷-۱۲۰۸-۱۲۰۹-۱۲۱۰-۱۲۱۱-۱۲۱۲-۱۲۱۳-۱۲۱۴-۱۲۱۵-۱۲۱۶-۱۲۱۷-۱۲۱۸-۱۲۱۹-۱۲۲۰-۱۲۲۱-۱۲۲۲-۱۲۲۳-۱۲۲۴-۱۲۲۵-۱۲۲۶-۱۲۲۷-۱۲۲۸-۱۲۲۹-۱۲۳۰-۱۲۳۱-۱۲۳۲-۱۲۳۳-۱۲۳۴-۱۲۳۵-۱۲۳۶-۱۲۳۷-۱۲۳۸-۱۲۳۹-۱۲۴۰-۱۲۴۱-۱۲۴۲-۱۲۴۳-۱۲۴۴-۱۲۴۵-۱۲۴۶-۱۲۴۷-۱۲۴۸-۱۲۴۹-۱۲۵۰-۱۲۵۱-۱۲۵۲-۱۲۵۳-۱۲۵۴-۱۲۵۵-۱۲۵۶-۱۲۵۷-۱۲۵۸-۱۲۵۹-۱۲۶۰-۱۲۶۱-۱۲۶۲-۱۲۶۳-۱۲۶۴-۱۲۶۵-۱۲۶۶-۱۲۶۷-۱۲۶۸-۱۲۶۹-۱۲۷۰-۱۲۷۱-۱۲۷۲-۱۲۷۳-۱۲۷۴-۱۲۷۵-۱۲۷۶-۱۲۷۷-۱۲۷۸-۱۲۷۹-۱۲۸۰-۱۲۸۱-۱۲۸۲-۱۲۸۳-۱۲۸۴-۱۲۸۵-۱۲۸۶-۱۲۸۷-۱۲۸۸-۱۲۸۹-۱۲۹۰-۱۲۹۱-۱۲۹۲-۱۲۹۳-۱۲۹۴-۱۲۹۵-۱۲۹۶-۱۲۹۷-۱۲۹۸-۱۲۹۹-۱۳۰۰-۱۳۰۱-۱۳۰۲-۱۳۰۳-۱۳۰۴-۱۳۰۵-۱۳۰۶-۱۳۰۷-۱۳۰۸-۱۳۰۹-۱۳۱۰-۱۳۱۱-۱۳۱۲-۱۳۱۳-۱۳۱۴-۱۳۱۵-۱۳۱۶-۱۳۱۷-۱۳۱۸-۱۳۱۹-۱۳۲۰-۱۳۲۱-۱۳۲۲-۱۳۲۳-۱۳۲۴-۱۳۲۵-۱۳۲۶-۱۳۲۷-۱۳۲۸-۱۳۲۹-۱۳۳۰-۱۳۳۱-۱۳۳۲-۱۳۳۳-۱۳۳۴-۱۳۳۵-۱۳۳۶-۱۳۳۷-۱۳۳۸-۱۳۳۹-۱۳۴۰-۱۳۴۱-۱۳۴۲-۱۳۴۳-۱۳۴۴-۱۳۴۵-۱۳۴۶-۱۳۴۷-۱۳۴۸-۱۳۴۹-۱۳۵۰-۱۳۵۱-۱۳۵۲-۱۳۵۳-۱۳۵۴-۱۳۵۵-۱۳۵۶-۱۳۵۷-۱۳۵۸-۱۳۵۹-۱۳۶۰-۱۳۶۱-۱۳۶۲-۱۳۶۳-۱۳۶۴-۱۳۶۵-۱۳۶۶-۱۳۶۷-۱۳۶۸-۱۳۶۹-۱۳۷۰-۱۳۷۱-۱۳۷۲-۱۳۷۳-۱۳۷۴-۱۳۷۵-۱۳۷۶-۱۳۷۷-۱۳۷۸-۱۳۷۹-۱۳۸۰-۱۳۸۱-۱۳۸۲-۱۳۸۳-۱۳۸۴-۱۳۸۵-۱۳۸۶-۱۳۸۷-۱۳۸۸-۱۳۸۹-۱۳۹۰-۱۳۹۱-۱۳۹۲-۱۳۹۳-۱۳۹۴-۱۳۹۵-۱۳۹۶-۱۳۹۷-۱۳۹۸-۱۳۹۹-۱۴۰۰-۱۴۰۱-۱۴۰۲-۱۴۰۳-۱۴۰۴-۱۴۰۵-۱۴۰۶-۱۴۰۷-۱۴۰۸-۱۴۰۹-۱۴۱۰-۱۴۱۱-۱۴۱۲-۱۴۱۳-۱۴۱۴-۱۴۱۵-۱۴۱۶-۱۴۱۷-۱۴۱۸-۱۴۱۹-۱۴۲۰-۱۴۲۱-۱۴۲۲-۱۴۲۳-۱۴۲۴-۱۴۲۵-۱۴۲۶-۱۴۲۷-۱۴۲۸-۱۴۲۹-۱۴۳۰-۱۴۳۱-۱۴۳۲-۱۴۳۳-۱۴۳۴-۱۴۳۵-۱۴۳۶-۱۴۳۷-۱۴۳۸-۱۴۳۹-۱۴۴۰-۱۴۴۱-۱۴۴۲-۱۴۴۳-۱۴۴۴-۱۴۴۵-۱۴۴۶-۱۴۴۷-۱۴۴۸-۱۴۴۹-۱۴۵۰-۱۴۵۱-۱۴۵۲-۱۴۵۳-۱۴۵۴-۱۴۵۵-۱۴۵۶-۱۴۵۷-۱۴۵۸-۱۴۵۹-۱۴۶۰-۱۴۶۱-۱۴۶۲-۱۴۶۳-۱۴۶۴-۱۴۶۵-۱۴۶۶-۱۴۶۷-۱۴۶۸-۱۴۶۹-۱۴۷۰-۱۴۷۱-۱۴۷۲-۱۴۷۳-۱۴۷۴-۱۴۷۵-۱۴۷۶-۱۴۷۷-۱۴۷۸-۱۴۷۹-۱۴۸۰-۱۴۸۱-۱۴۸۲-۱۴۸۳-۱۴۸۴-۱۴۸۵-۱۴۸۶-۱۴۸۷-۱۴۸۸-۱۴۸۹-۱۴۹۰-۱۴۹۱-۱۴۹۲-۱۴۹۳-۱۴۹۴-۱۴۹۵-۱۴۹۶-۱۴۹۷-۱۴۹۸-۱۴۹۹-۱۵۰۰-۱۵۰۱-۱۵۰۲-۱۵۰۳-۱۵۰۴-۱۵۰۵-۱۵۰۶-۱۵۰۷-۱۵۰۸-۱۵۰۹-۱۵۱۰-۱۵۱۱-۱۵۱۲-۱۵۱۳-۱۵۱۴-۱۵۱۵-۱۵۱۶-۱۵۱۷-۱۵۱۸-۱۵۱۹-۱۵۲۰-۱۵۲۱-۱۵۲۲-۱۵۲۳-۱۵۲۴-۱۵۲۵-۱۵۲۶-۱۵۲۷-۱۵۲۸-۱۵۲۹-۱۵۳۰-۱۵۳۱-۱۵۳۲-۱۵۳۳-۱۵۳۴-۱۵۳۵-۱۵۳۶-۱۵۳۷-۱۵۳۸-۱۵۳۹-۱۵۴۰-۱۵۴۱-۱۵۴۲-۱۵۴۳-۱۵۴۴-۱۵۴۵-۱۵۴۶-۱۵۴۷-۱۵۴۸-۱۵۴۹-۱۵۵۰-۱۵۵۱-۱۵۵۲-۱۵۵۳-۱۵۵۴-۱۵۵۵-۱۵۵۶-

وایند. و سزایند. و سزایند. و سزایند.

“ But to the vicious ones of evil authority, of evil-activity, of evil-speech, of evil-character (or, ethical law), of evil thought do their soul approach with bad foods : their true persons (or, existences) are in the home of Vice.” What is the meaning of the souls or willing-selves of these people approaching them with bad foods ? The word “ food ” is used for whatever a man enjoys, or does, thus denoting the circumstances of a man’s life including even his actions, though sometimes it is also used for the consumption of the doctrines of life. As is said in this stanza, it is the Urvan of a person that brings food to that person, because as is the will and inner sentiment of a person, so will be his words and actions. The Urvans of evil people being bad, whatever these Urvans bring forth will be bad : that is, their whole way of life including their doctrines and actions is the consequence of the inner bad Urvan of theirs. This being so, their existences are, truly speaking “ in the home of Vice.” This stanza expresses an idea which is quite the opposite of that of the immediately preceding one in the Gathic text (Y. 49, 10), where reference is made to the protection and care of the good conditions of virtuous people by the dispensation of Mazda Ahura : thus what is implied in the contrast between these two stanzas is that all the good people, since they act according to the Will of God, are under the protection of God or His agent on earth; while the evil people instead of being under the protection of God or His apostle, are in the home of vice where God’s protection and care do not extend since it is against the Will of God—an idea which we meet with more than once in the Gathas.

Upto this point we have confined ourselves to the Gathas in our treatment of the subject of Heaven and Hell, and have tried to show how the heaven and hell of the Gathas can apply to man’s earthly life. The question, then, is,—is there no reference in the Gathas to what is called the exclusively spiritual life of man after death ? Can we say that the Gathas lay emphasis not on the so-called spiritual fate of every individual after death, but only on the fate of that individual as manifested in his condition on earth ? From the foregoing exposition from Vahishta upto Drûjo Demâna, we conclude that it is the fate of human beings existing on earth—that is kept in view. There seems, however, to be a deliberate silence,—or, rather, ambiguity—in the Gathas about the question whether the condition of a man’s existence after death is

earthly or non-earthly. Let us read the following passage :—
 “ He who does not give that reward unto a deserving person, who should be given it for his orthodoxy-unto him what immediate (lit. first) measured-award shall befall? I know that which will be the ultimate measured-reward unto him.” It is not certain whether the fate alluded to in the last line is earthly or otherwise. One fact, however, seems certain. The word “ first, or immediate ” has reference to the present earthly life, while by the word “ final, or ultimate ” a condition after death is implied—specially because the speaker here declares his full faith in the final fate of that person, while declaring his ignorance as to what should befall him here and now in this present life of his. But this “ ultimate ”, as I said just above, does not help us in the least to determine what is the nature of that other existence. The same indefiniteness exists also in Y. 45, 3, where we are told that those who would not practise the true Mânthra of Zarathûshtra will have “ the end of their life in degradation (or, suffering) ” (aeibyô anghéush avôî anghat apémém). There is still one more passage of this kind in 31, 20 whose indefiniteness will be seen from the following :—“ He who deceitfully behaves towards a virtuous person, to him is, (or belongs) for a long period, a very great leanness,¹ of darkness, of bad food, of harmful speech ; and his character associated with his actions betakes him to the life of the Vicious one.”

“ The life pertaining to the vicious ” (ahûm Dregvatô) is the exact opposite of the life pertaining to the virtuous meant by “ Vahishtem ahûm ashaonâm (of the non-Gathic Avesta). The similarity of this passage (30, 20) with Y. 49, 11 is seen by comparing Dûsh-kharetha (bad food) with akâish kharethâish (bad food) and Drûjo Demâna with ahûm dregvato, meaning the hell of the vicious, and Urvâno with Daena, which two, though of course different from one another, are sometimes mentioned together as bringing good or bad fruits for the person to whom they belong. These points of similarity go to show that the hell of Y. 31, 20 is the same as the earthly hell of Y. 49, 11.

We shall now pass on to an examination of the doctrine of Heaven and Hell, or the condition of life after death as understood in the non-Gathic Avestan literature. Here the idea of next life is expressed by such terms as “ Paro-asti ” and “ Paro-asna-anghû ” and that of Heaven by “ Vahishta anghû ” and “ Garo-nmâna ”, while the idea of Hell is expressed by “ Achishta anghû ” and “ Angheush temanghahe ereghatô

¹ For the other meaning of “ aparem khshayo ” see my Gathas.

[illegible]

“ O Ahura-Mazda-Asha, the handsome one ! we choose, think upon, speak about, and practise those that are the best of existing actions for both the lives.” What is meant by “ actions that are best for both the lives ?” They mean actions which not only increase the virtuousness and prosperity of the life which is being led at present but which will also procure for the doer of these good actions a blessed reward in the next life. Such a statement of course shows the beginning of the formation of the idea of two lives, one of which is regarded as the present earthly one and the other of a quite different kind. This is therefore not in agreement with the idea of the two conditions of life we find in the

it is expressly stated that of the two lives one is corporeal (astvat) and the other "manahya". This latter life, that is, the cogitable life is here undoubtedly used to denote the spiritual life because it is put in direct antithesis to the corporeal life which shows that the corporeal condition is not at all associated with this next cogitable life. In the first of the above-quoted passages the speakers ask Sraosha to protect them against certain bad earthly circumstances not only for the present earthly life, that is not only for remaining happy in this life, but also for the spiritual life, that is, also for realising happiness in that life by being enabled to do good works more and more as a consequence of the protection afforded by Sraosha. In the second passage, a good man who is dead, is represented as having gone to the spiritual world away from the corporeal. Similarly, in the same fragment of Hâdokht Nûsk, an evil person who is dead and who is represented as having gone to hell is also said to have come from the corporeal to the cogitable spiritual life,—which shows that the "manahim ahûm" is of two kinds, good or bad, and both these kinds of life are associated with no corporeal condition. All this is entirely opposed to the position of the Gathas on this point where this cogitable life is never put in opposition to the corporeal life but can very well be understood as including the corporeal condition also. This shows that the doctrine of two lives, whose original signification is to be met with in the Gathas, has undergone a change in meaning due to the difference of time and place.

We shall now examine the other Avesta terms for next life, viz. "Paro-asna-anghû" and "Paro-asti." "Paro-asna-anghû" has been understood as meaning "life beyond the present," that is, the next life. It seems to be identical with the "Manahim Ahûm" of Srosh Yt. and Hādokht Nûsk Fragments. It occurs once in the Yasna, and twice in the Vendidad. As Manahim Ahûm, according to Hādokht Nûsk, may be good or bad according as the person is good or bad, so also is Paro-asna-anghû used to denote simply the general idea of next life implying both conditions, good or bad. In the Yasna, we find it used in Y. 55, 2, which is as follows :—

၁။ နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ်
 ၂။ နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ်
 ၃။ နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ် နေ့စဉ်

"May they (i. e., the Gathas) be good reward-procuring, much-reward-procuring, virtuous-reward-procuring for our next life after the separation of body and consciousness (from one another)." Here it is difficult to understand this next life as meaning anything else than an exclusively spiritual, because when this life is here associated with the condition of the separation of consciousness from the body, we presume that the condition of body seems here to be excluded from this life. This passage means to say that the writings of the Gathas which are as food and clothing for a person's soul, that is, the necessities for keeping the soul healthy, procure good reward for that man in the life beyond the present. Such a general expression would, of course, be liable, to be construed in both the senses, that is, as referring to an after death spiritual life or also to an after-death earthly life. The qualifying clause, however, *viz.*, "after the separation of body and consciousness", seems to imply that the author of this passage meant that next life to be devoid of a condition in which body and consciousness are joined together. At the same time, however, we cannot lay strong emphasis on this point too, since this separation of body and consciousness may only carry with it the idea of the destruction of the present life alone without thereby necessarily implying that this condition of separation will continue even in the next life. "Paro-asna-Anghû" is also mentioned in Vend. 9, 44, where a man who has performed the meritorious deed of cleansing the "Nasa" off from a polluted person, is said to realise "the happiness of Vahishta Anghû

(Best-Life) as a reward for (or, in) the next life" .

—

Here the summum bonum of Vahishta

Anghû is mentioned as a reward in the next life. In Vend. 13, 8, again, we are told that the man who has committed the very sinful action of killing useful dogs "crosses over to the next life more wailingly and more fearfully than when terrified by the terror-striking cry of a wolf in a mighty dreadful forest"—

—

—

temohva). Anyhow the thing on which emphasis is laid both in these passages and in the Gathas is one and the same, and that is the character of a person that takes form by his activity on earth. It does not matter if the consequences are represented in different forms. These representations vary with the high or low level of intelligence of the people for whom they are intended. The thing that man is immediately concerned with, is his present career on earth. And in this essential teaching the Gathic and the non-Gathic Avestan writings entirely agree with each other.

ON CHINVATO PERETÛ (THE BRIDGE OR PATH OF LONGING).

The doctrine of Chinvato Peretû can be said to be one of the most ancient doctrines of the Iranian Religion. Different interpretations have been put by different scholars on the term Chinvato Peretû, some meaning by it "the Bridge of Judgment or of the Judge" some "the bridge of atonement or punishment" others "the Bridge of Selection." The true meaning of the term should be "the Bridge or path of Longing," i.e., the path leading to, or containing, something that is longed for or eagerly sought. I shall show in another work of mine the inaccuracy of the former meanings and the justification of the latter one, with detailed arguments relating to grammar and context. The Bridge or the path of Longing is so called on account of it being a condition of existence which is eagerly longed for by every man and is therefore a synonym for the good goal which man aspires to. It is found occurring three times in the Gathas. First, we read in Y. 46, 10 as follows :—"That man or woman, who will give unto me (or, create for me) those best things of human life which Thou, O Mazda! hast announced (or, known), the good-fortune pertaining to virtuousness and the ruling-authority associated with Reason, and those whom I will lead to the glorification of those of your-position, all these (men and women) shall I guide to the Bridge of Longing (or, of the longed for reward)." Here we find Zarathûshtra giving a promise to those persons who will assist him in obtaining a perfect religious-political authority over the people, and this promise is to the effect that he would lead all of them to that ideal existence which is longed for by them, by imparting to them his beneficial teaching. The Bridge of the longed-for reward can be attained to only by those men who practise the good doctrines of life, or who, in the words of the text, are "guided to the glorification of Mazda" by these doctrines. On the contrary, as we read in the very next stanza, those who are the enemies of such good doctrines and practise those of quite the opposite kind, shall for ever remain "in the house of Lie" instead of realising "the path of

Longing " It is said—" the Karapans and the Kavis whom their own willing-self and their own character hardens (or, afflicts) when they come there where the Bridge of Longing is, consolidate their ruling powers in order to ruin the human world by their actions. Their existence (or, persons) are for ever in the House of Lie." As we explained this stanza before in connection with the subject of " Drûjo Demâna " the whole way of life of the Kavis and Karapans is associated with bad doctrines and actions, as a consequence of which on account of their hardened viciousness, whenever they approach anything or any doctrines which would contribute to the realisation of the path of Longing, or, in the words of the text " when they come there where the path of Longing lies," their whole career rebels against it, and thus " their persons remain for ever in the home of Drûj." This idea is repeated in Y. 51, 13 where it is said—" The ethical law or character of the upright one destroys (or, afflicts) the essential-being of the vicious one, whose willing-self having destroyed the paths of virtuousness by its own actions and words, is afflicted (or, hardened) by its own actions and words at the Bridge of Longing " The Urvan of the vicious people has had no liking for " the paths of virtuousness "; it is a destroyer of those paths ; this being so, it, on account of its hardened viciousness, is afflicted with pain and disgust at the sight of the good conditions of life. In this stanza it is implied that it is by " the paths of virtuousness," that " the Bridge of the Longed for reward " can be realised. Destroy the former, and you make it impossible for yourself to enter, or cross over, the latter.

In the non-Gathic Avesta, we more than once find the idea of " crossing " the Chinvat Peretû, in such phrase as " going to, or being led to, the Best Life (Vahishta Anghû) across Chinvat Peretû " (Vend. 19, 13 ; Y. 71, 16 ; Y. 19, 6). Such a form of expression has been understood by some as implying the idea that even people of bad character do enter this Bridge but can only not cross the whole of it from the beginning to the end. There is no evidence in the whole of the Avesta which can justify this idea. On the contrary, we find such a sentence as " yaeshâm anghat duzhâpem Chinvat peretûm " which means—" for whom Chinvat Peretu is difficult to attain to (or, unattainable) (Vend. 13, 3). Here we don't find the expression " difficult to cross " but " difficult to attain to," since " ap " certainly means " to reach, or attain to or obtain." I emphasise this point in order to show that the true original signification of Chinvato Peretû has nothing to do with what is called the judgment of God pronounced on a man good or bad, after his death, with which

the Pahalvi and other writings have brought it in close association, having lost sight of the idea that this Bridge is only that introductory passage to the Best Life, which is reserved for the virtuous ones. It is of course possible in one way to connect the idea of the judgment of God with this true signification of Chinvato Peretû. This is by understanding that those who have led a good life have already taken their march on this Bridge leading to the Best Life, while those who have led a bad mode of life cannot be allowed to place their foot on it. This is, however, not the way in which tradition connects the passing of the Bridge with the pronouncement of judgment by God, since here even an evil man is made to enter this Bridge. And, this is an instance the corruption of an original true reasonable doctrine which takes of place in course of time at the hands of those who are unable to grasp it.

ON THE SO-CALLED AMESHA SPENTAS.

The characteristics of the Zarathushtrian system of morality and ethics are not exhausted by what we have said in the foregoing part of our Essay. There are other doctrines or ideas to be found in it which require to be dealt with so far as they are connected with the subject of our Essay. One of these is the doctrine of the so-called Amesha Spentas, the Bountiful immortals who are conceived as personal celestial beings only second in rank to the Supreme God, Mazda Ahura, and possessing specific powers by which they render assistance to the work of Mazda Ahura in the Universe. First, we should bear in mind the fact that the term Amesha Spenta is never found in the Gathas, although it occurs in the introductory sentence which, however, does not form part of them : yet the terms which are understood to be the names of the Amesha Spentas *viz.*—Vohû Manangh, Asha, Khshathra, Ârmaiti, Haurvatât and Ameretât are to be found occurring a very large number of times in the Gathâs. Indeed it is not wrong to say that the ideas expressed by these six terms form the kernel of the teachings of Zarathushtra. It is not at all difficult to determine the meaning of these six terms. Vohu Manangh literally meaning "good mind", can be said to have its exact English equivalent in the word "reason" its superlative form "Vahishta Manangh" similarly meaning "Best Mind" or "the Best or Highest Reason." Asha (which is made of ere+ta or eret+a) expresses the idea of what is straightforward, thus meaning rectitude, or truth, or justice, or the right or true or just law, and when used with reference to the conduct of man, meaning right or morally lawful conduct, or virtuousness. Khshathra

has the comprehensive signification of "Power, or authority," which is sometimes used for the authority of God in the whole universe, sometimes the authority or kingdom of God reigning in man, and sometimes simply the political or religious authority which a ruler exercises over his people. Armaiti (derived from *ara*=high, and *maiti*=thought or disposition) signifies a high or noble disposition of mind, (*i. e.*, magnanimity.) *Haurvatât* (from *haurva*=whole) denotes the idea of a sound or healthy condition or health itself, and *Ameretât* that of immortality,—these two words "health" and "immortality" being used not only with reference to the physical condition of a man but also with reference to the condition of his soul. These six ideas, especially the three ones of *Vohû Managh*, *Asha*, and *Armaiti*, form, as I said before, the essence of Zarathushtra's teaching, and this accounts for the very large number of times that these terms occur in the small extant remnant of the Gathas (*Vohu Mangh* occurring about 125 times, *Asha* about 150, *Armaiti* about 45, and *Khshathra* about 50). From the significations of these three terms, one can well understand the close connexion subsisting between them. The beginning of all good character pertaining to a man lies, according to the Gathas, in *Armaiti i.e.*, in a high-minded or magnanimous disposition. It is this disposition that reveals to a man the right ethical laws of life, as it is said.—

"Do Thou, O Bountiful High-Thought! reveal the ethical laws associated with Truth" (Y. 33, 13).

It is High-Thought that "strengthens Truth or Virtuousness by actions" (Y. 44, 6); hence High-Thought is thrice mentioned in the Gathas as "joined together with Truth or Virtuousness" (*Ashâmat*-Y. 34, 11, & Y. 48, 11) & (*Ashâ hachaité* Y. 46, 16). The virtuous or morally lawful conduct always reigns in a man whose disposition is a noble one not distorted by unlawful feelings or tendencies of mind. It is the gift of a noble disposition or magnanimity that Mazda has given unto man to cause prosperity on the whole earth, or, in the words of the text for the nourishment of the living world, by means of the virtuous industry resulting through the entertainment of that kind of disposition (Y. 47, 3). Hence it is that with *Armaiti* is also associated "the care-taking-industrious good-happy-condition-of-life" (Y. 48, 11) and "of good activity" (Y. 45, 4). This noble disposition or magnanimity is as closely associated with *Khshathra*, "authority" as it is with "*Asha*, as is shown from the following instances :—

"Who made the beloved High-Thought (or Magnanimity) associated with (or, together with) authority?" (Y. 44, 7).

"Whose undecaying authority (or, kingdom) does High-Thought further " (Y. 28, 3)

"High-Thought.....increases through the kingdom of Reason...." (Y. 34, 11).

"Mazda Ahura associated with the authority of High Thought" (Y. 47, I). These different passages show the connection between Ârmaiti and Khshathra, or between High-Thought and authority, to be lying in this that whoever has a high or regulated or magnanimous disposition in him establishes within himself what is called the authority of Reason, which is the only true authority that should be possessed by man. At the same time, however, it also seems to be implied that a ruler, who rules over the people, should have as one of his chief characteristics a noble or magnanimous or generous disposition without which that ruler does not deserve to be a ruler at all. That Ârmaiti was the first and foremost teaching of Zarathûshtra and verily the panacea for all the wrongs that he saw existing in the country, will be apparent from the sentence—"How, O Mazda ! shall High-Thought come amongst those unto whom Thy Religion is preached?"—which implies that the first thing expected from those to whom Zarathûshtra preached his religion was the entertainment of a high or regulated or magnanimous disposition of mind, so that when once they have abandoned their infatuated condition of mind which showed itself in a hatred of and injury to all good things and persons, they will begin to see all things in their proper light, and by so doing develop the authority of Reason within themselves. It is that infatuated condition of mind, called "pairi-maiti" which is stated as one of the qualities of the Dævas and their followers (Y. 32, 3). In contrast to this, we find Ârmaiti mentioned as one of those things that make up the nature of Mazda, as when it is said: "We like (or love) Ârmaiti; she (and not her opposite) is ours" (Y. 32, 2) and again "Thine (or, in Thee) is Ârmaiti, O Mazda !" (Y. 31, 9).

I have quoted the above passages in order to point out the chief ideas that we come across in the Gathas about the beneficent influence (mark the epithet "spenta" applied to Ârmaiti) of a High-Regulated-Magnanimous disposition. The same signification of Ârmaiti can be proved invariably from all the remaining passages where it occurs with the exception of Y. 45, 4 where it is used in the concrete sense and signifies a wise female. I, however, omit citing these, since there is nothing of special importance in them as far as the term Ârmaiti is concerned.

As regards Asha, I have made some remarks in the chapter on "The Conception of God," where I have also shown how Asha is sometimes used in the vocative case together with Mazda Ahura, in which case, as I said, the Right Law or the Law of Truth or Justice is identified with Mazda Ahura. When used in connection with the conduct of man it includes all truthful actions and words and not thoughts. In other words the moral legality or the just conduct of a man has reference to the actions and words of that man. This will be seen from the fact that although Asha occurs more than 150 times in the Gathas, we never meet any such phrase as the thought of Asha or associated with Asha; whenever mention is made of good thought or good word, it is the term Vohû Manangh that is used: also because we meet such phrases as "hachâ ashât shyaothnâchâ vachanghâchâ" "ashâ shyaothnâ," etc. and notably the lines "yayâo shyaothnâish ashem thraoshtâ Ahura" (through whose actions thou, O Ahura, dost nourish the right Law) and "ashem shyaothnâish debânzaiti ârmaitish" (Ârmaiti strengthens the Right Law by actions). Sometimes we find Asha used in the concrete sense, in which case it signifies a virtuous man or a whole body of virtuous people.

The position which Vohû Manangh—Reason or good intelligence—occupies in the teaching of Zarathûshtra, is as high as that of Asha. In the Gathas we also meet with its superlative form Vahishta Manangh, which, when associated with Mazda Ahura expresses the idea of the Best or Highest Reason, and this, as pointed out in a former chapter, forms, like Asha, a part of the Trinity of the Gathic Godhead. Sometimes this term Best Reason or intelligence is used to denote the highest or best condition of existence, and thus is a synonym for what is called the highest heaven. There are two instances of this kind where we read as follows:—"The worst life is of (*i.e.* belong to) the evil ones, and the best intelligence is of (or belongs to) the virtuous one" (anghûsh achishtô dregvatâm at ashâune vahishtem mano): "who are emptied from (*i.e.*, entirely devoid of) the best intelligence belonging to the virtuous one (yoi vahishtâtashâuno mazdâ râreshyân manangho). In the first of these two instances we find "Vahishta Manangh" and not "Vahishta anghû" put in antithesis to "achishta anghû" hence it is right to say that "Vahishta Manangh although primarily meaning Best Reason can be used also to denote the idea of the best condition of life, in as much as we can very justifiably speak of the true life of a man as really consisting in his internal mental condition. In the second of the above quoted sentences we have the phrase "vahishta manangh ashâunô" which is exactly the same in idea

with the non-gathic phrase "vahishtem ahûm ashaonâm", and the same applies to the phrase "ashâune vahishtem mano" of the first quotation, and "mano vohu ashaonâm" of Y. 49, 10. The idea in both of these instances is the same, *viz.*, that the Best Life consisting in the best Reason or Intelligence is a privilege of the Righteous ones, whereas to the unrighteous ones belongs the worst life, who remain for ever in "drûjo demâna" as long as they don't mend their character. It should be remembered that we find in the Gathas the antonym of Vahishta Manangh in the term "achishta manangh" which on its part is the superlative form of "aka manangh" and it is the "achish-tahyâ mananghō demâna" (home of worst intelligence) (Y. 32, 13) which in this way can be understood as exactly similar in idea to the "Drûjo Demâna", and has its antithetical phrase in "Vangheush Manangho Demâna" (Y. 32, 15). I refer to these terms in conjunction to show how the phrases "best or good intelligence" and the "worst or bad intelligence" can signify the best or good and the worst or bad condition of life respectively.

We have pointed out before the association of Khshathra, "authority with Ârmaiti." We find however, more instances where Khshathra is found in conjunction with Vohu Manangh. (See Y. 29, 10 ; 32, 2 ; 33, 5 ; 34, 11 ; 43, 6 ; 44, 6 ; 45, 10 ; 46, 10, 16 ; 50, 3 ; 51, 2, 18). The idea contained in this phrase "Vangheush Mananghō Khshathra" or "Vohu Mananghâ Khshathrâ" is that of the authority or kingdom of Reason, which is not only descriptive of the authority exercised by God over His creatures, but also the authority or kingdom of Reason which a man establishes, or exercises, in his own person, in consequence of which his whole activity is dominated by the dictates of Reason. Such an authority of Reason in a man's own person is called the kingdom of Mazda. (see my Gathas). It is styled by some the kingdom of Heaven which phrase enables us to see how Reason or Good Intelligence can mean heaven which is the best condition of life. A man is said to have entered the kingdom of God when he has entered the kingdom of Reason and Right-Law (or, Moral Law : remember that in many instances where Vohu Manangh comes with Khshathra, we find Asha also mentioned side by side with it) ; and he is said to have entered the kingdom of Reason and Law, when he always submits to the dictates of Reason and Law in all actions of his life. This kingdom of Heaven, at least as far as individuals are concerned is not a thing of some remote future, but can be realised here and now irrespective of his external circumstances (see my Gathas). But there are passages in the Gathas which can also be understood

to have reference to the kingdom of God that will exist in some remote future in the whole human society and not simply in isolated individuals. Of such passages the following is an instance :—" Verily when the punishment of these harmful ones takes place (lit. comes), the kingdom of Reason for (or, of) those-who-are-Thine will be realised, &c., &c. (Y. 30, 8). The idea here is that when the evil people, who are oppressing the good people and are thus a great obstacle in the way of realising the kingdom of God, will be overpowered, then a kingdom of Heaven will be obtained by, or established amongst all those who are the favourites of Mazda.

Besides the association of Vohu Manangh with Khshathra, we find it associated with many other good things, as we see from the following phrases : " Vangheush Manangho ishtîm," the wealth of Reason, which expression is used to denote all the good doctrines contained in the religion taught by Zarathushtra ; " Vanghéush Mananghō Khratûm " the practical-intellect of Reason which is that power of Reason which devises means for the accomplishment of a good object after it has been thought of and known in one's mind ; " Vangheush Manangho Mayâo," the riches of Reason ; " Vanghéush Manangho Yasna " the love service of Reason " Vanghéush Manangho Padebish," the hymns of Reason ; " Vanghéush Manangho Shyaothnâ," the actions of Reason ; " Vanghéush Manangho Ukhdhê," the words of Reason etc., etc.

I have already dealt with the signification of Khshathra in the preceding exposition of Ârmaiti and Vohu Manangh. Here I shall quote some choice sentences or passages by way of further explanation of the meaning of that term. In Y. 33, 5 we find the words " the kingdom of Reason existing in (or, pertaining to) those straight paths of Truth, wherein Mazda Ahura lives." The idea of Mazda Ahura Himself living in these right ways of Truth is nothing but that of His working in the Universe, strictly according to the laws of truth or justice. Hence when any man adopts the right ways of life connected with the moral law, and realises the kingdom or authority of Reason, he has as it were brought himself in the abode of Mazda. The same is the idea in the following passage : " Do Thou, O Frashaoshtira go (or, come) there, with those gifts which we both like for a happy existence,—Here where High-Thought goes hand-in-hand with Truth (or, virtuousness) where exists the kingdom of Reason, in the wealth of Reason, where Mazda Ahura resides in-a-shielded (i.e., unharmable) condition." The reference here is to that

highest condition of existence wherein High-Thought, Righteousness, and the power of Reason prevail in the greatest measure, and which therefore is spoken of as the residence of Mazda. It is by the same kingdom or authority of Reason and Law that the true welfare of a person can be brought about :—" Do Thou increase happiness-of-existence (or, happy existence) through the authority of Reason and Right Law." (Y. 33, 10). Hence the existence in the kingdom of Mazda is called "the desirable, or loveable, existence" (Vairyâo stoish yâ thwahmi khshathroi. Vâchî (Y. 43, 13). And this welfare which a person obtains through Reason and Law consists of Haurvatât and Ameretât as we see from Y. 45, 10. " We should be pleasers of Him, who in His might is known as the Great-Creator Lord, by the love-services of High-Thought, as he has shown (or, promised) and created for this existence of ours the vigorous powers of Health and Immortality in His kingdom through the Right Law and Reason." This is one of those three Gathic passages wherein we find the names of all the seven so-called Amshâspends occurring together, and which therefore help us much in seeing the relationship of ideas between them. It is stated in this stanza that Mazda gives "in this kingdom 'Health and Immortality,' by means of Reason and the Right Law, which therefore requires a man to perform "the love-services of High-Thought." The words "Health" and "Immortality" require explanation at this stage. These words can also mean according to the context the healthy or sound condition of one's soul, which results from imbibing the good doctrines of life and the immortal condition of morality in which a man's soul is set as a result of that healthy condition. Without reproducing here all the thirteen instances where these terms occur, we shall quote here some choice sentences bearing out the above signification. In Y. 45, 7 we are told that "the soul of the righteous one is potent in vigorous Immortality" (ameretâiti ashâono urvâ aesho utayûtâ). Here it is explicitly stated that it is the "Urvan", not the body that is potent in vigorous Immortality. The vigour of the soul alluded to here consists in the strength of the moral position of a man. Again, in Y. 45, 5 we read that "those who will support (or, be devoted to) the knowledge and instruction pertaining to this word of mine, them will Mazda Ahura send (or, cause to realise) Health and Immortality through the actions of the good spirit." So also in Y. 44, 17 where we read of "securing Health and Immortality by this Mânthra, which is of the way of Truth." The idea in both is that it is the good precepts or words declared by Mazda, which, when learnt and practised, contribute to the establishment of a healthy and immortal condition (of the soul). I say, of the soul, since the doctrines which Zarathushtra taught

unto the people related to their character and conduct in life, and these cannot be spoken of as conditions of the body but only of the soul. Apart from this argument however, we find another strong one in Y. 55, 2 where it is said that "the Gathas are both food and clothing for our soul" (*yâo no henti urunê vaem kharethemchâ vâstremchâ*), which means that the doctrines of life inculcated in the Gathas, when they are learnt by man, keep his soul in as healthy condition as a man's body is kept in health by eating substantial food and putting on necessary clothes. It is in exactly the same sense that the word "Drao-nangh" is used in Y. 33, 8 where we read as follows: "Do You O Mazda Asha! announce unto me the right laws, so that (or, by which) I would promote through Reason the love-service and praise-words of One-of-your-position. Do you grant the vigorous sustaining food of Health and Immortality." Zarathushtra wants to perform and propagate the love-service of Mazda by being enlightened with the right rules or laws of life, and this enlightenment of his or the laws revealed to him will make that sustaining food for him, by which he will keep his soul permanently healthy and immortal, in other words, he will not relapse from his righteous position into a condition of evil: this abiding immortality of the soul is always enjoyed by those who are firmly convinced of the truth of Mazda's doctrine by having that doctrine revealed unto them. The opposite of "haurvatât and Ameretât" is "Khshayo", meaning leanness, or weakness. This term occurs twice in the Gathas. In Y. 32, 5 it is said "You (Daevas) cheat the people of good-happy life and Immortality, since to you Daevas belongs (lit. is) the Evil Harmful Spirit associated with bad thought, activity, and speech, by which leanness is taught (or, promised) unto the unrighteous one." The way of life practised by and taught by, the Daevas was a very bad mode of life, hence a "leanness" of soul and not a healthy immortal condition of soul attaches to them and their followers: hence they are here denounced for deluding the people by their false doctrines of life which can never give health and immortality to a man's soul, since these can only be had through Reason and the Right Law. The other passage where this "leanness" is mentioned is Y. 31, 21, which is immediately followed by a passage where mention is made of Health and Immortality, these two passages denoting the contrast between a good man's life and that of an evil one.

The above exposition regarding the six so-called Amesha Spentas is exclusively with reference to the Gathas. Before going to the non-Gathic Avasta, a few words are required as regards the term Amesha Spenta itself. The literal signification

of it is "the Immortal Bountiful." This compound term does not occur in the Gathas at all, although Spenta is more than once mentioned as the epithet of Mazda Ahura and Ârmaiti. The only reason for the origin of the doctrine of seven Amesha Spentas seems to lie in (1) the reference made to the Supreme God very often in the plural number in the Gathas, (2) the intrinsic association of Asha and Vahishta Manangh or Vohû Manangh with Mazda Ahura, (3) the description of Ârmaiti, Khshathra, Haurvatât and Ameretât as Mazda's own, (4) the fact that the ideas denoted by these terms form the sum and substance of the doctrine of the Gathas and (5) the fact that the poetic form of expression leads the writer sometimes to address the noble things or conditions denoted by these terms as if they were persons. There does not, however, seem to be any doubt that when the term Amesha Spenta first came to be applied to every one of the above six names, it was only used at least for some time as an abstract epithet without denoting any personal beings, as is seen from the following sentence of Yasna Haptanghâiti :

سپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه.
 واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه.
 (Y. 37, 4.) واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه. واپسپنتا امشاه.

"And we adore Virtuousness, the Best, which is the fairest, which is immortal bountiful, which is brilliant, which is all the good things (of the world)". Here we should mark (1) first that Spenta Amesha is mentioned as an epithet of Asha just like the epithets "fairest" and "shining"; there is no reason why one should regard "Sraeshta (fairest)" and "raochonghvat" (brilliant) alone as epithets and regard "Spenta Amesha" as a noun; secondly (2) that Asha is described in this passage as comprising "all good things" simultaneously with its being described as "Spenta Amesha"; these two ideas can only be reconciled by understanding "Spenta Amesha" to be only the epithets of Asha, viz., bountiful and immortal, which denote that the True Law of Mazda is Eternal and its influence is beneficent. By the lapse of time, however, Amesha Spenta came to be understood as denoting celestial beings next to Mazda in dignity and power and who are as it were His right-hand assistants, Mazda Ahura Himself being thereby regarded as the Highest Amesha Spenta of all. In Yt. I, we find Ahura Mazda identifying Himself with Amesha Spentas in the words "ahmākêṃ

They are designated as "the ruling ones, of efficacious eyesight, of high dignity, very courageous, strong, lordly, the undying holy ones (Khshaetanâm Verezi-doithranâm berezantâm aiwyâmanâm takhmanâm âhûryanâm yôî aithyejanghō ashavano). They are also called "good ruling, good-giving (or doing), ever-living, ever-benefiting" (hukshathra hûdhâongho yavaejyo yavaesvô). They are also described as "of the same will with the Sun" (hvare-hazaosha), which seems to imply that the activity of the Amesha Spentas and the light of the Sun serve common purpose, viz., to produce a beneficent influence on the world at large. Here ends our treatment of the subject of Ameshas Spentas. Taking all the points stated above into consideration, we conclude that Amesha Spenta is a term applied by generations posterior to Zarathushtra to the names that express the grandest ideas in his teaching. As these six ideas form the sum and substance of Zarathushtra's teaching, and as they are attached a sort of sanctity and regarded as being associated with Mazda Ahura, there is no wonder if in later times they were represented as beings next in rank to Mazda Ahura. In connection with this point let us note that each of these six Ameshaspents has, according to tradition, been associated with and presiding over some particular earthly object, as Vohû Manangh with cattle, Asha with fire, Khshathra with metals, Ârmaiti with the earth, Haurvatat with water, and Ameretat with vegetation. The association of Vohû Manangh with cattle is, I strongly believe, due to the misunderstanding of the word "Gâo" of the Gathas which properly means the living world or the earth inhabited by living beings, but which has been taken to mean "cattle" (gospend) by Palavi writers. This joint mention of "Gâo" and "Vohû Manangh" occurs in Y. 28, 1; 33, 3; 34, 14; 47, 3. The idea implied in this connection is that it is Reason which contributes to the prosperity and welfare of the living world and prevents it from destruction. In the Gathas we find Vohû Manangh also occurring in a passage (45, 9) where "the growth, or prosperity of cattle and men" are referred to. Mark that it is not only cattle but men too that are mentioned in this connection. There is a strong connection between Asha and Âthra as is seen even from the Gathas, where Âthra is called "ashâ-aojangh (43, 4), and Asha is spoken of as growing in its power by Âthra and Manangh (46, 7). This connection lies in the fact that without the physical energy or force of the body, which is the meaning of Âthra neither virtuous actions can be done by a man in his life, nor can truth overcome falsehood. This prevalence of truth contributes to the growth of virtuousness among the people. In the Gathas, of course, this idea of physical energy is sometimes meant to denote the

physical force shown at the time of battle, which shows the connection between Asha and Āthra to be that which exists between right and might. The connection of Khshathra with metals lies in this that it is the metallic weapons wielded by the king and his army which protects a good political society from an invader, and which also affords protection to the lawful people of the country against the criminals inhabiting the same country. The connection between Ârmaiti and the earth can also easily be found from the Gathas, chiefly from the joint mention made of Gâo and Ârmaiti in Y. 47, 3 and Y. 31, 9. A Regulated Disposition, or High Thought, or magnanimity, which is meant by Ârmaiti, is as essential as Vohû Manangh (Reason) or the prosperity of the living world (mark the relationship between Vohû Manangh and Ârmaiti in Y. 45, 4, as that between brother and sister). As regards Haurvatât and Ameretât it is easy to understand how health and immortality, when spoken of with reference to the body of a person, are possible only by food and water being used by man (see Y. 51, 7).

ON THE SO-CALLED YAZATAS.

After examining the doctrine of the Amesha Spentas we should say something as regards those that are called Yazatas. The word "Yazata" is understood to mean "one to be lovingly served." Taking into consideration what we have said before on the true signification of "Yaz" and "Yasna" as used in the Gathas, the term Yazata can very probably be applied to a being that is intrinsically associated with some noble condition which it is possible for man to aspire after or attain to, or to such a condition itself. Although the term "Yazata" does not occur in the Gathas, it is not wrong to apply this epithet to Mazda Ahura, Asha, Vohû Manangh (or Vahishta Manangh), Khshathra and Ârmaiti, since as we have pointed out and explained before, we read of the Yasnas pertaining to these five. In later times, however, the appellation of "Yazata" was assigned to a variety of things, including even some of the natural phenomena. Excluding the names of those Yazatas that have connection with the natural phenomena, we find that there are other names which are only expressions of some things or conditions associated with the life of man on earth. We have already dealt with two of these before, *viz.*, Daena and Mânthra Spenta. These names, as we showed, mean respectively the ethical law, or religion, or character of a person and the moral precepts that should guide the life of man, sometimes also denoting the whole Word of the

Scriptures. The rest of the so-called Yazatas, the ideas expressed in whose names fall within the scope of our subject, are Sraosha, Mithra, and Rashna with Arshtât.

ON SRAOSHA.

The word "Sraosha" derived from *Srû* or *Srûsh* (the extended form of *Srû*) means "hearing" or "that which is heard". It is very similar to the word "Sravangh" which, too, derived from "*Srû*", is used (apart from its meaning of "fame") to express the idea of a doctrine or declaration or word. Sraosha, meaning "hearing" or "the object that is heard," is to a great extent synonymous with those five Gathic words which contain in them the idea of religion, or of a religious word or injunction or doctrine. These are *Daena*, *Sengha*, *Ukhdha*, *Mânthra*, and *Sâsna*. Just as Sraosha is derived from a root meaning "to hear" and expresses the idea of knowing something by hearing, *Daena* is derived from a root (*di*) meaning "to see" and expresses the idea of seeing or knowing, or of that which is seen or known. Thus both Sraosha and *Daena* derived respectively from the roots which have reference to the two senses of hearing and seeing—which are undoubtedly the means of gaining knowledge—signify one and the same thing, *viz.*, knowledge of the law of God or religion or religious commandment. This knowledge, however, should not be understood derived literally through the physical senses of seeing and hearing : here seeing and hearing are used only metaphorically for what a man sees or hears in his mind. "*Senghâ*," which means "word or doctrine," comes from *Sangh* to speak, learn or teach, and "*Sâsna*" from "*Saongh*" to teach or enjoin or command, thus meaning religious or moral injunctions ; while "*Mânthra*" from "*Man*" "to think" means things which are required to be reflected upon or from "*man*" = to command, and thus signifies the moral precepts contained in the Word of the Religion. In Sraosha, however, we find one more meaning, *viz.*, that of a person who hears the words or enjoinders of God and is used, as we shall show below, for a great moral teacher who possesses also the political authority necessary for proclaiming the word of God far and wide among the people of the Country : in other words, Sraosha, when used as a personal being, means the viceregent of God on earth. In support of this view, let us first deal with the seven Gathic passages where Sraosha is mentioned, after which we shall turn to the text of *Srosh Yasht*. In Y. 28, 5, we read thus :—"When

shall I, as the knower (of the same) see Thee, O Right Law! and Reason and the throne of commandment of the most beneficent Ahura Mazda?" The reference in the latter part of this sentence is to the place where a man can hear the injunctions of Mazda Ahura. In this stanza, Zarathûshtra yearns for a real experience of that high spiritual condition in which he will have a vision of the Moral Law and Reason, and in which consequently he will come to gain a true convincing knowledge of the Will and commandments of Mazda Ahura. In another passage we find the following prayer :—" I, who call (or, ask for) Thy all-powerful Sraosha for help, as an obtainer, for a long-period-of-life, of the Kingdom of Reason, existing in (or, pertaining to) the right paths of the Right Law, wherein Mazda Ahura dwells " (Y. 33, 5). Here again we find conjoint mention made of Sraosha, Asha, Vohû Mano, and the residence of Mazda Ahura. Here, too, the speaker yearns for that highest kind of knowledge which is associated with the kingdom of Reason and this kingdom is here spoken of as pertaining to those right paths of the moral Law which form as it were the abode of Mazda. When a man has got the Will or Word of Mazda revealed unto him, he has entered the kingdom of Mazda which is here called the kingdom of Reason, and in such a kingdom are right ways of life invariably to be found, no wrong ways. The reason why the epithet " all powerful " is applied to the personification of the commandment or knowledge of God is the same as that by which we can explain the application of the same epithet to " Mânthra " (Gâh, 2), the epithet " efficacious " to " Senghâ " (Y. 46, 3), the epithet " best " to " Sravangh " (Y. 34, 15) and the epithet " powerful " to " Vaedhya " (knowledge, Y. 13, 3). All those epithets applied to these synonymous terms contain one and the same idea, *viz.*, that the knowledge of the Will and Word of God is the highest, and therefore the most efficacious and powerful, in the production of good results. The personification of " Sraosha " in the above Gathic age is also found in Y. 44, 16, where a prayer is made that Sraosha, the messenger of God bringing the commandments of God to man, may come into the Ratu (*i.e.*, chief or judge) of the people for whatever things are willed by God. In Y. 43, 14, again Sraosha is alluded to as a messenger bringing some news from Yazada unto Zarathûshtra to strengthen him before the decision of a battle. In Y. 33, 14, again, we read as follows :—" Zarathûshtra gives as an offering unto Mazda his own life-energy, and the excellence (or, abundance) of the activity of Reason and also those that are his hearing or knowledge of the Word and his authority." That Zarathûshtra dedicates unto Mazda his knowledge of the Word, means nothing but that he uses that knowledge for the advancement of the cause

of Asha and Vohu Mano, which is the cause of Mazda, amongst people on earth, since that was the object for which he had gained that knowledge. In Y. 46, 17, Zarathûshtra says unto Jâmâspa : " I shall declare unto you etc., etc., all the well-known bountiful glories associated with the Religious Commandment. What are called here " the bountiful glories (*(داناو گزشتگان)*)

mentioned here distinctly in connection with Sraosha goes to some extent to show the true meaning of Sraosha itself (Srávaya being the causal form of Srû and literally meaning "cause to hear"). It was a good reigning king who first proclaimed after studying it, the ethical law—taught by Zarathûshtra—by his laws and regulations. The teachings of this ethical law are here said to be embodied in the Gathas which mean the same as what are called the "hymns" (padaish, or padebish) in the Gathic text; and as we find in Y. 51, 16, it was through these hymns, undoubtedly of Zarathûshtra, that Kave Vistaspa realised the Wisdom (Chisti) taught by Zarathûshtra, so as to enable himself to spread the same amongst his subjects. Hence we find it stated in Y. 57, 24, that Sraosha is the "seer, that is, knower, of the Din," and that "Ahura Mazda showed (or, taught) unto him the Din" (daeno-diso daenayâo; ahmâi daenâm daesayât Ahurô Mazdâo ashava). Sraosha is also described as "the greatest protector-nourisher of the poor-virtuous" (drigûm thrâtotêmô) and also as "making a strong house for the poor virtuous males and females" (yo drigaoscha drivayâoscha amavat nmânem hâmtâshta), both of which denote the idea of the protection afforded by a good ruler to the common people under him. He is also described as the great opponent of Aeshma, this word signifying passionate violence and conflict prevailing in a country at the hands of the evil people, and such a condition is one which a good ruler always endeavours to eradicate; and this is the reason why he is spoken of as "protecting (lit. watching) the peace and the law contract (of the country) from (or, against) Drûj" (yô âkhshtishcha urvaitishcha Drûjo spasyô). The same is the reason when he is called "the protector and overseer of the whole vast territory" (haretacha aiwyâkhshtacha vispayâo fravoish gaethayâo), and also "the furtherer of the prosperity of the territory (Frâdat-gaethem). Again, in Y. 57, 23, we read that it is "through his courage and victoriousness and knowledge and wisdom" that "the Ameshaspentas come on to the earth." The idea here seems to be no other than that of all the good circumstances befalling the people of a country through the instrumentality of their good ruler. It is the advancement of the doctrine of God effected by a good ruler that is meant when it is said that "Ahuna Vairya became the weapon of Sraosha" (yanghe ahûno vairyô snaithish vîsata verethrajâo). The protecting power of a good ruler is very appropriately expressed by Sraosha when he is compared with a shepherd-dog: "We bear Sraosha round about us as the cattle-protecting dogs" (yathacha pasûsh-haurvâongho actat sraoshem ashim pairibarâmaide). Mazda Ahura Himself is the great shepherd, as it were, of the whole world but He has appointed His shepherd dog in the

person of a godly ruler who has heard His will and who always looks to the protection and welfare of His human flock. Finally, we find the term "Sraoshâvareza" in the non-Gathic Avesta, which preserves in it the true abstract signification of Sraosha as the doctrine proclaimed in the word of the Religion. Sraoshâvareza means one who puts into effect, or enforces, the laws of the Religion, and was the designation of an official whose function it was to see that all the regulations of the religion of the state were observed by the people, and who therefore had the necessary power to inflict punishment on those who violated those regulations. Hence it is that the idea of the judgment or sentence pronounced on a man according to the law of Religion is called "Sraosha" in Yt. 10, 109. See also "Sraosha" in the abstract sense in Vend. 13, 3, and in the concrete in Yt. 10, 26, but the meaning at both these places is not quite clear.

In the above exposition I have referred only to such passages as can very easily prove the meaning assigned above to Sraosha. There are, however, many other things said in the description of Sraosha in the two texts of that name which neither prove or disprove that meaning, as for instance, when it is said that he has his own house built of a thousand pillars on the mount Hara Berezaiti, that he scours the earth from one end to the other on four horses, etc., etc. Such descriptions are inevitable when once the position of a great good ruler is exalted to the position of a God. It is therefore impossible to find proof of the true signification of Sraosha in each and every passage connected with it.

ON MITHRA.

The word "Mithra" comes from "Mith" to unite, to bind,¹ hence it means that which binds or unites, thereby signifying a contract or agreement that binds two parties. This signification of the term Mithra is to be found not only in the Gathas but also in the non-Gathic Avestan writings, although in the latter Mithra is also sometimes used in connection with the Sun or the light of the Sun. We are, however, here concerned only with the abstract ethical signification of Mithra and therefore shall not dwell upon its physical aspect. Once Mithra signifies an agreement or a contract, it is used not only in the sense of an agreement between two individuals but it denotes what can be called a religio-socio-political contract by virtue of which all the inhabitants of a country bind themselves to the religio-socio-political law of the country and therefore to the ruler of that

¹ Mithwana, "a couple, a pair."

fulfilment of the religio-socio-political contract of a country, and who therefore is also described as the special god who severely punishes all who violate that contract and rebel against the authority of the law. But this can also be applied to the ruler of the land. For instance, we have the following passage in *Mihir Yasht* :—

سپنتمئەسە. واسە. وە. مەدکەنە وە (ئەلە) مەدە. مەسەسەسەسە.
 واسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. واسە. واسە. واسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. واسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 واسە. مەدکەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەدە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە.

(Yt. 10, 18.)

“ If the master of a house, or the master of a parish, or the master of a town, or the master of a province is faithless to (or, proves false to) (*i.e.*, Mithra), then the enraged and annoyed Mithra breaks (*i.e.*, destroys) that house, or that parish, or that town, or that province, &c., &c.” The idea here undoubtedly is that of the severe punishment that will overtake all the breakers of the law at the hands of the ruler of the country. This is also found in the following lines :—

سپنتمئەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسە.
 مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە. مەسەسەسەسەسەسە.

(Y. 10, 26.) مەسەسەسەسەسەسەسە.

“ Who (*i.e.*, Mithra), when not violated, endows a province with superior courage who, when not violated endows a province with superior victory”. Similarly it is said in Yt. 10, 62, that Mithra “ does not give power and strength to any one of the Mithra violating people, who does not give glory and reward to any one of the Mithra violating people.” A large

number of passages can be quoted containing the same idea, that of assistance given by Mithra whether understood as a God or as a ruler to those who remain faithful to him and of stringent punishment befalling those who violate that Mithra. Hence Mithra also becomes a War-god and is therefore styled a warrior.¹ Those men who belong to an antagonistic religio-socio-political law are called "Avi-mithri" and the territories where such men abound are called "Avi-mithrayão-daŋghâvo."

Another thing that we notice in Mihir Yasht is the close relationship between Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnû. We find Sraosha and Rasnu standing side by side with Mithra when Mithra inflicts vengeance on the battle-field on the Mithra Drûj's.² The reason for this close connection between the three is to be found in the fact that the three ideas expressed by them are closely connected with one another. Adherence to the good religio-socio-political law of the land (Mithra) is the first thing that a good ruler of divine knowledge (who is called Sraosha) requires from his people; and also the cause of justice (Rashnû) in a country can be best served when the breakers of that good law are punished and the Word of God is made to prevail everywhere. Moreover, there are certain things said of Mithra which are also said of Sraosha, thus showing how Mithra, too, like Sraosha, applies to the ruler of the land.³

Mithra is called the protector and supervisor of the whole country (or, world) which is also said of Sraosha.⁴ Mithra, too, just like Sraosha, is the opponent of Aeshma (strife, violence, &c.) among others.⁵ just as Sraosha is associated with Peace (âkhshti), Mithra too is said to be "ruling over the peaceful and unpeaceful condition of countries" (—âkhshtoish anâkhshtoishcha khshayéhi dakhyunâm, Yt. 10, 29) which means that he not only preserves peace in the country but also punishes those who produce an unpeaceful condition.⁶ (Just as Sraosha is described as furthering the prosperity of the country (Frâdat-gaetha), Mithra is also described as "the bestower of plenty, the bestower of prosperity, and the bestower of flocks" (frakhshti-dâo, ozuiti-dâo, vânthvô-dâo).

We have pointed out in the beginning that Mithra also signifies a contract or promise between one individual and another.

¹ Rathaeshtam : Yt. 10, 75.

² Y. 10, 41, 52. 100.

³ Yt. 10, 103.

⁴ Y. 57, 15.

⁵ Yt. 10, 97.

⁶ Yt. 10, 65.

producing a corresponding effect on the social and political position of the people following that religion, and *vice versa*. This interpretation is also indirectly corroborated by the fact that in the eleven kinds of contract named in this passage there is no mention made of the contract by which a citizen of the country is understood to bind himself to the king or to the law of the country. It is also to be noted that the binding power of this contract with the Mazdayasnian Religion is spoken of as the greatest of all (ten-thousand-fold) because on it depended the whole religious, social, and political fabric of the country.

We should remark that this passage which deals with the varying power of the different kinds of Mithra, does not seem to imply an agreement actually entered upon between two parties regarding some one particular thing relating to them both. It seems to be a tacit contract which should remind either of the two parties of its duty in general towards the other, in consequence of a peculiar relationship subsisting between them both, and which, therefore, is not restricted to any particular action for which a contract is made, but to all sorts of action that can be done by them. For instance, the contract between a father and his son does not mean an agreement made at a particular time between them in regard to any particular action to be done between them: it only signifies the contract which subsists between the father and the son from the very time when the son is born, a contract which reminds the father of his duty to his son, and the son of his duty to his father, and which therefore is required to be fulfilled by any good actions done towards one another as long as they both continue to live. In the same way the Mithra between a teacher and his disciples does not mean a money-contract by which a teacher gives instruction to his pupil: it means that particular sort of relationship which they should understand as subsisting between them both, which on the one hand, should make the teacher give more and more instruction to, and improve the character of, his pupil, and on the other hand, should make the pupil look upon his teacher with love, reverence, and awe, and entertain a feeling of gratitude towards him. So also is the Mithra between two different countries (or provinces). It denotes the tacit moral contract by which different countries bind themselves to preserve peace and harmony amongst them and thus add to their love of one another; though this Mithra between two countries can also be understood in the sense of the political or other treaties made between them. And so on with the rest of the cases. This passage also enables us to see the other sense in which Mithra is sometimes used especially in the Pahlavi writings,

viz., love or friendship. This is not inconsistent with the root-meaning of the word Mithra, *viz.*, "that which binds." It is not only a contract moral, religious, social, or political, but also love and friendship that binds different individuals with one another, and also the fulfilment of one's duties towards others strengthens the bonds of love and friendship.

In the Vendidad, too, we find different kinds of Mithras mentioned, though here it is the nature of contracts and not the contracting parties, to which allusion is made. We find this in Vend. 4, 2, which says:—"How many are those contracts that are of Thine, O Ahura Mazda?" Then said Ahura Mazda—"The first is the contract which is made by word of mouth, the second that which is made by a hand pledge; the third of the value of cattle, the fourth of the value of herds, the fifth of the value of man, the sixth of the value of the country (or, territory). These contracts are certainly not tacit agreements based upon a consciousness of one's duty towards others. They are promises made by one person to another with a particular kind of surety for some particular transaction. According to the Vendidad, a contract of a smaller value can be cancelled if a greater one is agreed upon in its stead, and the punishment for a breach of these contracts did of course vary with the greater or less importance of the same.

The above statement of Mithra is made solely with reference to the ethical signification of Mithra.

We have pointed out before the close connection of Rashnû, the personification of justice, with Mithra and Sraosha. Rashnû comes also in company with Arshtât. Both are derived from the same word "êrêsh" meaning 'straightforward, just, true.' In the Yasht dedicated to Rashnû, we find Rashnû represented as a being living in all the different parts of the world conceived by the Avestan people, which seems to convey the idea of the omnipresence of the god of truth and justice. It is strange that the term Arshtat does not occur even once in the Yasht known after that name.

INDEX.

	PAGE
A	
Abode of Reason	43
Achishta Anghu 83, 86, 87, 106, 111, 118	
Achishta Manangh	83
Aeshma	136
Ahu	28, 52, 113
Ahuna Vairya	25, 136
Ahura .. 1, 3, 5, 45, 68, 70, 76, 124	
Ahura Mazda 1, 10, 11, 25, 26, 30, 31, 39, 49, 56, 60, 67, 69, 71, 75, 78, 92, 103, 118, 130, 136	
Ahura-Mazda-Asha	112
Aim of Man	83
Aka	18-20, 25
Aka Mainyu	14
Aka Manangh	20
Aka Shyaothna	20
Aka Vachangh	20
Ameretat 117, 121, 122, 124, 127-129, 132	
Amesha Spentas 58, 93, 94, 121, 128-132	
Ang	19, 23
Angra Mainyu 14, 16, 18-21, 23, 26-28	
Apema Urvaesa	101, 103
Armaiti 8, 45, 58, 91, 92, 96, 121-123, 125, 126, 129, 131, 132	
Arshatat	133
Artificer	9
Asha 3, 5, 6, 19, 39, 57, 58, 68, 70, 74, 76, 77, 79, 91, 92, 105, 121, 124, 129, 131, 132, 135	
Asha Chithra	13
Asha Hazaosha	3
Asha-Mazda-Ahura	4
Asha Vahishta	5, 11
Ashi	28, 29
Astvat Ereta	98, 100, 101
Athra	8, 96, 131
B	
Baodhangh	28, 52
Behesht	84, 85
Bounteous Spirit	11
Bridge of Longing	42, 119, 120

	PAGE
C	
Chinvat Peretu 108, 119-121	
Chisti	47, 49-52
Conception of God	1, 124
Conduct	77
Creator-Governor	3, 4, 104
D	
Daena 28, 40-43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55-57, 118, 132, 133	
Daeva	34, 44, 65, 123
Dami	102
Deity	11, 12
Destiny	29
Din Yasht	49, 51
Dregvant	17, 25, 77
Dregvao Mainyu 22, 23, 26-28	
Druj 17-21, 23, 27, 28, 36, 53, 57, 77, 91, 136, 140	
Druj-i Nasush	27
Drujo Demāna .. 106-110, 118, 120	
Drvant	18, 25, 28
Duties of man	58
E	
Evil	17, 18, 24, 26
Evil Fravashi	38
F	
Farvardin Yasht 11, 31, 34, 40, 97, 100	
Frashem Ahūm 90, 92, 94, 95, 100	
Frashocharethra .. 94, 97, 101	
Frashokereti 90, 92, 94-97, 101, 103	
Frashaoshtra	63
Fravashi .. 21, 28-41, 52, 98	
G	
Garodemāna 7, 9, 83, 104-106, 111, 117, 118	
Gāthas 2, 10, 12, 14-16, 22, 25-27, 31, 41, 45, 49, 55, 67, 72, 73, 75, 77, 90, 92, 104-106, 110, 113-119, 124, 125, 128, 131, 132, 135, 137	

Rashnu 133, 140, 143
 Ratu 136
 Reason (Vohu Manangh) 4, 5, 9, 60,
 61, 70, 79, 83, 89, 92, 106, 107,
 123-128, 134
 Right Law .. 6, 127, 128, 134

S	PAGE
Saoshyants 33, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100	101
Self of Man	28
Sengha	133
Spenshta Mainyu 14, 16, 18, 22, 75	
Spenta	14, 96
Spenta Mainyu 12-14, 16, 18, 18-21,	30, 31, 75
Spirit of Evil	17
Spirit of Good	13
Spiritual Forces	30
Supreme Being 4, 8, 11, 12, 26	
Supreme Deity	3
Supreme Godhead	5
Sraosha 74, 106, 114, 115, 133-137,	140, 143
Staota .. 5, 8, 58, 59, 67, 68, 73	
Staota Yasna	95
Stavas	67
T	
Thraetaona	34, 97
Trinity	6, 124
Truth 9, 22, 23, 83, 122, 126, 127	
U	
Ukhda	133
Universe	14, 30, 39
Urvan 24, 28, 40, 41, 46, 52, 91,	110, 111, 120, 127
V	
Vahishta 83-85, 88, 106, 110, 118	
Vahishta Anghū 83, 86, 87, 104,	106, 111, 116-118, 120
Vahishta Mainyu 14, 75, 76, 105	
Vahishta Manangh 6, 7, 68, 76, 79,	107, 121, 124, 129

V—(concl'd.)	PAGE
Vahma	58, 67, 68, 104
Vendidad 26-28, 47-49, 54, 115, 116,	120, 143
Verezi Saoka	12
Vice 21, 53, 57, 65, 77, 108-110	
Vidhavih	12
Vishtāspa 34, 63, 97, 101, 135, 136	
Vispa Tasha	12
Vispa Vana	12
Vohu Manangh 34, 58, 60, 62, 75,	79, 83, 92, 106, 126, 131, 132,
	135
Vohunemangh	34
W	
Will .. 25, 106, 110, 134, 135	
Willing Self	46
Wisdom	9, 12
Y	
Yasna 5, 58, 59, 60, 62-68, 95, 115,	132
Yasna of Armaiti	62
Yasna of Mazda	65
Yasna of Vohu Manangh 62, 65	
Yavoi Vispāi	108
Yazata	10, 54, 93, 132,
	133
Yima	34, 97
Z	
Zamyāt Yasht 92, 94, 95, 100	
Zarathushtra 5, 34, 35, 47-49, 51,	58, 60, 63, 69, 70, 73, 74, 77,
	79, 80, 87, 88, 92, 97, 101, 106,
	111, 119, 121, 126-128, 134-136
Zevishtya	8

